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Computer Forensics involves the preservation, identification, extraction and 
documentation of computer evidence stored in the form of magnetically encoded 
information. With the proliferation of E-commerce initiatives and the increasing criminal 
activities on the web, this area of study is catching on in the IT industry and among the 
law enforcement agencies.  
 
The objective of the study is to explore the techniques of computer forensics from 
the computer security perspective. Specifically, the thesis looks into the application of 
forensic principles and techniques, security designs of computer hardware and software, 
and network protocols, in an effort to discover the trails of the computer hackers. The 
thesis subsequently packages this knowledge into a curriculum for a twelve weeks 
resident course at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
 
Complementing the course materials are surveys conducted on agencies and 
vendors currently providing computer forensic courses and training, reading materials, 
and software tools applicable to computer forensic investigation. The purpose of these 
surveys is to provide a depository of useful information related to this specialized 
discipline of computer security. 
 
It is the hope of the study that students in the future will benefit from the 
knowledge gathered in this thesis and the exposure gained from the course and laboratory 
exercises will allow them to correctly respond to computer intrusions and unauthorized 
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1 
DESCRIPTION OF THE THESIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the study is to explore the techniques of computer forensics from 
the computer security perspective and package this knowledge into a curriculum for a 
twelve week resident course at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Specifically, the 
thesis has looked into the application of forensic principles and techniques, security 
designs of computer hardware and software, and network protocols, in an effort to 
discover the trails of the computer hackers.  
This course is intended to provide students with an understanding of the 
fundamentals of computer forensics. Students will examine how information is stored in 
computer systems and how it may be deliberately hidden and subverted. The course will 
establish a sound theoretical foundation on the methods used in extracting information for 
evidential purposes before going on to emphasis practical forensic examination and 
analysis. It will also cover the techniques of computer evidence recovery and the 
successful presentation of such evidence before the court.  
Complementing the course materials are surveys conducted on agencies and 
vendors currently providing computer forensic courses and training, reading materials, 
and software tools applicable to computer forensic investigation. 
While it is not the purpose of this course to train students to become computer 
forensic experts within such a brief period of instruction, it is hoped that it can provide 
basic computer forensic knowledge to the Computer Science and Information 
Technology graduates. If more students from NPS become experienced in the 
fundamentals of computer forensics, then more Military Commands will be able to 
benefit from the capability of these graduates to correctly respond to computer intrusions 
and unauthorized activities on their C4I systems.   
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B. COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION IN NPS 
Educating students in the techniques of computer and network security demands 
an institution that is properly equipped with the necessary resources in order to stay 
current with both information system technology and advances in computer security 
threat, tools, techniques, solutions and risk containment. Students aspiring to become 
Information Security (INFOSEC) professionals must receive the relevant education and 
good training foundations to work effectively in a variety of INFOSEC situations. Since 
the underlying technologies are changing so rapidly, yesterday’s most significant 
problem and solution may be of no relevance tomorrow. As such, they need to be 
educated broadly enough to allow them to move rapidly to new problem areas and new 
technologies.  
During the “Goals for Computer Security Education” forum at NPS, Jim 
Schindler, a participant from HP, mentioned that technology is changing, computer 
paradigms are changing, and security requirements are changing. He considered security 
education a must for a much larger community than security professionals. [6] The 
explosive growth of information systems has resulted in rapidly changing technologies 
and challenges in computer security. Continued curriculum development is necessary to 
ensure a timely, coherent and comprehensive program in INFOSEC foundations and 
technology.  
NPS has fostered an academic environment to examine the INFOSEC 
requirements of the Department of Defense (DoD) and address the challenges presented 
by those requirements. It has developed a strong curriculum for computer and network 
security courses and continues to conduct leading-edge research in problems related to 
information assurance. These initiatives not only increase an appreciation of the 
foundations of computer security, but also heighten an understanding of the need to 
consider security throughout the entire process of system design and development. 
Through the Center for Information Assurance and INFOSEC Studies and Research 
(CISR), NPS has been producing a talent pool of computer security savvy graduates to 
apply to the variety of INFOSEC challenges in the DoD. [7] 
 
3 
C. WHY A COMPUTER FORENSIC COURSE IN NPS 
Computer and network security is not a discipline for the isolationist. Computer 
security education needs to produce individuals who have a broad understanding of the 
scope of the discipline as well as considerable knowledge and expertise in specific areas. 
[8] Computer forensics, the application of established forensic methodology in the 
examination of computer crime, is one of these specific areas that have gained increasing 
emphasis in large corporations and especially in the defense organizations. No longer are 
organizations content with relying solely on national Computer Emergency and Response 
Teams (CERT) or law enforcement agencies to perform investigation on suspected 
compromise in their computer systems. More and more of them are gearing up to arm 
themselves with in-house computer forensic skills to meet the increasing likelihood of 
threats to their “corporate lifelines”. Many organizations’ business functions will come to 
a halt if their network computer system collapses. No longer are they willing to rely 
solely on the advice of the CERT organizations or law enforcement agencies who are 
likely to shut off their entire system even if the suspected security compromise is only 
reported in a localized sector of the network. 
This developing trend is a result of numerous motivations. Given the volatile 
nature of digital information in the computer and magnetic media, digital evidence in the 
system can be potentially destroyed when one responds to a suspected intrusion, whether 
by “doing something or doing nothing”. As most computer security professionals will 
advocate, having an incident response plan is not just fashionable. From the instance an 
intrusion is detected, every additional action taken, whether trivial or not, can bring 
considerable consequence to the success of an investigation effort. Even having a 
thoroughly tested incident response plan is not fool-proofed. Responding to reported 
computer security incidents require constant evaluation of the effects observed so far, 
before taking the next step. However, if one is armed with basic knowledge in computer 
forensics, then one is more likely to be able to accurately anticipate the consequential 
effects. The likelihood of success that each action taken to contain the damage to the 
system and towards the investigation effort can also be dramatically improved. Arming 
computer security professionals within the organization with basic computer forensic 
skills can enable the organization to react correctly in the first few moments of a reported 
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computer security incident by facilitating the preservation of digital evidence for the 
subsequent investigation when the “big boys” or experts takeover the case.  
Due to increasingly confusing business client privacy legislation and the liability 
that an organization faces if its computer system has been used as a tool to attack another 
computer system, many organizations are finding it more attractive to conduct their own 
computer security incident investigations than report them to the authorities, unless they 
have already developed into an advanced stage that can no longer be hidden from the 
general public’s notice. Whenever feasible, organizations will prefer not to alarm their 
clients or risk their reputation by announcing or admitting the existence of a computer 
security incident. Not only will this blemish an organization’s standing in the industry 
and market competitiveness, it may also bring on the unwelcomed involvement of law 
enforcement agencies and media attention. Once an investigation has escalated to the 
point of law enforcement agency involvement, the confidentiality of the organization’s 
sensitive information on its clients, market strategy, competitive advantage initiatives and 
“dirty laundry” comes under the mercy of the external investigators. Thus, harnessing 
basic computer forensic skills in-house will enable organizations to conduct their own 
investigations and keep the incident within its own perimeter, especially for minor 
incidents that can be conveniently “swept under the carpet”.   
If an organization is an agency in a defense department, the argument for in-house 
computer forensic expertise is even greater. In this case, an alarm may not just cause a 
loss of public confidence, but also public panic, because DoD’s information is so 
pertinent to national security interests. Thus, it is not surprising that ministries, military 
establishments, and the state and defense departments all have their own computer 
forensic expertise in varying degrees. Since technology is the most effective force 
multiplier in modern combat, most defense and military organizations have invested 
heavily on C4I in their force structure. As such, computer technology, information 
protection and networking have become indispensable in the military infrastructure with 
military systems becoming increasingly dependent upon the national information 
infrastructure for critical services. A key aspect of achieving and maintaining information 
superiority is the protection of critical national information assets. In fact, “cyberwar”—
creating havoc in the national information infrastructure of an adversary—has been 
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identified by many armed forces as one of the important strategic options. Many defense 
organizations have placed considerable emphasis on safeguarding their C4I systems and 
mastering techniques to deny the enemy effective use of their C4I system. The detection 
of an initial computer attack could be an early warning sign of an impending military 
attack because, as is common in many military options, the first strike leading to the 
escalation to a full-blown war is generally an operative that will bring an asymmetric 
effect to the enemy and least risk of casualties to their own force. However, it is 
important for the military to be able to promptly distinguish between attacks carried out 
by “script kiddies” from the orchestrated attacks sponsored by state players. To this 
effect, defense organizations have, in tandem to their civilian law enforcement 
counterparts, developed advanced technologies in the discipline of computer forensics. 
Unfortunately, the opportunities for computer forensic training in defense organizations 
have been limited generally to individuals and agencies that are highly specialized in the 
area. Even though increasing numbers of subordinate Commands are developing and 
operating their own computer systems, most do not have any computer forensic 
considerations beyond their standard incident response plans. Thus, as with business 
corporations, it is becoming increasingly attractive for individual Military Commands to 
possess a sufficiently high level of computer forensics capabilities.  
To date, only the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS), United Kingdom, 
has a program leading to a Postgraduate Diploma or Master of Science in Forensic 
Computing. Thus it is imperative that NPS consider developing such a curriculum when 
the resources become available. As a start, it can provide basic computer forensic 
knowledge to the Computer Science and Information Technology graduates. If more 
students from NPS become experienced in the fundamentals of computer forensics, then 
more Military Commands will be able to correctly respond to detected computer 
intrusions and unauthorized activities on their C4I systems. It is this motivation that has 
lead to the formulation of computer forensic material for a potential Computer Forensic 
Course at NPS.  
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D. WHAT IS COMPUTER FORENSICS 
Computer forensics involves the preservation, identification, extraction, analysis, 
documentation and presentation of computer evidence. This computer evidence is useful 
in criminal cases, civil disputes, and human resources/employment proceedings. Many 
times computer evidence is created transparently by a computer’s operating system and 
without the knowledge of the computer user. Such information is often hidden from view 
so that special forensic software tools and techniques are required to preserve, identify, 
extract and document it. It is frequently this information that benefits law enforcement 
and military agencies the most while gathering evidence during an investigation.  
With the proliferation of computers in the workplace, it should be no surprise that 
computer technology is involved in a growing number of crimes. As more criminals use 
technology to achieve their goals and avoid apprehension, there is a developing need for 
specialists who can analyze and use digital evidence stored on and transmitted by 
computers. [2] As such, the discipline of computer forensic analysis has emerged to meet 
such needs. Computers can contain evidence in many ways, in electronic mail systems, 
on network servers and on individual's computers. However, due to the ease with which 
computer data can be manipulated, the search and analysis need to be performed by a 
trained computer forensic specialist, otherwise it will likely lead to evidence being either 
overlooked or rendered legally useless. 
 
E. SURVEY OF AGENCIES AND VENDORS PROVIDING COMPUTER 
FORENSIC COURSES AND TRAINING 
The field of computer forensic investigation is a relatively new addition to the 
forensic sciences. Computer forensic analysis requires a thorough and painstaking 
examination of digital evidence. This evidence may take the form of digitally stored 
documents, photographs, sounds, motion pictures, spreadsheets, databases, Internet 
history files, or any other recording in digital form. In addition, the examiner may be 
asked to retrieve these documents or recordings after they have been deleted, fragmented 
or encrypted. This mandates that the forensic examiner have a diverse set of both 
technical and investigative skills. Due to the exponential growth of computer technology 
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and the increasing rate of change in that technology, law enforcement and government 
agencies are unable to continually provide qualified computer forensic examiners. When 
the area of computer forensics was established more than a decade ago, there was no 
standard as to what comprises a basic or advanced computer forensic training, education 
or certification program. [9] Since then, there have been numerous activities and efforts 
by the industry and computer security agencies to define the concepts and structures of 
computer forensics. Currently, training in computer forensics is widely available. It is 
offered by government, private and academic organizations, with some programs are only 
available for law enforcement officers. A list of the agencies and vendors providing 
computer forensic courses and training is detailed in Appendix A. These may prove to be 
valuable sources for maintaining staff expertise and course currency in the future. 
 
F. SURVEY OF READINGS ON COMPUTER FORENSIC  
The number of published books, journals and articles related to computer 
forensics has blossomed dramatically in recent years. Many of these books and 
publications are written within the last three years. In addition, many credible sources of 
information related to computer forensics can be found on the websites of numerous 
interest groups, INFOSEC agencies, law enforcement organizations and vendors 
providing computer security solutions. While it is not possible to read and comment all of 
these materials, a list of books on computer forensics has been provided in Appendix B 
with brief editorial reviews and selected readers’ comments. It is hoped that this list will 
facilitate the lecturer and student who is interested in reading material that is beyond the 
scope of the course.  
 
G. SURVEY OF TOOLS FOR COMPUTER FORENSIC INVESTIGATION  
The use of computer forensics tools is invaluable in gathering computer forensics 
information. Computer forensic software tools can be used to identify passwords, 
backdated files, network logins, files stored in a computers memory and the hard disk; 
and associate an external document to a specific computer. A list of popular computer 
forensics toolkits is consolidated in Appendix C. Due to relatively limited demands for 
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such specialized toolkits, most of these computer forensic suites are not widely advertised 
or promoted.  
Examining a computer for forensic evidence generally requires another computer 
and a set of forensics tools. Various developers and vendors of computer forensic 
analysis software have their own unique perspective on the needs of the investigative 
community and their own approach as to how to meet those needs. An investigator would 
naturally desire a forensic analysis toolbox to have all possible forensic capabilities. 
However, in reality, there is no such a universal toolbox. What the various developers 
and vendors have produced is a suite of tools that meets a significant majority of an 
investigator’s needs. James Holley’s Meeting Computer Forensic Analysis Requirements 
[5], which are summarized in Appendix D, provides an overview of such requirements. 
 
H. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPUTER FORENSIC COURSE 
This course is intended to provide students with an understanding of the 
fundamentals of computer forensics. Students will examine how information is stored in 
computer systems and how it may be deliberately hidden and subverted. The course will 
establish a sound theoretical foundation on the methods used in extracting information for 
evidential purposes before going on to emphasis practical forensic examination and 
analysis. It will also cover the techniques of computer evidence recovery and the 
successful presentation of such evidence before the court.  
Laboratory facilities will be used to introduce students to the use of common 
computer forensic tools, the principle of original integrity, disk examination, logging and 
preparation of evidence. Further descriptions of the laboratory exercises are found in the 
section on Laboratory Setup and Instruction Manual. 
Recommended prerequisites for the Computer Forensic Course shall ideally 
include the incumbent CS3600—Introduction to Computer Security and CS3670—
Secure Management of Systems. These computer security foundation courses will 
provide students with a good understanding of the security mechanisms that are in place 
in most computer systems and how they can aid in the recovery of digital evidence in a 
forensic analysis. Exposures to hacking techniques and tools in CS3675—Internet 
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Security Resources and Policy, will further enhance the students’ appreciation on the 
characteristics of genetic tracks left behind by these security exploits. However, this 
course is not an absolute prerequisite.   
Based on the scope and magnitude of the course materials, weekly instruction 
with three hours of lectures and two hours of laboratory exercises should be adequate for 
the students to complete the syllabus at a comfortable pace, with opportunities to clarify 
doubts during classes and considering the occasional cancellation of classes on official 
holidays within an academic quarter.    
 
I. MATERIALS FOR COURSE LECTURES 
The course materials were gathered from various books, journals and on-line 
articles. In order to support a course that provides wide coverage of many relevant topics, 
much of the content is derived from the main sources described below. 
Materials on the application of forensic methodology in a computer crime 
investigation were extracted from Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic 
Science, Computers, and the Internet by Eoghan Casey. [2] The Handbook of Computer 
Crime Investigation: Forensic Tools & Technology, which is edited by Eoghan Casey [3] 
consists of chapters written by a few top experts, provided materials for the three aspects 
of the course. It provided a good description of some of the leading computer forensic 
tools, simple to read technical information for collecting and analyzing digital evidence, 
and case examples of the technical, legal and practical challenges in real computer 
investigations. 
The on-line Computer Forensics Column from the Doctor Dobb's Journal column 
by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema [4] provided good technical coverage on forensic 
techniques for the Unix and Linux environment. Some of the materials were also 
borrowed from the Unix Computer Forensics Analysis Class that was conducted at the 
IBM Thomas J Watson Research Center in August 1999. These on-line materials are free 
and available on either www.fish.com/security/ddj.html or www.porcupine.org/forensics. 
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Last but not least, The Process of Network Security: Design and Managing a Safe 
Network by Thomas Wadlow [10] helped to fill in the management perspectives on 
responding to computer-related incidents and advice on how to facilitate the activities of 
a computer forensic investigation.  
While a course text is not absolutely necessary, the Handbook of Computer Crime 
Investigation: Forensic Tools & Technology, by Eoghan Casey, is a recommended 
reference text. Students who are unfamiliar with Unix or Linux can refer to the on-line 
Computer Forensics Column from the Doctor Dobb's Journal column series by Dan 
Farmer and Wietse Venema. 
 
J. CONTENTS OF THE COURSE  
The course content is organized into the following twelve sections, each covering  
a specific area related to the topic. 
 
1. Cyber Crime & Incident Response 
This section starts with an explanation on how computers and networks 
could be used as instruments for crime, the types of cyber crimes and computer 
crime prosecution. Incident response is described in terms of the necessary 
reaction measures, procedural steps and priorities, investigation checklist and risk 
management.      
 
2. Introduction to Computer Forensics 
This introduction to computer forensics focuses on the collection and use 
of digital evidence, hardware, information media and physical evidence. It also 
describes the controversies of whether to turn the computer off or leave it running 
when an attack is detected and on reporting the computer crime to the law 




3. Application of Forensic Science to Computers  
Computer forensics applies the basic principles of forensic science to 
computer crime investigation. It describes the fundamentals and highlights issues 
pertaining to the recognition, preservation, collection, documentation, 
classification, comparison, individualization and reconstruction of the digital 
evidence.   
 
4. Structure for Forensic Investigations  
The structural requirements for forensic investigations emphasizes the 
importance of preserving the integrity of the digital evidence by first testing the 
reliability of the forensic tools used for formulating the leads in the investigations. 
It also highlights some of the specific issues related to data and evidence 
recovery. The last part of this section describes ways to characterize an intrusion 
and how an examiner’s mindset can influence the success of the investigation.  
 
5. Computer Forensic Procedures 
This section steps through the common computer forensic procedures in 
details. It differentiates the differences between physical from logical 
examinations. It also highlights the challenges of investigating criminal activities, 
problems of gaining access to the relevant data, opportunities for tampering and 
the chain of trust. Understanding the data storage and its logical abstraction are 
necessary for preparing, imaging, processing, filtering, preserving and 
reconstructing the evidentiary images. Thereafter, the digital evidence shall be 
indexed and bates numbered for electronic management and future reference. 
 
6. Forensics using MAC Times 
MAC Times represent the last time a file was modified, accessed or had its 
attributed changed. The analysis of the MAC Times has often been invaluable in 
helping the examiner understand how files in the system were manipulated or 
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deleted during the crime. The section also cautions how the MAC Times could be 
subjected to tampering.  
 
7. Forensics on Windows 
This section starts with an introduction of the Windows master file table 
and metafiles for the NT file system and the folder entries for the file allocation 
table. It goes on to describe the characteristics of the recycle bin, shortcut files, 
registry entries, printer spool and operating system logs for the system events, 
internet information server, Exchange mail server, Outlook mail client and Active 
Directory; and how digital evidence can be recovered from these information 
depositories. 
 
8. Forensics on Unix 
Similar to the previous section, this section starts with an introduction of 
the user permissions, shared files and system services. The numerous standard 
logs and the Shell history files in the Unix operating system commonly provide a 
rich source of digital evidence. The section also describes the process of restoring 
information from backup tapes and on duplicating the hard drive. It notes that 
some of the system events are not necessarily recorded in the system logs and 
how entries in these logs can be manipulated or tampered. Understanding the 
details of the Unix file system, the file attributes, and their logical and physical 
properties, is necessary to comprehend the effects of file deletion and in 
recovering the erased tracks. 
 
9. Forensics on the Networks  
Computer forensics on the networks poses numerous challenges and 
difficulties due to the voluminous, transient and dispersed nature of the 
information on the network activities. This section describes how information on 
the network traffic could be collected and reconstructed for evidentiary purposes. 
In particular, the Netflow records, dialup server logs, network sniffer, TCP logs 
13 
and the various logs in the Unix and Windows operating system, address 
resolution cache at the datalink layer and intrusion detection system are valuable 
sources for finding digital evidence on the network activities. Similarly, there are 
also reliability and time synchronization problems related to these logs that the 
examiner must take into considerations. The final part of this section deals with 
network forensics on the application layer, such as emails, relay chat and the 
Internet. 
 
10. Forensics on an Unknown Program  
Identifying an unknown program requires analysis tools to study clues in 
the symbol tables and embedded strings in order to understand exploit code and 
backdoor code. Valuable information can be gathered from the system 
configuration, system and user programs, system and kernel memory, raw 
memory and the disk, or from the IP hostnames. This section also gives an 
example showing the determining of an unknown program that was installed 
through a compromised root account. 
 
11. Forensics on Intrusion Activities 
This section brings together the knowledge from the previous sections to 
perform forensic examinations on intrusion activities and reconstruction of the 
user activities. It looks at some of the unmistakable rootkit signatures and the 
tools and methods for collecting the digital evidence in areas such as program 
analysis, memory examination, remote network examination, process capture and 
system call trace. A forensic case example is also used in the latter part of the 
section to step through an investigation of a suspected intrusion, with follow up 
actions and a post mortem. 
 
12. Forensics on Wireless Network 
Forensic examinations on the wireless network centers mainly on the 
mobile phone network, covering areas such as the circuit switched wireless 
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network, the mobile device, the SIM card, the switching center, the various 
registries, the operational and maintenance center, encryption, billing database, 
wiretapping and location-based services. This section concludes with a brief 
description on the analysis of the 802.11 wireless local area network. 
 
K. LABORATORY EXERCISES  
Since computer security education and training is not an abstract academic 
discipline, it lends itself to the use of laboratory exercises. Formal classroom instruction 
needs to be augmented with case study analysis and projects necessary to impart such 
analytic and technical skills. [1] In addition, laboratory exercises help students 
understand and internalize key concepts. The use of tools and methods from both 
academic programs and industry can help instructors build useful laboratory programs to 
clarify the concepts and provide interesting challenges for the students. 
The objective of the course is not to train students in the details of a particular 
product or to pass a standardized classroom test. Rather, the focus is on developing the 
students’ analytical skills to tackle any computer security incidents that may arise. A set 
of laboratory exercises is thus designed to illustrate the computer forensic concepts being 
taught in class. Students will learn to use operating system tools and rootkits to extract 
useful digital evidence as well as lay their hands on professional computer forensic 
software. 
 
L. SUMMARY OF THE LABORATORY EXERCISES 
The laboratory manual is organized into seven sections covering the main topic 
areas in the course. 
 
1. Foundstone Forensic Toolkit 
The Foundstone Forensic Toolkit contains several Win32 command line 
tools to help examine files on an NTFS disk partition for unauthorized activity. 
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These open source tools scan the disk for hidden files and data streams, and list 
them with their MAC time without tampering the data attributes on the disk. 
 
2. EnCase (Guidance Software) 
EnCase is a powerful and non-invasive computer forensic tool featuring 
a graphical user interface that enables examiners to easily manage large volumes 
of computer evidence and view files, file slack and unallocated data. The 
integrated functionality of EnCase allows the examiner to perform all functions of 
the computer forensic investigation process, from the initial previewing of a target 
drive, the acquisition of the evidentiary images, the search and recovery of the 
data and the final reporting of findings, all within the same application. 
 
3. AccessData Forensic Toolkit 
The AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) is a handy utility offering a 
complete suite for performing forensic examinations of computer systems. Its full 
text indexing offers quick advanced searching capabilities. Its deleted file 
recovery and file slack analysis are commendable. FTK is also interoperable with 
other AccessData utilities such as password recovery and encryption file 
identification programs. In addition, the FTK incorporates Stellent's Outside In 
Viewer Technology to access over 255 different file formats. The Known File 
Filter (KFF) feature can be used to automatically pull out benign files that are 
known not to contain any potential evidence and flags known problem files for 
the investigator to immediately examine. FTK can also support evidence files 
acquired by EnCase, Snapback, SafeBack and Linux DD. 
 
4. Windows Event Log Analysis 
Microsoft WinNT/2K can be configured to log events in binary files to 
record System events, Application events and Security events. These event logs 
store the descriptive messages in the registry and the separate executables or 
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dynamic link library files. The Event Viewer combines and displays the 
information in these files, providing a convenient way to view the data. 
Consequently, copying event log files from one system to another for examination 
may result in misinterpretation when viewing event logs on a remote system. The 
Event Viewers will read the event record data from the remote log files, but will 
search the registry of the local system for the corresponding event message files. 
Unless the forensic PC have similar configuration to the imaged system, it is 
necessary to extract all the registry keys and event message files from the image. 
By viewing the extracted logs using the Event Viewer, it is possible to create a 
short list of missing event message files and configure them in the forensic PC 
accordingly. Otherwise, the Event Viewer will not display explanatory material 
for any event for which there is no associated event message file.  
 
5. DumpEvt (SomarSoft) 
It is evident from the previous exercise, the clumsiness of performing 
manual Windows event log analysis on a remote forensic PC. Moreover 
displaying the logs using the Event Viewer is not very conducive for analysis 
since the Event Viewer is not integrated with other data processing tools. Besides, 
performing separate log analysis on individual machines in a networked 
environment does not readily link a related event across multiple machines. 
Rather, importing the contents of multiple machines’ log files into a spreadsheet 
makes it easier to sort events chronologically and search the logs simultaneously. 
DumpEvt is a utility designed to dump multiple event logs in a format suitable for 
importing into a database to facilitate more event log analysis. 
 
6. Unix Log Analysis 
Unix serves as a wonderful training ground for computer security 
specialists. It teaches about access permissions for objects, builds on MS-DOS 
knowledge, and expands on MS-DOS piping and redirection capabilities. Using 
Unix scripting capabilities similar to DOS batch file, an investigator can create 
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combinations of commands into specialized programs to conduct security audits 
and to do granular file searching. The Unix system also has a comprehensive set 
of system configuration files that can prove to be an invaluable source of 
information.  
 
7. Network Analysis 
Analyzer is a fully configurable network analysis program for Win32 
environment. It captures packets from network and displays them through a user- 
friendly graphical interface. Analyzer is capable of capturing packets from the 
network for real time monitoring and creating capture files. It allows the examiner 
to describe the protocol format, customize the display of the packets, evaluate 
statistics, plot graphs, set query on the analysis engine and set filter to record 
packets at the MAC, Network, Transport or Application Layer.  
 
The intention of the laboratory exercise is not to spoon-feed students with step-
by-step instructions on how to conduct a forensic examination. Rather, students will be 
expected to actively search for the relevant information, user instructions, software 
downloads, and put into practice the course concepts, in carrying out the exercises. This 
is to build up their resourcefulness and creativity towards tackling future forensic 
examinations. Pertinent technical guidance is included in each of the exercises in order to 
help them get started.  
All the exercises will require students to have access to the Internet to download 
the software tools and if required, seek clarifications or technical support from the vendor 
on emails. However, this does not necessarily require the forensic machines to be 
connected to the external network. Rather, some of the exercises only require a 
standalone forensic machine with evidence already captured on a diskette, while others 
only require the forensic machine to be interconnected with the subject machines in a 
local area network. Implicit in the laboratory instructions is the preparation of the 
relevant evidence files by the laboratory technician for the students’ forensic 
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investigations. Subject evidence issued to the student project groups shall preferably 
contain subtle differences between the groups to discourage duplications.  
The laboratory exercise involving the EnCase forensic tool will require the 
forensic machine to be attached with a physical dongle on its parallel or USB port. This is 
a copyright protection feature. The user name and the corresponding password distributed 
with the licensed software are also necessary for downloading the latest software version 
of the forensic tool from the Guidance Software’s website. All the other laboratory 
exercises are based on the inherent operating system utilities, freeware or demonstration 
software, which can be obtained from the relevant websites without cost. The 
demonstration software may include certain restrictions on its functionalities. 
Nevertheless, they are adequate for students to fulfill the laboratory requirements.   
 
M. CONCLUSION 
Becoming a computer forensic expert demands more training and experience than 
the brief introduction that can be afforded by this course. Computer forensics warrants 
technical expertise across a wide range of operating systems, hardware, and network 
devices and protocols. It is thus not the aim of this thesis to develop a course that will 
encompass all the necessary technical disciplines in order to produce graduates who will 
immediately become computer forensic experts. Rather it is hoped that the knowledge 
and laboratory exposure gained from the course will allow them to correctly respond to 
detected computer intrusions and unauthorized activities they may encountered on their 
C4I systems and facilitate those who aspire to become a full-fledged computer forensic 
expert, to start with by equipping them with the fundamentals in this specialized 
discipline of computer security. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF AGENCIES AND VENDORS PROVIDING 
COMPUTER FORENSIC COURSES AND TRAINING 
1. AccessData Corporation 
www.accessdata.com 
 
AccessData Corporation has been doing business in the computer forensic and 
cryptography fields since 1987 and has established itself as a password recovery 
expert. Since then, AccessData has developed a trusted relationship with the US 
Government, state and local law enforcement, and corporate America. To help 
keep government agencies and corporate security departments up to date with 
current computer forensic technology, AccessData has developed training 
seminars to help both the novice and expert computer specialists.  
 
A 4-day Computer Forensic Training Class costs $1600 (not inclusive of 
software). The course covers basic computer forensic fundamentals and training 
on AccessData's Forensic Toolkit, Password Recovery Toolkit, and Distributed 
Network Attack Toolkit.  
 
2. ASR Data Acquisition and Analysis 
www.asrdata.com 
 
ASR Data Acquisition and Analysis is a leading authority in the field of 
computer investigations by the United States Department of Justice. It provides 
software solutions, training and technical support to meet the needs of law 
enforcement agencies.  
 
ASR offers six computer forensic courses, namely the Data Acquisition 
Protocols Course, the Data Analysis Protocols Course and the Computer Crime 
Investigative Techniques Course for either DOS/Windows or Macintosh. These 
courses are geared toward the use of the Expert Witness, an automated 
computer forensic application created by ASR. 
 
3. Berryhill Computer Forensic 
www.computerforensic.com 
 
Berryhill Computer Forensic provides computer forensic services to law 
enforcement agencies, attorneys, private investigators and businesses. It owns 
expertise and experience in handling evidence in criminal and civil cases, and 
also facilities to secure sensitive material. It caters mainly to law enforcement 
agencies in the Californian region. The Computer Forensic in Law Enforcement 
Course provides basic training in computer seizure procedures and computer 




4.  CompuForensic 
www.compuforensic.com 
 
As a small business, CompuForensic offers computer forensic training in 
association with the Wright State University (WSU) in Ohio and Southern 
Methodist University (SMU) in Texas. CompuForensic specializes in the 
development of high quality computer forensic training. Previously restricted 
to full-time government employees or a select group of corporate security 
investigators, the computer forensic training is now available to the general 
public through the two universities.  
 
A 4-day Basic Computer Forensic Initial Response Team Training costs 
$1995. It also includes the issue of commercially licensed software such 
as Norton Utilities, Quick View plus, Partition Magic, Norton Ghost and 
selected Maresware forensic utilities. The course is designed to equip 
computer investigators and analysts with the skills needed to safely locate and 
secure computer evidence at the search site.  
 
A 4-day Advanced Computer Forensic Initial Response Team Training costs 
$1495 and employs the same software coupled with a major Linux 
distribution. A 1-day Program Manager’s Course is designed for managers 
involved in supporting and supervising computer forensic operations.  
 
5.  Computer Sciences Corporation 
www.csc.com 
 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) administers the Department of 
Defense Computer Investigations Training Program (DCITP) computer 
forensic program under contract to train the Department of Defense (DoD) 
criminal and counterintelligence investigators in computer forensic.  
 
A 3-week Field Forensic Examinations curriculum is patterned after the 
Preparation, Preservation, Duplication, Investigation and Reporting (PPDIR) 
framework. It emphasizes on the evidence chain of custody and technical 
investigative software tools.  Students are given three days to conduct an 
actual graded practical examination of a computer hard drive without 
technical assistance. Students also participate in a half-day mock trial where 
actual trial and defense attorneys question and cross-examine them on their 
findings from the graded examination. 
 
6.  Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science 
www.cranfield.ac.uk 
 
The Center for Forensic Computing in Cranfield University, Royal Military 
College of Science (RMCS) is one of the very few institutions offering 
Forensic Computing postgraduate education leading to a Masters of Science 
(3 years part-time program) or Postgraduate Diploma (2 years part-time 
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(3 years part-time program) or Postgraduate Diploma (2 years part-time 
program). It also offers short courses such as the Forensic Computing 
Foundation Course, Forensic Internet Course, and the Forensic Network 
Course. These 2-week short courses are also taught and discussed at the 
postgraduate level.  
 
These courses provide an understanding of the principles and practical 
methods employed in the extraction of information for evidential purposes 
from computer systems. They examine how information may be stored in 
computer systems and how it may be deliberately hidden and subverted, 
thereby to gain an understanding of the methods and techniques used in the 
extraction of information for evidential purposes.  
 
7.  Department of Defense Computer Investigations Training Program  
www.dcitp.gov 
 
The Department of Defense Computer Investigations Training Program 
(DCITP) is dedicated to the development and delivery of computer 
investigative training for the following DoD elements: Defense Computer 
Forensic Lab (DCFL), Air Force Office Of Special Investigations (AFOSI), 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Army Criminal Investigations 
Division (CID), Military Intelligence Group (IWB), Defense Criminal 
Investigative Service (DCIS). The DCITP offers a healthy variety of computer 
forensic short courses. 
 
A 3-day Introduction to Computer Search and Seizure Course is designed to 
provide knowledge to properly seize and maintain the evidence value of 
computer media.  
 
The System Administrator Incident Preparation and Response Course is a 
computer- based training distributed by Data Interchange Standards 
Association (DISA). It provides instructions in computer crime activities and 
specific practices to protect computer systems and support computer 
investigations.  
 
The Basic Evidence Recovery Techniques Course is a scenario-based course 
for general computer-related crime. It includes extensive practice on imaging 
media on DOS and Windows 95/98. The course concludes with the creation of 
a case folder containing evidence for forensic analysis.  
 
The Basic Forensic Examinations is a scenario-based course that focuses on 
media analysis. Principles of forensic analysis are presented with tools 
commonly used in the field, such as Encase. Students will learn preparation, 
image restoration, both FAT and NTFS file and directory structures, recovery 
of deleted files, and other analysis topics. The course concludes with the 




The Incident Response in a Network Environment Course is a scenario-based 
course on network intrusions. Students will learn basic system administrator 
functions and extract information of evidentiary value from log files, user 
information and access rights. Students are given extensive practice on 
collecting images in a network environment.  
 
The Managing Computer Investigations Course familiarizes students with the 
duties and activities common to the computer crime investigators. 
 
The Field Investigations in a Solaris Environment Course prepares students to 
perform in-depth investigative functions in a Solaris operating system 
environment. This is a scenario-based course. Students will complete an 
investigation by performing forensic media analysis and log file analysis on a 
Solaris network.  
 
The Field Investigations in a Windows NT/2K Environment Course prepares 
students to perform in-depth investigative functions in a NT/W2K operating 
system environment. Students will complete an investigation by performing 
forensic media analysis and log file analysis across a NT/W2K network.  
 
8.  DIBS USA Inc 
www.dibsusa.com 
 
DIBS USA Inc is a privately owned, independent corporation specializing in 
forensic computing, with activities in three main areas, namely the design, 
manufacture and supply of a range of computer forensic equipment; the 
provision of computer forensic analysis services and the training of 
investigators in computer forensic techniques and practice.  
 
A 1-day intensive introductory course, Understanding Computer Forensic, 
costing $469, provides an overview in computer forensic theory and practice. 
This course is appropriate for professionals in related fields but not for those 
specializing primarily in computer forensic.  
 
A 2-day course, Computer Forensic – The Essential Techniques, is designed 
to give a more solid foundation in the theory and practice of essential 
computer forensic techniques. The practical aspects of the course involves a 
number of simulated investigations on how to make image copies using the 
range of DIBS equipment for analysis and presentation to court. The course is 
suitable only for beginner with little previous experience or the more 
experienced computer operator wishing to learn basic forensic techniques. 





9.  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
www.fbi.gov 
 
The Computer Training Unit (CTU) at the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) Academy provides investigative computer instructions, training, and 
curriculum development to FBI and other foreign law enforcement personnel. 
Primarily, CTU trains its students on how to use the computer as an 
investigative tool, computer fraud, computer crimes, intrusions, search and 
seizure of computer as well as how to use the computer as a source of 
information. 
 
10.  Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
www.fletc.gov 
 
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) serves as an 
interagency law enforcement training organization for numerous Federal 
agencies throughout US. The center also provides services to state, local and 
international law enforcement agencies. 
 
The Seized Computer Evidence Recovery Specialist Training Program 
introduces the concept of automated data processing and the techniques and 
procedures for investigative computer search, seizure and analysis issues of a 
multitude of operating systems. The curriculum also addresses the legal issues 
related to computer evidence. 
 
11.  Foundstone 
www.foundstone.com 
 
With a combination of outstanding personnel and industry-leading 
methodologies, Foundstone delivers computer-security services in consulting 
and education. It provides professional services in penetration testing, e-
commerce application testing, incident response and computer forensics, 
product testing, wireless security testing as well as expertise in Microsoft 
environments utilizing ISA Server technology. 
 
A 4-day Incident Response & Computer Forensic Course deals with forensic 
techniques to recognize, respond to, and recover from insider and outsider 
attacks. Students learn the science of incident response through presentations 
and hands-on lab exercises. This includes an in-depth study of the computer 
forensics process from creating evidentiary disk images to recognizing the 
often-faint trail of unauthorized activity. Students will also learn step-by-step 
incident-response procedures for Unix and Windows NT/2K. Lab Exercises 
include forensic analysis of victimized systems, review of network traffic and 
intrusion-log, review of backdoor tools that circumvent intrusion-detection 
systems, determining the function of unidentified processes, detection of 
loadable kernel modules, rootkits and trojans. The course costs $3500. 
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loadable kernel modules, rootkits and trojans. The course costs $3500. 
 
12.  Fred Cohen & Associates 
www.all.net 
 
Fred Cohen & Associates is one of the world’s leading researcher and 
corporate consultant in the area of information protection. It specializes in 
top-level assessment of corporate protection programs, strategic scenario 
development for national policy decisions, risk management support for large 
multinational corporations, strategic program planning, Internet firewall 
suitability assessments, electronic commerce architecture analysis and 
effectiveness testing for critical infrastructure elements. 
 
The Digital Forensic Course is a self-paced CD-ROM instruction providing a 
comprehensive overview of digital forensic with a slight focus on the Unix 
operating environment and examples from many other sorts of systems. It 
includes viewgraphs covering a wide range of topics in digital forensic, audio 
recordings and examples from real cases. A copy of the CD-ROM costs $249.  
 
13.  Guidance Software 
www.guidancesoftware.com 
 
Guidance Software is one of the leaders in computer forensic software, 
acquisition hardware and training. Guidance Software is well known for 
developing EnCase, a comprehensive software that handles every stage of 
computer forensic investigations, from the preview and acquisition of an 
evidence drive to the generation of a final report. 
 
Guidance Software offers three training courses on the EnCase Computer 
Forensic Methodology at the introductory, intermediate and advanced level. 
The introductory course introduces students to the field of computer forensic.  
The intermediate course addresses data recovery techniques. The advanced 
course involves advanced data recovery techniques and an in-depth study of 
file systems. The course fees for each of the 4-day course are $2000, $2500 
and $3000 respectively.  
 
14.  High Tech Crime Consortium 
www.hightechcrimecops.org 
 
The High Tech Crime Consortium (HTCC) provide practical information and 
hands-on training on evidence seizure, handling and storage, legal 
requirements and search warrant preparation, computer criminal behavior 
analysis and guidelines for planning, personnel considerations, field seizure 
team development 
 
The HTCC proposal for a Certificate in Computer Forensic consists of 45 
quarter hours curriculum for basic computer forensic, high technology 
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quarter hours curriculum for basic computer forensic, high technology 
incident response, high technology vulnerability assessments, risk 
management and high technology infrastructure protection management. Two 
other specialty courses, Computing Forensic I and Computing Forensic II are 
taught using computer-based instructions. 
 
15.  High Tech Investigators Association  
www.htcia.org 
 
The High Technology Crime Investigation Association (HTCIA) is an 
organization designed to encourage, promote, aid and effect the voluntary 
interchange of data, information, experience, ideas and knowledge about 
methods, processes, and techniques relating to investigations and security in 
advanced technologies among its membership. It organizes regular computer 
forensic training conferences for law enforcement personnel under its 
Regional Training Program. These training conferences are restricted only to 
law enforcement personnel.  
 
16.  High Tech Crime Network 
www.htcn.org 
 
The High Tech Crime Network (HTCN) issues certifications on a variety of 
high tech crime related topics through courses provided by its list of approved 
agencies, organizations or companies. HTCN does not directly provide such 
training. Rather, it offers both basic and advanced certifications for Certified 
Computer Crime Investigator, Certified Computer Forensic Technician, 
Certified Computer Crime Prosecutor, Certified Computer Crime Attorney 
and the Certified Network Security Professional. These certifications are 
issued as a result of acquiring the required experience, course hours and 
successfully completing a written test. They serve to provide a higher degree 
of professionalism and continued training and support within the high tech 
crime industry. The cost for each of the certifications is $250. 
 
17.  Institute of Police Technology and Management, University of North Florida 
www.iptm.org 
 
The Institute of Police Technology and Management (IPTM), University of 
North Florida is established to provide specialty training to law enforcement 
agencies in community policing. 
 
A 5-day Computer Crime Investigations Course is designed to train law 
enforcement investigators in the latest techniques of modern computer crime 
investigation. The course includes practice on preparing search warrant 
documents for the seizure of a suspect’s computer, how to image and examine 
the system for evidence relating to a criminal offense, and how to present this 
evidence for prosecution. It also includes the use of the Internet to conduct 
follow-up investigative work pursuant to an ongoing investigation. The cost 
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follow-up investigative work pursuant to an ongoing investigation. The cost 
fee is $795.  
 
18.  International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists 
www.cops.org  
 
The International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) 
is a volunteer non-profit corporation composed of law enforcement 
professionals dedicated to education in the field of forensic science. The 
international computer investigative organization provides both a network for 
trained investigators and an annual basic training conference for law 
enforcement professionals. 
 
The Law Enforcement Computer Forensic Training is a 2-week course 
costing $1395. It consists of both classroom and hands-on training. The 
course outlines generic computer crime investigations, such as interpreting 
and tracing email, identification of electronic evidence and the proper 
collection method to preserve the integrity of such evidence. The course also 
includes sector level examination and analysis of hard disks and removable 
media, data recovery, identification and handling of data destructive software 
schemes, encryption theory and decryption techniques. After completion of 
the 2-week course, a basic examiner is required to complete a set of forensic 
investigation problems via home study before receiving certification. The 
students are given one year to complete the hands-on technical examinations 
on the issued computer media without the use of any automated forensic 
processing software. 
 




The International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and 
Training (IADLEST) is an international organization whose mission is to 
research, develop and share information, ideas and innovations in establishing 
effective and defensible standards for employment and training of law 
enforcement officers. Its primary focus is criminal justice standards and 
training. It does not directly conduct any formal computer forensic training, 
but offers a list of computer forensic courses conducted by the Law 
Enforcement Training Center, the Police Training Institute, and the Institute 
of Police Technology and Management. 
 
20.  Internet Crimes, Inc 
www.internetcrimes.com 
 
Internet Crimes, Inc is a subsidiary of PowerPhone, Inc. It offers on-site, 
hands on training for law enforcement agents, government officials, attorneys, 
and computer security professionals in the area of Internet crime 
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and computer security professionals in the area of Internet crime 
investigations. Its staff includes computer crime investigators and attorneys 
who have worked on computer crimes cases. Internet Crimes, Inc. is one of 
the official training provider for the High Technology Crime Network 
(HTCN).  
 
A 5-day Computer Crime Investigators Certification Program costs $649. The 
topics covered include examples of computer crimes, introduction to 
computer forensic, computer evidence collection and crime specific 
investigations.  
 
A 3-day Computer Fraud and Financial Crime Investigation Program costs 
$599. Topics covered include introduction on theft of identity, intellectual 
property, fraud, piracy, scams, counterfeiting and the relevant investigative 
tools and techniques. 
 
21.  Key Computer Service, Inc 
www.keycomputer.net 
 
Key Computer Service, Inc. is a small corporation that specializes in 
computer forensic. It has a full range of technical and investigative expertise 
providing computer forensic examination, data recovery, password recovery 
and other electronic data services. In addition, it also provides self-paced on-
line training in computer forensic and data recovery. 
 
The Computer Forensic Course is broken up into five modules and the fee for 
the on-line instructions is $2250. The course covers processes and 
methodologies to conduct forensic examinations and the recovery of evidence 
and data from magnetic media with the use of specially prepared practical 
exercises. The practical exercises will require students to create and verify 
forensically sterile examination media, to create forensic boot diskettes, to 
make forensic copies of media, to find and recover deleted, formatted, hidden 
and lost data, to access mail, cache and other internet related files, to unlock 
passwords, data format conversion, to provide opinions regarding 
examinations and a complete hands-on examination of a specially prepared 
hard disk drive with real life forensic issues.  Software provided as part of the 
course includes the Wiper, FreeSecs and DiskDupe disk utilities, ListDrv and 
ChkSum.  
 
The Data Recovery Course is broken into three modules and the fee for the 
on-line instructions is $1650. The course covers physical crash recovery 
techniques, as well as data recovery from raw media that has no directory or 
sub-directory listings. The on-line instruction is also accompanied with 




22.  Knowledge Solutions Campus 
www.forensic-science.com 
 
Knowledge Solutions specializes in delivering on-line instructions on forensic 
science. It has onboard, qualified and experienced instructors who have done 
leading edge casework in their fields. One of the instructors is Eoghan Casey, 
an author and editor of several books on computer forensic. Lesson plans and 
assignments are posted weekly as web pages with web-based discussion 
forum to allow interaction among fellow students and the instructor, post 
questions and exchange ideas. Students are expected to spend about 5 hours 
per week for the on-line instructions. 
 
Knowledge Solutions offers a range of courses on forensic sciences, and four 
modular courses specifically on computer forensic. The Introduction to 
Internet Crime Course, and the Introduction to Digital Evidence and 
Computer Crime Course are both 3-week long, each costing $75. The 
Investigating Internet Crime Course and Advanced Digital Evidence Course 
are 10-week long and cost $225 each. These courses are based on material in 
Eoghan Casey’s book on Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic 
Science, Computers, and the Internet. 
 
23.  Kroll 
www.krollworldwide.com 
 
Kroll is a leading risk-consulting company offering professional services in 
analysis of intelligence, assessment of threats and implementation of 
measures to offset risks relating to a wide range of current and potential 
difficulties. They include internal controls, employee or vendor malfeasance, 
threats to corporate security, intellectual property theft, and financial 
improprieties.  
 
The Kroll Information Security Group provides a variety of courses designed 
for forensic and network investigative certifications. The Introduction to 
Technology Crime/First Responder Course is a 5-day introductory program to 
the field of technology crime. At the conclusion of the course, students will be 
able to recognize the occurrence of technology crimes, as well as preserve and 
collect necessary items of evidence. The cost for the course is $1595. The 
Computer Forensic Course is a 5-day program at $1695. It covers the 
fundamentals of forensic investigations. The Internet Investigation Course 
introduces students to the configuration and operations of the Internet and 
techniques for conducting investigations on the Internet. The 5-day program 
costs $1595. The LAN Investigation Course introduces students to the 
principles of computer networks, common network configurations and some 
of the considerations that investigators need to consider when they encounter 
computer networks. The 5-day program costs $1695. The Electronic 
Discovery and Forensic, Continuing Legal Education Course is an 8-hour 
custom seminar to present attorneys with a familiarization to computer 
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custom seminar to present attorneys with a familiarization to computer 
forensic and electronic recovery. 
 
24.  LC Technology International, Inc 
www.lc-tech.com 
 
LC Technology International, Inc is a developer of PC-based utility software. 
As the end-user market increases and users become more sophisticated, LC 
Technology is experiencing large increases in sales outside of its core 
business. Its core product line is designed to fill the security needs of data 
protection, recovery and security of digital data. LC Technology offers a 
series of 3-day course costing $1250 each. 
 
Both the Basic and Advanced Computer Forensics Course are designed to 
train corporate and law enforcement investigators in the basic elements of 
computer forensic investigation. Through hands-on practice, students will 
learn how to properly seize and examine an IBM-based PC and related media 
for evidence relating to a criminal or civil offense.  
 
The Homeland Defense Digital Investigations Program is designed to train 
corporate and law enforcement investigators in computer and digital 
investigations relating to domestic terrorism suspects. Students will conduct 
examinations of digital media captured from actual domestic terrorism cases 
and will work as a team to develop credible intelligence. Emphasis will be 
placed on the recovery and examination of terrorist e-mails and the use of 
encryption by terrorist cells. 
 
The Investigating Internet Crimes Against People Program includes a 
statutory overview of Internet and computer crimes, setting up an on-line 
Investigation, a hands-on laboratory simulating an internet investigation, 
acquiring and preserving digital evidence. During the exercise, students will 
use the data recovery and forensic tools, and learn the techniques to conduct a 
thorough computer forensic exam for a courtroom presentation. 
 
25.  Mares and Company, LLC 
www.dmares.com 
 
Mares and Company, LLC is a small company that provides computer 
forensic examinations and periodically hosts computer forensic and 
MARESWARE training seminars to state and local law enforcement.  
 
A 5-day Basic Computer Forensic Seminar costs $1000. The topics covered 
include search warrant wording, creating forensic boot disks undeleting files, 




A 2-week Advanced Computer Forensic Seminar cost $2000. It covers more 
complex topics and include more hands-on and practical exercises such as in 
depth command line usage and designing complicated script batch files, disk 
editing, preserving disk evidence, forensic processing, hashing techniques, 
disk cataloging, imaging and copying procedures, process validation and 
automating the seizure process. 
 
A 5-day Maresware Forensic Software Computer Training cost $800. The 
topics covered include how to use Maresware forensic software for 
performing forensic analysis of computers with a significant amount of 
hands-on practice using the Maresware forensic software. Students will 
practice with and become familiar with the capabilities of the software, thus 
developing a better understanding of what the software is capable of and how 
to use it more efficiently when doing forensic and data analysis.  
 
26.  National White Collar Crime Center 
www.cybercrime.org 
 
The National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) is a non-profit organization 
funded by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. It provides 
support to local and state enforcement agencies involved in the prevention, 
investigation, and prosecution of economic and high-tech crime. It conducts a 
Basic as well as an Advanced Data Recovery and Analysis Course. These 5-
day courses are sponsored by the National Cybercrime Training Partnership 
(NCTP). There is no fee for the courses and they are open only to law 
enforcement personnel.  
 
The Basic Data Recovery and Analysis Course includes hands-on instructions 
and discussion about evidence identification and extraction, hardware and 
software needed to do a seizure, how to recover erased files, how to overcome 
encryption and high-tech legal issues. The Advanced Data Recovery & 
Analysis Course takes the students into more varied and complex technical 
areas such as large hard drives, new partition types, long file name and date 
stamp issues, FAT, NTFS, advanced imaging, alternate media, transient data, 
internet issues and testimony considerations.  
 
27.  New Technologies, Inc 
www.forensic-intl.com 
 
New Technologies, Inc (NTI) provides consulting services to large law firms 
and corporations concerning e-commerce evidence and general computer 
evidence issues. NTI also provides software tools and advisory services to 
military and intelligence agencies in computer security risk identification and 
on the elimination of such risks. Its primary expertise lies in the development 
of state-of-the-art computer forensic and risk assessment tool, computer 




A 1-day Data Imaging Course deals specifically with issues related to creating 
evidence grade bit stream copies of computer hard disk that may contain 
electronic evidence. The training course will include detailed instructions and 
hands-on experience in using NTI's forensic tools developed for the bit stream 
backup imaging process. These tools, provided with the course, include 
SafeBack, Disk Scrub and M-Sweep. 
 
A 1-day Forensic Training Course is intended as an overview of computer 
evidence processing techniques and the use of NTI's automated computer 
forensic software. The software provided with the course includes DiskSig, 
CrcMD5 and NTIDoc documentation tool. 
 
A 3-day Computer Forensic Course deals specifically with DOS and 
Windows 95/98/ME. It covers evidence preservation, evidence processing 
methodologies and computer security risk assessments in detail. Recently, the 
course content has been expanded to support US Government’s needs on 
computer incident responses and computer forensic binary data searches for 
foreign language computer data. This hands-on training course exploits the 
inherent security weaknesses of the operating systems to find computer 
evidence and security leakage of sensitive data. The students will receive a 
suite of NTI forensic software. The course costs $2295. 
 
A 2-day Network Forensic Course is intended to supplement the 3-day 
Computer Forensic Course and deals specifically with the Windows NT/2000. 
The course includes instructions and hands-on experience in using the NTI 
forensic tools on the processing and analysis of NTFS related evidence. They 
include PTable, DiskSearchNT, GetSlackNT, GetFreeNT, NTICopy and 
FileListNT. Students will receive a copy of these specialized forensic tools. 
 
28.  Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy 
www.ag.state.oh.us/opota/opota.htm  
 
The Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy (OPOTA) is administered by the 
Attorney General through the Ohio Peace Officer Training Commission. The 
commission establishes uniform courses of training for law enforcement 
officers and private security throughout Ohio. It offers training subjects 
ranging from criminal investigation to the use of firearms. All the computer 
forensic courses offered by OPOTA are restricted to active law enforcement 
only. 
 
A 4-day Basic Computer Data Recovery Course is designed for law 
enforcement personnel responsible for forensic data recovery from seized 
computers. The course emphasizes the safe preservation and recovery of 
computer evidence. The course fee is $375.  
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A 5-day Intermediate Computer Forensic Course is designed to prepare law 
enforcement personnel for more advanced investigations on systems such as 
Windows NT/2K, Unix and Macintosh, data recovery from networks and 
other advanced problems generally faced by computer forensic specialist. The 
course fee is $275. 
 
A 4-day Internet Investigation Course is designed for law enforcement 
personnel responsible for investigating crimes involving the Internet. Topics 
include case preparation, email and IP tracing, viruses and introduction to 
intrusions. The course fee is $225. 
 
29.  University of New Haven 
www.newhaven.ed 
 
The University of New Haven offers on-line courses for undergraduate and 
graduate credit toward degrees in criminal justice in the areas of forensic 
computer investigation and information protection and security. Among its 
faculty is Fred Cohen, who is best known as the inventor of computer viruses 
and virus defense techniques. 
 
The Certificate in Forensic Science/Forensic Computer Investigation requires 
12 academic credits from a list of related on-line courses such as Computer 
Crime, Legal Issues and Investigative Procedures Computers, Technology 
and Criminal Justice Information Management Systems, Advanced Crime 
Scene Investigation. Each of the 3-credit on-line course costs $1335.   
 
30.  Veridian  
www.veridian.com 
 
Veridian is a designer and operator of secure, intelligent network 
environments. Leveraging 25 years of experience gained from protecting 
important components of the country's communications infrastructures, 
Veridian offers a full suite of leading-edge network and information security 
services and products. As a knowledge applications provider, it develops 
integrated systems and applications, establishes secure network environments 
to make intelligent decisions.  
 
A 10-day Macintosh Forensics Analysis Course provides a short overview of 
the Apple hardware and software, the Macintosh 9.0.4 operating system and 
highlights system functions and features that are important for a forensic 
examination. Students will learn how to map a Macintosh hard drive and learn 
places to discover hidden data. Students will also learn to use selected 




APPENDIX B: LIST OF READINGS ON COMPUTER FORENSICS  
1.  Avoiding Cyber Fraud in Small Businesses: What Auditors and 
Owners Need to Know 
by Jack Bologna, Paul Shaw and G. Jack Bologna 
John Wiley & Sons, May 2000 
 
 
 This book provides critical guidance on what auditors and businesses can do 
to prevent and detect the most rapidly growing kind of fraud—cyber fraud. 
Here, auditors, business owners and managers—the ones being held 
accountable when this kind of criminal activity is detected—will learn how to 
beware of the dangers of internal theft by computer, illegal access to 
information systems, credit card frauds, Internet scams and insure that 
adequate controls are in place for its prevention and detection.  
 
2.  Computer Crime: A Crimefighter's Handbook  
by David J. Icove, David Seger Karl Icove, Karl A. Seger and 
Vonstorch 
O’Reilly & Associates, Inc. 
 
 
 Terrorist attacks on computer centers, electronic fraud on international funds 
transfer networks, viruses and worms in software, corporate espionage on 
business networks, and crackers breaking into systems on the Internet. 
Computer criminals are becoming ever more technically sophisticated, and it's 
an increasing challenge to keep up with their methods. The book is for readers 
who need to know what today's computer crimes look like, how to prevent 
them, how to detect, investigate and prosecute them if they do occur. It 
contains basic computer security information as well as guidelines for 
investigators, law enforcement, computer system managers and 
administrators.  
 
The book contains a discussion on computer crimes, the computer criminal 
and computer crime laws. It describes the various categories of computer 
crimes and profiles the computer criminal using techniques developed for the 
FBI and other law enforcement agencies. It outlines the risks to computer 
systems and personnel, operational, physical, and communications measures 
that can be taken to prevent computer crimes. It then discusses how to plan 
for, investigate, and prosecute computer crimes, ranging from the supplies 
needed for criminal investigation, to the detection and audit tools used in 
investigation, to the presentation of evidence to a jury. It also contains a 
compendium of the computer-related US federal statutes and all of the 
statutes of the individual states, as well as representative international laws. 
Lastly, the book contains a resource summary, detailed papers on computer 
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Lastly, the book contains a resource summary, detailed papers on computer 
crime and a sample search warrant for a computer crime.  
 
3.  Cyber Crime Investigator's Field Guide 
by Bruce Middleton 
CRC Press, December 2001 
 
 
 This book provides the details of investigating computer crime and the chain 
of evidence from what to do upon arrival at the scene until the investigation is 
complete. It covers information such questions to ask the client, steps to 
follow when arriving at the client's site, procedures for collecting evidence, 
details on how to use various evidence collection and analysis tools, and how 
to recover lost passwords or documents that are password protected. It also 
includes case studies on computer forensic tools in action, commonly used 
Unix/Linux commands, port number reference for various services and 
applications, computer forensic software tools commands synopsis, attack 
signatures and Cisco PIX firewall commands. The author provides an 
investigative framework, knowledge of how cyberspace really works and the 
tools to investigate cyber crime. 
 
4.  Computer Forensics 
by Warren G. Kruse II and Jay G. Heiser 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, September 2001 
 
 
 The book offers a disciplined approach to implementing a comprehensive 
incident-response plan, with a focus on how to detect intruders, discover what 
damage they did and find out who they are. The bulk of the book details the 
technical skills and emphasis on providing a well-documented basis for a 
criminal investigation. The key to success is becoming a "white hat" hacker in 
order to combat the criminal "black hat" hackers. In this vein, the authors use 
a number of technical examples and encourage readers to develop expertise in 
Unix/Linux and Windows NT fundamentals. They also provide an overview 
of a number of third-party tools, many of which can be used for both tracking 
hackers and to probe the users’ own systems. Frequent examples are used to 
demonstrate how to extract evidence from a violated computer system.  
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5.  Computer Forensics: Computer Crime Scene Investigation  
by John R. Vacca 
Charles River Media, December 2001  
 
 
 This book provides a comprehensive overview of computer forensics from its 
definition to crime scene investigation, seizure of data, determining the 
fingerprints of the crime and tracking down the criminal. The book focuses on 
solving the crime rather than information security. Case studies and vignettes 
of actual computer crimes are used. The enclosed CD includes 
demonstrations on the latest computer forensics and auditing software. 
 
6.  Computer Forensics and Privacy  
(Artech House Computer Security Series) 
by Michael Caloyannides 
Artech House, September 2001 
  
  
 The book delivers a comprehensive treatment on the threats to data 
confidentiality posed both by the emerging field of computer forensics and by 
connecting a computer to the Internet. It provides valuable critical 
information on identifying the specific areas where sensitive and potentially 
incriminating data is hiding in personal computers and explains how to go 
about removing this data; on install operating systems and application 
software that will help to minimize the possibility of security compromises; 
on ensuring computers that are connected to the Internet are protected from 
malicious mobile code and the new fashion of “adware/spyware”, and on 
detecting whether advanced investigative tools, such as keystroke storing and 
relaying hardware and software, are in use in a computer. Other key topics 
include the pitfalls of encryption and how to use it effectively, the practical 
aspects of online anonymity and the current legal issues that pertain to the use 
of computers. Over 70 illustrations emphasize major points throughout the 
book. 
 
7.  Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer 
Espionage 
by Clifford Stoll 





 A sentimental favorite, this book has inspired a whole category of books 
exploring the quest to capture computer criminals. Several years after its 
initial publication and after much imitation, the book remains a good read 
with an engaging story line and a critical outlook, as the author becomes a 
one-man security force trying to track down faceless criminals who have 
invaded the university computer lab he stewards. What first appears as a 75-
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invaded the university computer lab he stewards. What first appears as a 75-
cent accounting error in a computer log is eventually revealed to be a ring of 
industrial espionage, primarily thanks to the author's persistence and 
intellectual tenacity. 
 
8.  Cyber Crime: How to Protect Yourself from Computer 
Criminals 
by Laura E. Quarantiello 





 The author offers a detailed look at what is happening in the world of 
computer crime, complete with insights into the minds of the perpetrators—
from the mischievous to the malicious. Her stories include both the disturbing 
and the heartening, and the advice she has collected—from cyber-cops and 
cyber-criminals alike, is well worth heeding. Readers will learn about the 
three-step scale of vulnerability, cyber-cops, how they walk the digital beat 
and view intimate portraits of hackers and the tools they use. 
 
9.  Cyber Forensics: A Field Manual for Collecting, Examining, and Preserving 
Evidence of Computer Crimes 
by Albert J. Marcella Jr (editor) and Robert S. Greenfield 
Auerbach Publications, December 2001 
 
The book provides a comprehensive, highly usable and clearly organized 
resource to the issues, tools and control techniques needed to successfully 
investigate illegal activities perpetuated through the use of information 
technology. This book introduces the broad field of cyber forensics and 
presents the various tools and techniques designed to maintain control in an 
organization. It dwells on how to identify inappropriate uses of corporate IT, 
examine computing environments to identify and gather electronic evidence 
of wrongdoing, secure corporate systems from further misuse, identify 
individuals responsible for engaging in inappropriate acts, and protect and 
secure electronic evidence from intentional or accidental modification or 
destruction. Knowing how to identify, gather, document, and preserve 
evidence of electronic tampering and misuse makes reading this book and 
using the forensic audit procedures it discusses essential to protecting 
corporate assets. 
 
10.  Defending Your Digital Assets Against Hackers, Crackers, 
Spies, and Thieves 
by Randall K. Nichols, Daniel J. Ryan, Julie J. C. H. Ryan and 
Arthur W. Jr. Coviello 
McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, December 1999 
  
 This is a guide to computer security. In place of specific how-to information, 
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readers learn about the motives of on-line attackers and the strategies they use 
to gain unauthorized access to systems and data, plus overarching concepts 
like public-key cryptography. It also deals about defensive and forensic 
strategies for preventing attacks and limiting their potency when they occur. 
The topics covered include computer and network security, risk management, 
security policy, cryptography, access control, authentication, biometrics, 
actions to be taken during an attack and case studies of hacking and 
information warfare.  
 
11.  Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, 
Computers, and the Internet 
by Eoghan Casey 
Academic Press, March 2000 
   
 Many readers commented that this is one of the best computer forensic book 
describing the elements of digital crime. The book is clear and easy to 
understand. The author applies the methodology of forensic science to 
computer crime investigations. The book begins with an explanation of how 
the computer functions, how they can be used in crime and how the evidence 
created from these activities can be used for later analysis. The accompanying 
CD-ROM contains simulated cases to integrate the topics covered in the text. 
This book is used as a training text at the Atlanta ISSA. 
 
12.  Disk Detective - Secrets You Must Know to Recover 
Information from a Computer 
by Norbert Zaenglein 
Paladin Press, September 1998 
 
 
 This book is designed to bring the secrets of information recover to the 
average person. In it, the author shows private investigators, parents, teachers, 
business owners and law enforcement professionals what types of information 
can be recovered from IBM-compatible personal computers and how. He 
includes step-by-step instructions for recovering information from 
reformatted disks or overwritten files, retrieving deleted files, discovering 
passwords and retracing visited Internet files. 
 
13.  Fighting Computer Crime: A New Framework for Protecting 
Information 
by Donn B. Parker 
John Wiley & Sons, August 1998 
  
 
 A revolutionary new approach to computer security. In this book, the author 
first shows why current approaches to preventing computer crime are not 
working, and then presents a new framework for understanding criminal 
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working, and then presents a new framework for understanding criminal 
threats, describing proven countermeasures and discussing actual crime cases. 
Boldly critiquing many prominent business and government figures for their 
failings, this book pulls no punches in its drive to improve information 
security.  
 
14.  Forensic Computing: A Practitioner’s Guide 
(Practitioner Series) 
by Tony Sammes, Brian Jenkinson and A. J. Sammes 
Springer Verlag, October 2000 
  
 
 In this book, the authors show how information held in computer systems can 
be recovered and how it may be deliberately hidden or subverted for criminal 
purposes. The content is illustrated by plenty of case studies and worked 
examples and will help practitioners and readers gain a clear understanding of 
how to recover information from computer systems in such a way as to ensure 
that its integrity cannot be challenged and that it will be accepted as 
admissible evidence in court; the principles involved in password protection 
and data encryption; the evaluation procedures used in circumventing these 
safeguards; the particular legal issues associated with computer-generated 
evidence and how to ensure admissibility of such evidence. This is a text 
aimed at helping practitioners get to a level of technical understanding that 
would allow them to be able to use forensic computing analysis to search for, 
find and present any form of digital document as evidence in court. 
 
15.  Handbook of Computer Crime Investigation: Forensic Tools & 
Technology 
by Eoghan Casey (editor) 
Academic Press, October 2001 
 
  
 Following on the success of his introductory text, Digital Evidence and 
Computer Crime, the author brings together the specialized knowledge of a 
few top experts to create the first detailed guide for professionals who are 
already familiar with digital evidence. This book helps readers master the 
forensic analysis of computer systems with a three-part approach covering 
tools, technology and case studies. The Tools section provides the details on 
leading hardware and software programs—such as EnCase, Dragon and 
ForensiX—with each chapter written by that product’s creator. The section 
ends with an objective comparison of the strengths and limitations of each 
tool. The main Technology section provides the technical “how to” 
information for collecting and analyzing digital evidence in common 
situations, starting with computers, moving on to networks and culminating 
with embedded systems. The Case Examples section gives readers a sense of 





16.  High Technology Crime Investigator’s Handbook 
by Gerald L. Kovacich and William C. Boni 
Butterworth-Heinemann, September 1999 
 
 This book informs readers about the potential of high tech crimes and the 
resources that are available to combat them. The book covers the management 
of a high tech investigation unit. The authors provide an overview of the 
entire high-technology crime investigation process. The book not only deals 
with a myriad of important issues but also offers viable solutions and 
prevention programs.  
 
17.  Incident Response 
by Richard Forno, Kenneth R. Van Wyk and Rick Forno 
O’Reilly & Associates, July 2001 
 
  
 This book introduces the modes of attack and the methods of response. The 
authors explain the organization and function of the professional, 
governmental and ad hoc groups that exist to respond to attacks and 
disseminate information about them. The topics covered include tools and 
strategies hackers use to break into systems illegally, and mechanisms and 
procedures for dealing with such attacks. Emphasis falls on the business 
considerations associated with incident preparedness and response.  
 
18.  Incident Response: A Strategic Guide to Handling System and 
Network Security Breaches 
by Russell Shumway and E. Eugene Schultz 
New Riders Publishing, January 2002 
  
 This book teaches readers what they need to know to not only set up an 
incident response effort, but also how to improve existing incident response 
efforts. The book provides a comprehensive approach to incident response, 
covering everything necessary to deal with all phases of incident response 
effectively, spanning from pre-incident conditions and considerations to the 
end of an incident. It also covers the technical considerations, what needs to 
be inspected in case they are corrupted, the types of logging data available in 
major operating systems and how to interpret it to obtain information about 
incidents, and how network attacks can be detected on the basis of 
information contained in packets. The major focus of this book is on 
managerial and procedural matters. It advances the notion that without 
effective management, incident response cannot succeed. 
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19.  Incident Response: Investigating Computer Crime 
by Chris Prosise and Kevin Mandia 
McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, June 2001 
 
  
 Written by FBI insiders, this book reveals the computer forensics process and 
offers authoritative solutions designed to counteract and conquer hacker 
attacks. It teaches the readers how to determine when an attack has occurred 
or is underway and what to do about it. The authors favor a tools- and 
procedures-centric approach to the subject, thereby distinguishing this book 
from others that catalog particular attacks and methods for dealing with each 
one. Their approach is more generic and therefore better suited to dealing 
with newly emerging attack techniques. Anti-attack procedures are presented 
with the goal of identifying, apprehending and prosecuting attackers. The 
advice on carefully preserving volatile information, such as the list of 
processes active at the time of an attack, is easy to follow. The book is quick 
to endorse tools and the functionalities of which are described so as to inspire 
creative applications. Information on bad-guy behavior is top quality as well, 
giving readers knowledge of how to interpret logs and other observed 
phenomena. The authors do not offer a foolproof guide to catching crackers in 
the act, but they do offer a great “best practices” guide to active surveillance.  
 
20.  Investigating Computer Crime 
(CRC Series in Practical Aspects of Criminal and Forensic 
Investigations) 
by Franklin Clark, Ken Diliberto (contributor) and Vernon J. 
Geberth (editor) 
CRC Press, July 1996  
  
 This book presents practical methods for gathering electronic evidence and 
dealing with crimes involving computers. It follows a step-by-step approach 
to the investigation, seizure and evaluation of computer evidence. The 
material in the book has been used at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC), the Canadian Police College for teaching computer classes 
in white-collar crime and sex crime investigations and by US Army 
Intelligence in cooperation with NATO in Europe. It has also been used to 
teach a 1-week course in computer crime investigation to agents from the 
IRS, Secret Service, and state and local agencies.  
 
21.  Investigating Computer Crime: A Primer for Security Managers 
by Ronald L. Mendell 




 This book provides a fundamental investigative foundation for law 
enforcement and security managers by moving through the basic phases of a 
computer crime investigation. Topics include: solvability factors; retail 
computer security; intelligence gathering; the investigative process; 
establishing the corpus delicti; preserving evidence; determining the 
evidence, weak points and responsible parties; and deciding on a course of 
action. Ideas for discussion follow each chapter, providing material for in-
depth exploration of the topics presented. The appendix contains a wealth of 
knowledge on information warfare, extremists and other threats from 
cyberspace. 
 
22.  Investigating Computer-Related Crime: A Handbook For 
Corporate Investigators 
by Peter Stephenson 




 Written by an experienced information security specialist, this book offers a 
step-by-step approach to understanding and investigating security problems, 
technical and legal information, and computer forensic techniques. It 
discusses the nature of cyber crime, its impact in the 21st century, its 
investigation and difficulties encountered by both public law enforcement 
officials and private investigators. It gives advice on collecting and preserving 
evidence, interrogating suspects, handling crime in progress and in involving 
authorities.  
 
23.  I-Way Robbery: Crime on the Internet 
by William C. Boni, Gerald L. Kovacich and John P. Kenney 




 This book offers a basic understanding of Internet crime and covers related 
Internet business, government, political and privacy issues. It describes 
techniques used to commit crimes, what can be done about them, what 
challenges the future may hold, discusses real world problems and solutions 
for both technical and non-technical professionals, and analyzes actual 
Internet crime cases. This book is for security professionals who need to get 
up to speed on the whole issue of crime on the Internet. This book explains 




24.  Network Intrusion Detection: An Analysts' Handbook 
by Stephen Northcutt 
New Riders Publishing, August 1999 
 
 
 This book explains what readers need to know to prevent unauthorized 
accesses of networked computers and minimize the damage intruders can do. 
It emphasizes proven techniques for recognizing attacks while they are 
underway. The author explains ways to spot suspicious behavior and deal 
with it, both automatically and manually. He explains SYN flooding and TCP 
hijacking with clarity and detail. Readers will get a good picture of the 
famous Kelvin Mitnick’s attack and how Tsutomu Shimomura's server 
reacted. He also explains how a system administrator would detect and defeat 
a Mitnick attack. Another case study shows how a bad guy with root 
privileges attacked a DNS server.  
 
25.  Secret Software: Making the Most of Computer Resources for 
Data Protection, Information Recovery, Forensic Examination, 
Crime Investigation and More 
by Norbert Zaenglein 
Paladin Press, July 2000 
 
 Norbert Zaenglein, author of the best-selling book Disk Detective, takes the 
software secrets that have been the exclusive domain of hackers and other 
computer-savvy surfers mainstream. In straightforward, non-technical terms, 
the book covers an array of computer resources: electronic document 
shredders, a new electronic truth serum that rivals the polygraph, detection 
and identification of electronic intruders, professional forensics software and 
image enhancement software to assist in law enforcement investigations, file 
viewers that provide instant access to files that cannot be opened, and 
computer security programs. However, one reader ever described this book as 
basically an advertisement for software.  
 
26.  Tangled Web: Tales of Digital Crime from the Shadows of 
Cyberspace 
by Richard Power 
Que, August 2000 
 
 
 Between interviews with hackers and security experts, the author suggests 
that the world's networks are swarming with money-sucking leeches, most of 
which are never even noticed, and certainly not caught. He delves into the 
twists and turns of the criminal investigations and the motivation of cyber-
crooks. The author also gives credit to law enforcement agencies and security 
consultants who have made genuine progress in preventing crime and 
apprehending criminals.  
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27.  Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime, and Money 
Laundering: A Handbook for Law Enforcement Officers, 
Auditors, and Financial Investigator 
by James R. Richards 
CRC Press, December 1998 
 
 
 Written by a law-enforcement professional, this book examines the workings 
of organized criminals and criminal groups that transcend national 
boundaries. Discussions include methods used by criminal groups to 
internationally launder money; law enforcement efforts to counteract such 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF TOOLS FOR COMPUTER FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION 
1.  Computer Forensics Software 
from The Coroner's Toolkit 
www.cerias.purdue.edu/homes/carrier/forensics 
 
The Coroner's Toolkit (TCT) is a collection of tools oriented towards 
gathering or analyzing forensic data on a Unix system. 
 
TCTUTILs is a collection of utilities in the TCT. It lists directory inode 
contents to view file, device, and directory names. This allows deleted file 
names to be viewed and with some platforms, an entire deleted file can be 
easily recovered. It can obtain Modified, Accessed, and Created time data on 
deleted files. It can also display the contents of a given block in several 
formats and the details of an inode, including all the block numbers. 
TCTUTILs is tested on OpenBSD, Linux and Solaris.   
 
Autopsy Forensic Browser is an HTML based front-end interface to TCT 
and TCTUTILs. It allows an investigator to browse forensic images generated 
from a file, inode or block level abstraction. It also provides a convenient 
interface for searching for key words on an image. It browses a forensic 
image from the file/directory level using a File Manager style interface, 
searches the image at the block level for specified strings and displays the file 
contents in raw, ASCII, or hexdump. Finally, it generates autopsy reports on 
files, blocks or inodes with their MD5 hash values.  
 
Lazarus  is another program in TCT. Its goal is to give unstructured data 
some form that can be viewed and manipulated by the examiner. It achieves 
this goal via a few simple heuristics. It begins by reading in a block of data 
from its input stream and roughly determining what sort of data—text or 
binary—the block is. This is done by examining the first ten percent of the 
bytes in the block—if they are mostly unprintable characters, then it is 
flagged as a binary block; otherwise, it is flagged as text data. If the block has 
been flagged as text, Lazarus checks the data against a set of regular 
expressions to attempt to determine what it is with finer detail. If the block is 
binary, the Unix file command is run over the chunk of data to classify the 
file based on its content. If the data block is not specifically recognized after 
the initial text/binary recognition but instead follows a recognized chunk of 
text/binary data (respectively), Lazarus assumes that it is a continuation of the 
previous data and will concatenate it to the previous data block. These 





2.  Computer Incident Response Suite  
from New Technologies, Inc  
www.secure-data.com/suite1.html 
 
CRCMd5 is a CRC program that mathematically creates a unique signature 
for the contents of one, multiple or all files on a given storage device. Such 
signatures can be used to identify whether or not the contents of one or more 
computer files have changed. This forensics tool relies upon 128-bit accuracy 
and can easily be run from a floppy diskette to benchmark the files on a 
specific storage device. CRCMd5 can be used as the first step in the 
implementation of a configuration management policy. Such a policy and 
related system bench marking can help computer specialists isolate problems 
and deal with computer incidents after they occur. The program is also used 
to document that computer evidence has not been altered or modified during 
computer evidence processing.  
 
DiskScrub is a scrub utility used to eliminate data on the hard disk drive. The 
data storage areas are repeatedly overwritten in such a way that the original 
data cannot be recovered using data recovery or computer forensics software. 
This process involves writing data on the hard disk drive tracks from the first 
sector to the last sector on the subject hard disk drive. DiskScrub conforms to 
US DoD computer security standards, which require that the data overwrite 
process involve one pass with a character, a second overwrite pass using the 
compliment of the first character overwrite and a third pass with a random 
character. 
 
DiskSig is another CRC program that validates mirror image backup 
accuracy. This program is used to mathematically create a unique signature 
for the content of a computer hard disk drive. Such signatures can then be 
used to validate the accuracy of forensic bit stream image backups of 
computer hard disk drives. This program was primarily created for use with 
SafeBack software. 
 
FileList is a disk catalog tool used to evaluate computer use time lines. It 
documents information about files stored on one or more computer hard disk 
drives and other computer storage devices. This multi-purpose tool is 
designed for covert use, security reviews and forensic laboratory processing 
of computer evidence. It leaves no trace that it has been used and the output is 
compressed so that the output will usually fit on just one floppy diskette. The 
compressed output is automatically converted into a dBASE III file format by 
a companion program FileCNVT. The dBASE III file format will import into 
most commercial spreadsheet and database applications. The converted 
output can also be viewed, sorted and analyzed through the use of timeline 
analysis tool ShowFile. FileList is compatible with DOS, Windows, Windows 
95/98 and a special version is available for Windows NT systems. The 
Windows NT version is sold separately.   
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Filter I is an intelligent fuzzy logic filter for use with ambient data. This 
enhanced forensic filter can quickly make sense in the analysis of Windows 
swap file data, file slack data and data associated with erased files. It relies 
upon pre-programmed artificial intelligence to identify fragments of word 
processing communications, fragments of E-mail communications, fragments 
of Internet chat room communications, fragments of Internet news group 
posts, encryption passwords, network passwords, network logons, database 
entries, credit card numbers, social security numbers and the first and last 
names of individuals that have been listed in communications involving the 
subject computer. This unique computer forensic tool can also be effectively 
used in computer security reviews as it quickly reveals security leakage and 
violations of corporate policy that might not be uncovered otherwise. The 
software does not rely upon key words entered by the computer specialist. It 
is a pattern recognition tool that recognizes patters of text, letter 
combinations, number patterns, potential passwords, potential network logons 
and the names of individuals.  
 
GetFree is an ambient data collection tool used to capture unallocated data. It 
is used to capture all of the unallocated file space on DOS and Windows 
95/98 systems. It can be used to validate the secure scrubbing of unallocated 
storage space with the M-Sweep ambient data deletion software. When used 
as an investigative tool, it eliminates the need to restore files on the hard disk 
drives. GetFree has also proven to be an ideal tool for use in computer 
security risk assessments because the software automatically captures the data 
associated with unallocated file space. This tool is ideal for the validation of 
the results when computer security scrubbers have been used. Thus, it aids in 
the process of security certifications of computer storage media.  
 
GetSlack is an ambient data collection tool used to capture file slack. It is an 
ideal computer forensics tool for use in investigations because memory 
dumps in file slack are the cause for security related concerns. Typically, 
network logons and passwords are found in file slack. It is also possible for 
passwords used in file encryption to be stored as memory dumps in file slack. 
From an investigative standpoint, file slack can contain leads and evidence in 
the form of fragments of word processing communications, Internet E-mail 
communications, Internet chat room communications, Internet news group 
communications and Internet browsing activity. It also acts as a good 
validation tool for use with computer security programs designed to eliminate 
file slack 
 
GetTime  is used to document the system date and system time settings of the 
subject computer. File dates and times associated with allocated files and 
previously deleted files can be important in cases involving computer 
evidence. The reliability of the file dates and times are directly tied to the 
accuracy of the system settings for date and time on the subject computer. It 
is thus important to document the accuracy of the system clock.  
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is thus important to document the accuracy of the system clock.  
 
Net Threat Analyzer is a forensic internet analysis software used to identify 
corporate internet account abuses. The software relies upon computer 
artificial intelligence logic to quickly identify patterns of computer data tied 
to Internet E-mail communications, Internet Browsing activity and the 
download of files from Internet sites. It is used to identify Internet activities 
that have been transparently stored in ambient data storage areas of computer 
hard disk drive, to evaluate Windows swap files and investigative leads in the 
form of file slack and unallocated data storage areas. 
 
M-Sweep Pro is an ambient data security scrubbing utility for use on 
notebook computers that contain sensitive computer data. It also has 
application both with desktop computers and in the safe exchange of data via 
floppy diskettes and Iomega Zip Disks. This software repeatedly overwrites 
data storage areas. It is compatible with DOS, Windows 95/98/NT/2000. It 
meets US government requirements for the secure deletion of computer data 
and it deals with threats associated with shadow data concepts.  
 
NTI-Doc is a documentation program for use in recording file dates, times 
and attributes. This program is used to essentially take an electronic snapshot 
of files and subdirectories that have previously been identified as having 
evidentiary value. The program automatically creates documentation that can 
be printed, viewed or pasted into investigative computer forensic reports.  
 
PTable is a utility used to review and analyze the partition tables assigned to 
a hard disk drive. This tool is essential concerning network forensics or when 
multiple operating systems are stored on one hard disk drive in multiple 
partitions. It can also used to identify hidden data potentially stored in the 
partition gap or unknown partitions. 
 
Seized is a program used to lock and secure evidence computers. It limits 
access to computers that have been seized as evidence. When the program is 
operated, it locks the computer system and displays a message on the screen 
advising the computer user that the computer contains evidence and it should 
not be operated without authorization. The program is to be installed on a 
DOS system diskette for placement in the floppy diskette drive on the 
computer system and is to be called from an AUTOEXEC.BAT file. Once the 
program has been called it, locks the computer and displays the warning 
message on the screen.  
 
ShowFL is a program used to analyze the output of file list. It is intended for 
use with the FileList software. It allows for easy sorting, analysis and viewing 
of database output.  
 
TextSearch Plus  is a text search utility used to locate key strings of text and 
graphic files. It quickly searches hard disk drives, zip disks and floppy 
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graphic files. It quickly searches hard disk drives, zip disks and floppy 
diskettes for key words or specific patterns of text. It operates at either a 
logical or physical level at the option of the user. It is compatible with FAT 
12, FAT 16 and FAT 32 DOS based systems on DOS and Windows95/98. 
 
3.  EnCase 
from Guidance Software, Inc. 
www.encase.com/html/forensic_software.html 
 
EnCase is the industry leading computer forensic software tool used by most 
all computer forensic examiners. Award winning and court tested, EnCase 
software allows law enforcement and IT professionals to conduct a powerful, 
yet completely non-invasive computer forensic investigation. EnCase features 
a graphical user interface that enables examiners to easily manage large 
volumes of computer evidence and view all relevant files, including "deleted" 
files, file slack and unallocated data. The integrated functionality of EnCase 
allows the examiner to perform all functions of the computer forensic 
investigation process, from the initial "previewing" of a target drive, the 
acquisition of the evidentiary images, the search and recovery of the data and 
the final reporting of findings, all within the same application. Further, 
EnCase methodology allows the examiner to perform these processes in a 
non-invasive manner, meaning not one byte of data is changed on the original 
evidence. The final reports and extracts generated by the built-in report 
feature documents the investigation results and integrity of the original data 
with a clear and concise chain of custody to ensure the authentication of the 
examined electronic evidence in a court of law.  
 
4.  Extractor  
from WetStone Technologies, Inc 
www.wetstonetech.com/extract.htm 
 
Extractor is a Linux RedHat deleted file recovery tool. It can assist law 
enforcement, government and commercial organizations in retrieving 
maliciously or accidentally deleted files within the increasingly popular Linux 
operating system environment. The technology was initially invented to assist 
the New York State Police Forensic Investigation Center (FIC) with the 
extraction of deleted data from a Linux RedHat computer system taken as 
evidence on a case. The tool can extract the deleted file contents, the original 
file attributes, the time and date of deletion, last modification, access and 
creation date of the file, and the owner and group the file was a member of. 
 
5.  Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device 
from Digital Intelligence, Inc.  
www.digitalintel.com/fred.htm 
 
The Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device (FRED) is a highly integrated 
platform for the acquisition and analysis of computer-based evidence. FRED 
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platform for the acquisition and analysis of computer-based evidence. FRED 
contains a suite of forensic software like DriveSpy, Image, PDWipe, 
PDBlock, PART 
 
DriveSpy is a forensic DOS shell. It is designed to emulate and extend the 
capabilities of DOS to meet forensic needs. Whenever appropriate DriveSpy 
will use familiar DOS commands  to navigate the system under investigation. 
When beneficial, DriveSpy will extend the capabilities of the associated DOS 
commands, or add new commands as necessary. DriveSpy provides a familiar 
DOS-like prompt during system navigation. DriveSpy does not use drive 
letters in the prompt, but rather a Drive/Part combination to eliminate 
confusion in the event where the resident operating system has not assigned a 
drive letter to the drive being processed. 
 
Image is a standalone utility to generate physical images of floppy disks. The 
files generated by Image contain complete physical images of the diskette 
being processed. Image is capable of generating either highly compressed or 
flat images for forensic analysis. It utilizes internally implemented algorithms 
which are identical to those used in ZIP compatible archives. Non-
compressed flat images may also be generated to facilitate examination of the 
image file itself. Image supports cyclic imaging and restoration to automate 
the processing of large numbers of diskettes. The program also provides the 
ability to attach descriptive information to each image file. Technical and 
descriptive information associated with each file may be displayed without 
having to actually restore the image. Image maintains an MD5 checksum of 
each image file it creates. This checksum compared during restoration to 
ensure that no degradation or corruption of the image file has occurred. Image 
will generate self-restoring image executables for distribution and usage 
without the utility itself. Image is very simple to use.  Command line 
parameters are minimal and very intuitive. 
 
PDWipe  (Physical Drive Wipe) is a standalone utility to wipe (zero) an entire 
physical hard drives.  It provides the option of using a character other than 
0x00 when wiping a drive. It also offers the ability to wipe the drive using a 
random pattern.  It will optionally record Logical Sector Addresses, and CHS 
addresses for both Int13 and Int13x geometries at the beginning of sectors as 
they are wiped. The latter is useful when diagnosing architectural 
discrepancies when moving a drive between systems or validating imaging 
utilities. It can also verify that the contents of a specified number of randomly 
chosen sectors have been wiped. If a wipe-verification is requested, it will 
also automatically verify the first and last sector on the drive. Command line 
options are provided such that the program may run from within a batch file 
to wipe large numbers of hard drives prior to redistribution.  
 
PDBlock (Physical Drive Blocker) is a standalone utility designed to prevent 
unexpected writes to a physical disk drive. When PDBlock is executed on a 
computer its job is to prevent all writes to the physical drives. 
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computer its job is to prevent all writes to the physical drives. 
 
PART is a Partition Manager, which lists summary information about all the 
partitions on a hard disk, switch bootable partitions, and even hide and unhide 
DOS partitions. The PART utility adds 10x to the DOS partition type code to 
hide and unhide partitions. The PART utility may be used to switch between 
multiple bootable primary partitions.  
 
6.  Forensic Utilities 
from Key Computer Service, Inc 
www.cftco.com/utilities.htm 
 
Wiper is a forensic disk wiping utility that will completely erase all 
information on a logical or physical drive by overwriting each and every byte 
with a character that is user selectable. The program is written entirely in 
assembly language and therefore is small and fast. It uses the BIOS disk 
services, even for the logical drives, thus will wipe a drive regardless of the 
operating system format. The user may select a one-pass wipe, using the 
default character of 00 or a character entered by the user, or a "secure", seven-
pass wipe.  The "secure" wipe uses alternating ones and zeros for six passes, 
then finishes the process with a pass using the user-selected character or zero, 
leaving a completely blank drive, except for the low level formatting 
information.  The speed is about 3 to 4 minutes per GB per pass for a hard 
drive.  
   
ListDrv is an assembly language utility that examines a logical drive, or 
several logical drives on a physical drive, for FAT12, FAT16, or FAT32 
files. As they are found, they are saved to a comma-delimited and quotation 
mark-delimited file prepared for importation into a database program or a 
spreadsheet program such as Excel, for any desired manipulation. ListDrv 
will also list deleted files if desired. The listing includes the complete path, 
the long file name, if present, the alias or short file name, and the other date, 
time, size, and location information. If removable media is used to save the 
listing file, ListDrv will span multiple disks.   
   
ChkSum is an assembly language disk utility that calculates a 64-bit 
checksum for a physical or logical disk drive.   
 
FreeSecs is an assembly language disk utility that searches a specified logical 
drive for the unallocated or free space, and saves the information contained in 
unallocated space to one or more files. FreeSecs can additionally search any 
physical drive (regardless of the operating system) and save all the 
information contained on all sectors to one or more files.   
   
DiskDupe  is an assembly language utility that makes exact forensic copies of 
floppy diskettes.    
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DataSniffer is an excellent parsing and carving utility that can “carves" data 
or files from files or unused space.  DataSniffer has a number of separate 
functions such as a file extraction utility, a data parsing utility, a image 
compiler utility, a recycle bin history utility and a file signature generator 
utility. 
 
7.  Forensic Utility Suite 
from LC Technology International, Inc 
www.lc-tech.com/forensicsuite.asp 
 
The Forensic Utility Suite allows forensic recovery of data on all Microsoft 
operating systems. The suite is a compilation of the RecoverNT, Recover98 
EXPRESS and FILERECOVERY for Windows. All of these utilities are 
unique in their own way providing multiple recovery options on IBM 
compatible Intel based computers with Windows 95/98/Me/NT/2000/XP. It is 
a total solution for all Microsoft file systems, allowing for fast, safe, and 
reliable file recovery with the ease of use of the Windows environment. The 
Forensic Suite comes with remote clients to do recovery across a network as 
well as a DOS client that allows user to recover through DOS on un-bootable 
machines. 
 
RecoverNT runs natively under the Windows 95/98/Me/NT/2000/XP 
operating system and supports multi-boot, striped, spanned and mirrored 
drives as well as all versions of RAID. RecoverNT can scan and recover files 
that have been destroyed. It is compatible with FAT12, 16, 32 and NTFS file 
systems and IDE/ATA, SCSI, RAID and removable media.  
 
Recover98 Express is a fast Undelete for Windows 95/98 with FAT File 
Systems. It allows the retrieval of files which have been deleted from a disk 
and recycle bin. It uses a unique Virtual File System that displays only 
deleted files and directories making finding files a simple task. The user can 
scan a drive and the Explorer-like interface displays the recoverable files. 
 
FileRecovery for Windows  is a cross platform undelete for Windows 
95/98/Me/NT/2000/XP. It supports FAT12, FAT16, FAT32 and NTFS 
formats. The new Search and Filter options make recovering files fast and 
easy with full preservation of the directory structure.  
 
8.  ForensiX 
from Fred Cohen & Associates 
www.all.net/ 
 
ForensiX is a software embedded in a system, using a wide variety of 
existing tools to aid in forensic analysis of digital evidence. This 
comprehensive digital forensic analysis package images and analyzes Mac, 
DOS, Windows, Unix, and other disks and files, PCMCIA cards, IDE, SCSI, 
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DOS, Windows, Unix, and other disks and files, PCMCIA cards, IDE, SCSI, 
parallel, serial, IP traffic and other data sources. It searches for known site 
names and known digital fingerprints. It automatically produces chain-of-
evidence information to assure the integrity of the imaged data, generate 
reproducible analytical results and documents the analysis process.  
 
9.  Omniquad Detective 
from Tech Assist, Inc 
www.toolsthatwork.com/ttw-tools.shtml 
 
Byte Back is a professional data recovery and computer investigative utility 
with powerful low level cloning, imaging, and disk analysis tools. It clones 
and images most drive formats, repairs Partitions and Boot Records of 
FAT12, FAT16, FAT32 and NTFS volumes, offers individual file recovery 
for these environments, quickly overwrites every sector of a drive, contains a 
powerful sector editor for working with raw data and performs an in-depth 
read-only scan of a disk's surface. It supports drives up to 4 terabytes, 
archives images and reports to most network storage devices and perform safe 
recoveries on hard disk, Zip, Jaz and floppy. It has the ability to search for 
any character string on the entire drive, including slack areas, and gives on-
the-fly direct control over the system's Read Retries, Process Delay and 
Timeout. It is also integrated with MD5. 
 
Desktop Surveillance is a combination of a Network Intelligence 
Management and Productivity tool and a Desktop Content Security utility. It 
can identify every action performed by the user and record those actions in 
three different ways: virtual video, keystroke capture and smart activity 
logging. It monitor and records all Windows desktop activity, such as 
keystrokes, e-mail, chat, surfing, instant messaging and hacking with 
powerful access control and filter capabilities. The monitor can operates in a 
Prevention mode to make the users aware that their actions may be monitored 
or in the Stealth mode without the users’ knowledge. Desktop Surveillance 
can be remotely controlled via local network or the Internet, and in both cases 
it is possible to remotely observe activity on the local desktop in real-time. Its 
access control provides an ability to easily design, create and implement an 
organization-wide acceptable usage policy to launch Blocking, Limited 
Access or Lockdown functions. 
 
Detective is a software tool designed to allow for rapid investigation of the 
contents and activities of a Windows PC. It investigate the history of the PC 
to determine what the system was used for, such as which web sites were 
visited, what images were downloaded. Detective can be installed on the file 
server and operated in batch mode. This will simultaneously scan network 
workstations and save results on the network server for easy retrieval by the 
system administrator. It can also automatically perform the scan according to 
preset parameters, providing either a separate report for each workstation or 
only one summary log to be appended each day. 
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only one summary log to be appended each day. 
 
10.  Ultimate Toolkit for the Forensics Specialist 
from AccessData Corporation 
www.accessdata.com/products.htm#Modules 
 
Password Recovery is a toolkit that handles all password recovery needs in 
one package, with a wide variety of individual password breaking modules. 
 
NT and Novell Password Replacement Utilities allow continued access to 
Windows NT and Novell file servers with replacement of administrator 
password. 
 
Distributed Network Attack (DNA) is a utility for recovering password-
protected files. DNA decrypts password protected Microsoft Word and Excel, 
and Adobe Acrobat (PDF) documents, using an exhaustive key search. The 
DNA Manager is installed in a central location where machines running DNA 
Client can access it over the network. DNA Manager coordinates the attack, 
assigning small portions of the key search to machines distributed throughout 
the network. DNA Client will run in the background, only taking unused 
processor time. Users will see no difference in processor speed since DNA 
Client cannot override a higher priority program. The program uses the 
combined processing capabilities of all the attached clients to perform an 
exhaustive key search on Office 97/2000 encrypted documents to decrypt the 
file.  
 
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) is a handy utility for computer crimes 
investigators. FTK offers users a complete suite of technologies needed when 
performing forensic examinations of computer systems. Its full text indexing 
offers quick advanced searching capabilities. In addition, the FTK has 
incorporated Stellent's Outside In Viewer Technology to access over 255 
different file formats. The Known File Filter (KFF) feature can be used to 
automatically pull out benign files that are known not to contain any potential 
evidence and flags known problem files for the investigator to immediately 
examine.  
 
SecureClean provides reliable and comprehensive protection to 
electronically shred information by purging deleted files on the PC. It also 
cleans cache, cookie and history files from IE4 and IE5 in real time. 
 
CleanDrive offers reliable and comprehensive protection to electronically 
wipe the hard drive. CleanDrive includes two utilities: WipeDrv and 
CleanDrv. WipeDrv erases data from a physical hard drive, independent of 
the format, including the partition tables. CleanDrv is a secure drive 
reformatting utility that both reformats and erases drive data stored on 
FAT12, FAT16, and FAT32 formatted drives. It erases filenames, folder 
names, file content, the file information tables and the logical drive partitions 
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names, file content, the file information tables and the logical drive partitions 
(drive letters). Both the CleanDrive utilities support any size hard drive and 
can overwrite drive data 1, 3, 7, 12, or 35 times. 
 




Vision is a forensic utility that maps all of a host's executables to 
corresponding ports, allowing the examiner to identify and investigate 
suspicious services. It allow the interrogation of suspected services to identify 
backdoors and Trojan applications. If a malicious service is identified, it can 
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS OF A 
COMPUTER FORENSIC INVESTIGATOR 
1. An investigator requires a capability to simultaneously preview a large 
number of systems on site to determine which ones contain relevant evidence. 
In most cases, an initial search at the physical level of the media may be 
sufficient to determine if a specific computer system or piece of media 
contains relevant information and should be imaged and preserved for further 
more detailed analysis. However, a search at the logical layer would be also 
required to look for relevant files that may be compressed, encrypted, 
encoded, or with reserved keywords that may be physically fragmented on 
disk.  
 
2. An investigator requires the capability to conduct a search at the physical 
level of the target media, ignoring operating system and file system logical 
structures, regardless of the logical content. This physical search of the media 
essentially searches all logical files, file slack, free or unallocated space, and 
all space on the media outside any logical data areas. 
 
3. The search tool must be able to reliably report the physical location on the 
media where responsive data were found. Even though a physical search is 
conducted, the search tool may be able to determine whether the keyword 
resides in a logical file on the media, in file slack, in free space, or in areas of 
the media outside the logical data area. The investigator must be able to 
discern the context within which a word or phrase resides on the media to 
determine if the context is relevant to the investigation. So the search tool 
must be capable of displaying some amount of data that resides on disk 
immediately prior to the keyword and some amount of data that resides on 
disk immediately after the keyword. 
 
4. An investigator requires the capability to conduct a thorough, read only 
search at the logical level of the target media. A search of the logical file 
space is likely to require less time than a search of the physical media, but 
likely will not search every sector of the media. If an investigator begins with 
a logical search to preview media, and that search produces no relevant 
results, the investigator may have to follow up with a search of the physical 
media to ensure a thorough search.  
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5. An investigator requires an ability to generate a listing of all logical files in a 
file system. This listing must include not only all the regular files in a file 
system, but also all files with special attributes, such as hidden files, read-
only files, system files, executable files, directories, links to files, device files, 
etc. And the tool that creates this list must be able to write the list of files to 
appropriate media, whether that is a network accessible volume, a local hard 
drive not under investigation, or some appropriate removable media 
connected to the analysis machine. In addition, an investigator requires an 
ability to generate a listing of all the date and time stamps an operating 
system may store in relation to each file in the file system. Further, an 
investigator requires the ability to identify and generate a listing of all deleted 
files in the file system. Various operating systems handle deleting files in 
various ways, so the specific capability of a tool will be dependant on the file 
system the tool is examining, but to some degree, all file systems have a way 
of at least identifying that a file once existed in a certain space. 
 
6. An investigator requires an ability to search the contents of the regular files in 
a file system without changing either the data in the file or any date and time 
data recorded by the operating system about the file. Some search tools that 
operate at the logical level of the media do not quite meet this requirement. If 
a search tool allows the operating system to update date and time stamps of 
last accessed when the tool runs, then the investigator must take steps to 
preserve those date and time stamps prior to using the search tool. 
 
7. An investigator requires an ability to identify and process special files. 
Special files are in a format where their contents not in a readily readable, 
searchable format. These include encrypted, compressed or password 
protected files; steganographic carrier files; graphics files, video files and 
audio files; PDF format files; executable files or binary data files; files 
housing email archives and/or active email content; swap files or virtual 
memory files, and other such file formats that obscure their plain text content.  
 
8. An investigator requires the capability to recover pertinent deleted files or 
portions thereof that have not been overwritten. This would logically include 
a capability to identify and search all file slack, identify and search all free 
and unallocated space, identify relevant file headers in free space, identify 
deleted directories in free space, including directory entries for deleted files, 
and recover deleted directory entries as well as all pertinent deleted files that 
are not overwritten. 
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9. An investigator requires the capability to make forensically sound images of a 
wide variety of media. Once the preview process has identified that certain 
systems or media contain information relevant to the issues at hand, an 
investigator must have tools capable of making forensically sound images of 
those systems or media. The image must include a true, validated copy of 
every bit of every byte contained on the media, without regard to media 
contents. 
 
10. An investigator requires the capability to restore forensic images to suitable 
media. This requirement stems from a need to be able to run applications 
installed on drive that have been preserved as evidence. Most applications 
rely on installation processes that do more than just copy the application files 
to the media. So running the application in its installed environment may be 
necessary. This cannot currently be done from within the image files, so the 
image must be restored. 
 
11. An investigator requires the capability to perform a sector-by-sector 
comparison of two pieces of media to determine where they differ. To verify 
that one piece of media is an identical copy of another, investigators typically 
use media hashes of some type. But where two pieces of media are thought to 
be identical copies of each other but hash differently, it must be possible to 
compare sector-by-sector. The tool should also verify if any of the differences 
between the original and the copy are merely sectors filled with 0x00 and are 
accounted for by geometry differences only. 
 
12. An investigator requires the capability to thoroughly document their 
investigative activities and succinctly document the data recovered from a 
piece of media that are relevant to the allegations under investigation. If the 
software is self-documenting and certain reports are automatically generated 
for the user, based on the results of exercising the capabilities of the software, 
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• To provide students with an understanding of 
the fundamentals of computer forensics.
• To examine how information is stored in 
computer systems and how it may be 
deliberately hidden and subverted. 
• To establish a sound theoretical foundation of 
the methods used in extracting information 
for forensic examination. 
3
What is Covered
• Fundamentals of computer forensics
• An overview of existing computer security 
mechanisms that could aid in the recovery of 
digital evidence for forensic analysis
• Techniques for computer evidence recovery 




• Handbook of Computer Crime Investigation: 
Forensic Tools & Technology
• Eoghan Casey (editor)
• Computer Forensics Column, 
Doctor Dobb's Journal 
• Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema 
• Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: 
Forensic Science, Computers, and the Internet 
• Eoghan Casey
• The Process of Network Security: 




1. Cyber Crime & Incident Response
2. Introduction to Computer Forensics
3. Application of Forensic Science to Computers
4. A Structure for Forensic Investigations
5. Computer Forensic Procedures
6. Forensics using MAC Times
6
Sections
7. Forensics on Windows
8. Forensics on Unix
9. Forensics on the Networks 
10. Forensics on an Unknown Program 
11. Forensics on Intrusion Activities 
12. Forensics on Wireless Network
27





• Crime involving computers and networks
• Types
– Computer as a Target
– Computer as a Criminal Instrument
– Computer Incidental to other Crimes
– Crimes Associated with Prevalence of Computer
9
Cyber Crime
• Computer as a Target 
– Computer and Network Intrusion
– Data Theft
– Technical Vandalism
• Computer as a Criminal Instrument














• One of the types of Cyber Crime





Types of Computer Crimes
• Theft of computer services and information
• Unauthorized access to protected systems
• Software piracy
• Alterations of electronic information
• Crimes involving use of computers
• Transmission of malicious code
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Computer Crime Prosecution
• Locate the attack areas.
• Gather adequate proof.
• Collect evidence without breaking the law.
• Select a lawyer and court familiar with the 
technicalities of computer crimes. 
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Computer Crime Prosecution
• Convince the court to issue an order for the 
appropriate law enforcement agency to act.
• Collect more evidence, ensuring that the 
integrity of the digital evidence is not 
compromised.





– Familiar with operations of the organization
– Thorough understanding of the design, defenses and 
monitoring systems in the network
– Aware of the system resources and tools
– Understand the response plan for reported/detected 
incidents
– Familiar with the procedures and specific tasks, and the 
importance of urgency 
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Incident Response
• More than often, the computer security 
team, the incident response team, and the 
computer forensic team, are the same key 
players wearing multiple hats.
• Some of these roles may complement 




• The tasks at hand usually compete for time 
and attention from these key players
a. The incident response team needs to conduct a 
preliminary assessment of the compromise 
and tighten the security settings to minimize 




b. The computer forensic team needs to collect 
and preserve evidence to reconstruct the 
events, determine the extent of the damage, 
and prosecute the intruder.
c. The computer security team needs to review 
the computer security plan and policy to 
prevent recurrences of such incidents.
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Incident Response
• It is important to be able to put aside the less 
important and distracting tasks that may 
interfere with the incident response, forensic 
examination or security implementation—
whichever is the priority. 
• This priority may change depending on the 
type of intrusion and incident. All key 
players must understand what is the priority.
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System Discrepancies
• There are many minor discrepancies every 
day that are not caused by intruders.
• Too many false alarms will dull the ability 
of the incident response and forensic team 
to response properly in a real crisis.
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System Discrepancies
• Discrepancies may not be noticed first by the 
incident response team but by users who are 
untrained in spotting computer security 
problems.  
• The incident response team will generally 
exhaust many other possibilities before seriously 
entertaining the idea of an intruder break in.
22
React Quickly & Decisively
• You are not playing chess where there are clear 
rules and you can see the position of all pieces 
on the board.
• If you adopt a conservative plan, move and 
then wait for countermove, you will be playing 
the game the way the attacker wants it played. 
23
Priorities During an Attack
1. Confirm the attack
– Examine other information sources for 
confirmation to determine if the incident 
report is a false alarm
24
Priorities During an Attack
2. Attack Response
– Scramble the response team
– Determine the location of the attacker (internal 
or external) and means of entry, so that he can 
be cut off 
– Decide on a state of lockdown—monitor or halt 
network
– Verify integrity of logs and logging machines
– Estimate extent of contamination and locate 
contaminated systems
525
Priorities During an Attack
3. Lockdown
– Verify integrity of essential infrastructure systems
– Deny attacker additional access to network or 
attempts to switch to another machine on the 
network
– Close the apparent means of entry
– If compromise of normal shutdown procedure is 
suspected, pull the power cord to halt machine 
abruptly.
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Priorities During an Attack
4. Stabilization
– Ensure attacker has no further influence on 
the network
– Monitor system activities to determine 
secondary contamination or successfully 
installed malicious code
27
Priorities During an Attack
5. Cleanup
– Focus on returning network and systems to 
full operational status
– Contaminated systems shall be taken offline 
and completely rebuilt, and watch for self- or 
re-infection
– Verify that attack has not been designed to 
erase backup tapes when mounted
28
Priorities During an Attack
6. Restart and Monitor
– Watch all subsequent activities from the 
attack source network or entries of attack
29
Investigation Checklist
• Date and time of attack or detection
• What files were compromised
– New and hidden files
– Unusual file or directory names and size
– Normal-looking files out of their unusual places
• bin: binary programs
• lib: loaded libraries and static data files
• dev: device drivers
• etc: administrative programs and configuration files
• man: manual pages  
30
Investigation Checklist
• Which machines were compromised
– Unusual running processes 
• How initial penetration occurred
• What holes have been added
• Anomalies in logs
• Anomalies in network
– Unauthorized network listeners
631
Managing the Incident Response
• Break up the investigation 
– Assign members to examine different areas 
concurrently
• Schedule regular team briefing
– Avoid constant interruption for status updates
– Avoid uncoordinated duplication and poor correlation
• Schedule management brief
– Provide facts and not too much unproven speculations 
or undue alarms 32
Managing the Risk
• Before resuming normal business operation, 
be reasonably confident that it will not 
cause a major problem or re-attacks
• Difficult to be absolutely certain
• Need to find acceptable level of risk and get 
back online 
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Requirements for Digital Detectives
• Technical awareness
• Knowing the technical implications of your actions
• Understand how data can be modified
• Clever, open-minded & devious
• Highly ethical
• Continuing education, knowledge of history
• Always use highly redundant data sources when 
drawing conclusions 40
Digital Evidence
• Physical Evidence in Electromagnetic form
• Pros
– An exact copy can be duplicated to avoid risk 
of damaging original evidence 
– Having the right tools can help to determine if 




• Pros (cont) 
– Evidence may not be easily destroyed and can 
be recovered even when deleted
• Cons
– Seizing, preserving and analyzing digital 
evidence is the greatest forensic challenge
– Privacy concerns complicate gathering of 
evidence
42
Use of Digital Evidence
• Digital evidence must be preserved in its 
original state
• Evidence must be proven to be authentic 
and unaltered
• A printout or duplicate of digital evidence is 
admissible in court unless the authenticity 
of the original evidence is in question
843
US Federal Rules of Evidence
• Records of regularly conducted activity are 







• What to collect? 
• Hardware
• All Information Media
• Selected Information Media
• Relevant when hardware or information are
• Fruit of the Crime 
• Instruments of the Crime




– When hardware contains a large amount of 
evidence
– Requires little technical expertise
– Simple and less open to criticism





– Risk of damaging equipment, preventing it 
from operating properly again
– Risk liability for unnecessary disruption of 
service
– Develop a bad reputation for a heavy-handed 
approach to investigation
47
Collecting All Information Media
• Advantages
– Information and evidence can be examined later 
in a controlled environment
– Working with a duplicated copy avoids damage 
of original evidence
– Avoids the risk and liabilities of collecting 
hardware
48
Collecting All Information Media
• Disadvantages
– Requires equipment and technical expertise
– Risk not being able to restart computer or 
access entire contents
– Risk missing evidence
– Time consuming
– Methods are open to criticism 
949
Collecting Selected Information Media
• Advantages 
– Allow for a range of expertise
– Able to obtain help from System Administration
– Practical, quick and inexpensive
– Avoid risk and liabilities of collecting hardware and 
information media not specified in warrant
• Disadvantages
– May miss or destroy evidence
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Whether to Turn the Computer 
Off or Leave It Running?
• Most law enforcement agencies recommend 
turning the computer off immediately 
• Philosophy based on the assumption that 
evidence trail may later be erased by the 
intruder
51
Whether to Turn the Computer 
Off or Leave It Running?
• Advantages of turning the computer off 
immediately
– To prevent evidence from being destroyed or 
corrupted
– To contain the attack
52
Whether to Turn the Computer 
off or Leave It Running?
• Disadvantages of turning the computer off 
immediately 
– Terminate monitoring of the intruder and 
collection of further evidence
– Disruption of service
– Tip off intruder that his attack has been detected




• Prevent unauthorized access to powered 
down systems
– Mark contaminated systems with label “Do not 
touch. Do not power up.”
– Tape up power switches or remove power cords 
from the systems.
– Keep contaminated systems in a secure place.
54
Reporting to Law Enforcement
• Many organizations distrust law 
enforcement when it comes to computer 
crime 
• Many organizations have experienced or 
heard of seizure and damage of hardware 
and the information media as a result of 




Reporting to Law Enforcement
• These organizations will choose not to 
involve law enforcement until they decide it 
is absolutely necessary 
– which is often too late 
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What is Computer Forensics?
Computer Forensics involves the 
identification, extraction, 
preservation and documentation of 
computer evidence stored in the 
form of magnetically encoded 
information. 
64
Computer Forensics - Why?
• Many times computer evidence is created 
transparently by the computer’s operating 
system and without the knowledge of the 
computer operator. 
• Such information may actually be hidden from 
view and thus forensic software tools and 
techniques are required to preserve, identify, 
extract and document this computer evidence. 
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Collecting Contents from a Computer
• The computer should be shut down
• The computer should be booted using 
another operating system that bypass the 
existing one and does not change data on 
the hard drive
66
Collecting Contents from a Computer
• All related evidence should be taken out of 
RAM
• A copy of the digital evidence from the hard 




• When collecting the contents of a computer 
memory, a bitstream copy is usually desired
• A bitstream copy duplicates everything in a 




• Unlike a bitstream copy, a regular file copy 
only duplicates the file and leaves the slack 
space behind
• The slack space or allocated space may 
contain important evidence
69
Evidence Collection and Preservation
• Empirical Law of Digital Evidence 
Collection and Preservation: 
– If you only make one copy of digital evidence, 
that evidence will be damaged or completely 
lost 
• Always make multiple copies of the digital 
evidence
70
• Hackers have been known to interfere with 
the backup process to prevent it from 
working correctly
– Make certain that the copying of evidence is 
successful and can be accessed on another 
computer
Evidence Collection and Preservation
71
• It is imperative that the digital evidence is 
saved onto a completely clean disk or write-
once media like a CD-ROM
– Copying digital evidence on used media may 
allow the old data in the slack space to pollute 
or contaminate the digital evidence 
Evidence Collection and Preservation
72
• An alternative to seizing all of the hardware 
or digital evidence is to just take what is 
needed
– This has the advantage of being easier, faster, 
less expensive and less risky than shutting 
down a computer, rebooting it and making full 
bitstream copies




• Do not power off computer, RAM evidence will 
be lost
• To get content out of RAM, all opened programs 
must be closed
• When prompted to save, do not write over 
existing content 
• Shut down the computer…
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Evidence on DOS/MAC/FAT32
• Use a boot disk to bypass OS in the hard drive 
when booting up the computer
• Copy content of hard disk to clean tape, disk or 
CD-ROM (some I/O devices will not operate 
without loading specialized drivers, so have 
different backup devices available)
• Perform a bitstream copy
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Evidence on NTFS
• Security partitions complicate the collection of 
digital evidence
• Use a boot disk to bypass the Win NT OS to 
access content of hard disk
• Evidence can also be collected directly by 
another computer connected on cable and 
running the disk copy utilities 
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Evidence on Unix
• Unix allows programs to run on background, 
hence it is necessary to explicitly list all 
processs using ps –aux
• Extract key evidence from RAM on unfamiliar 
or suspicious processes using gcore
• Booting a Unix machine off a boot disk is a 
complicated process, be careful to avoid 
destroying digital evidence
• Make a bitstream copy using dd
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Documenting Digital Evidence
• To support that digital evidence is authentic, 
unaltered and in its original state
• Since digital copies of evidence are identical, 
labeling helps to tell them apart from the 
original
• Labeling is particularly crucial when there are 
several computers with identical components
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Documenting Digital Evidence
• Labeling can support a chain of custody for 
the digital evidence, thus establishing 
complete control of the evidence at all times
• A complete list of all files, properties and 





• A message digest produces a statistically 
unique hash for a given input and is always 
the same for the same input
• Examples:




• Message digests provide statistically 
uniqueness of a file, hence they are 
sometimes referred as digital fingerprint
• A message digest of the digital evidence 
will produce a different hash if the digital 
evidence has been tampered with
81
Message Digest
• Digital signature adds authenticity to 
the message digest
Message Digest = Integrity
Digital Signature = Authenticity
82
Individualization of Evidence
• Comparing digital evidence with a control 
specimen can highlight unique aspects of the 
evidence
• These individualizing characteristics of the digital 
evidence can be used to 
– link cases
– generate suspects
– associate a crime with a specific computer
83
Individualization of Evidence
Richard Smith tracked down the creator of 
the Melissa virus based on the Ethernet 
address of the computer embedded in the 
Word97 document
84
Classifications of Digital Evidence
• By Contents
– Using the contents of an email meassage to 
classify it and to determine which computer it 
came from
– Swap files and slack space contain a random 




Classifications of Digital Evidence
• By Function
– Examining how a program functions 




– Identifying the computer that remotely controls 
or creates the program
86
Classifications of Digital Evidence
• By Characteristics







Gathering and analyzing data in a 
manner as free from distortion or 
bias as possible to reconstruct data or 
what has happened in the past on a 
system.
88
Digital Evidence & Reconstruction
• 2 aspects of reconstruction
– Reconstructing digital evidence that has been 
damaged





– A deleted file can often be easily recovered
– A deleted file that is partially overwritten still 
leaves partial information in the slack space
– More difficult for Unix since high level of 
activities quickly overwrite deleted 
information.
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• Shadow Data 
– Result of minor imprecision that naturally 
occurs when data is being written on a disk
– Only some part of the data is over written 
leaving other portions untouched
– Scanning probe microscopes and magnetic 
force microscope can recover these fragments 





– Evidence can also be retrieved from Swap files 
that are used to store temporary information
• PAGEFILE.SYS in Win NT




• Using digital evidence to determine actions 
surrounding a criminal act
• Establish what has happened, who caused 





• Identifying the object, its source, and relations 
to other objects 
• Functional 
• How the object was used 
• Temporal 





– Do not be too dependent on digital evidence. 
Look for supporting physical evidence when 
possible
– Do not be influenced by the media, which tend 
to sensationalize and misreport facts, thereby 
changing the way we perceive facts.
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Digital Evidence Guidelines
• Do not violate any laws or give rise to liability 
when collecting digital evidence
• If these laws are violated, the evidence could 
be inadmissible
• Obtain a search warrant if necessary
• If the seizure interrupts a business 
unnecessarily, the investigators could be held 
personally responsible
96
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• After computer equipment has been seized, 
the evidence it contains must be collected in 
a way that preserves its integrity. 
• Employ an imaging utility to capture a 




• While processing an evidence disk, run a 
message digest program and record its 
output. 
• Periodically, validate the entire logical file 




• Disk-level (as opposed to logical-level) 
hashing is not viable because even hard 
drives of the same manufacture, model and 
lot number may differ in size and location 
of bad sectors and maintenance sectors.
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Testing Initial Tools
• Trust in Forensic tools should not be 
explicitly based on the word of the vendor. 
• Long-held beliefs that a certain tool will 





• Imaging utilities must be tested thoroughly 
or have its source code vetted to ensure the 
pristine nature of evidence.
• To test a tool, take hashes before and after 




• Another effective way to stress test tools is 
to manipulate the access modes of the 
controlling BIOS. 
• Submit the tools to an array of size, bus and 




• James Holley conducted a thorough test of forensic 
imaging utilities.
– Numerous imaging utilities worked fine against the IDE 
chain. 
– This discovery awakened many users and sparked 
investigations of other tools.




• When dealing with child pornography, this 
stage might involve analyzing all URLs and 
extracting all images on the suspect’s hard 
drive. 
• When investigating an Intellectual Property 
theft, it may be sufficient to analyze 
communications and data transfers, and 
perform a key word search. 
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Formulating Leads
• The examiner must find an acceptable level of 
‘hits ’ during a search. 
• In some cases, false positive during the leads 
generation phase can be useful. 
• However, in other situations this may be 
impractical, overly expensive, or detrimental to 
the investigation. 
– Client may have expense constraints 
– Short window of opportunity 
– Non effective case management. 108
Formulating Leads
• Drawbacks of finding too little information. 
– Failure to find critical evidence can 
• Stop investigations





• Having numerous lead-generation tools is 
vital. 
• Although buying more than 1 or 2 sets of 
tools can be expensive, it is a necessary 
aspect of computer forensics.
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Formulating Leads
• Unix search and analysis commands are 
reasonably powerful.
– awk is extremely powerful for performing 
analysis. 
– grep search can output binary data such as 
carriage returns and line feeds. This data can be 
piped to awk to redirect the requisite evidence 
into smaller database files. 
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Focused Search
• Search the medium for specific information. 
• Focus and precisely pinpoint exactly the 
relevant details. 
• Conduct 
– Regular expression searches




• With NT being as ubiquitous as it currently 
is, support for Unicode is a requirement. 
• If a tool does not understand Unicode, it 
will miss vital evidence.
113
Temporal Analysis
• Temporal analysis is performed to ascertain 
date and time information of the evidence. 
• Identify deleted files, deleted subdirectories 
and when they are deleted. 
– Examine Windows Recycle Bin or Recycler 
entities in the respective registries. 
• Build an analytical timeline based upon 
information from the sources. 
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Temporal Analysis
• In Unix file systems, it is possible to 
determine file deletion time, assuming the
inodes involved have not been overwritten. 
• Scattered data all rely upon one another and 
analysis of them as a whole. 
• Navigate through deleted subdirectories on 




• Once the evidentiary material is located, it 
can be recovered from the medium.
• Some tools include the slack space when 
recovering a file, others stop at the 
appropriate byte offset, excluding the slack. 
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Data/Evidence Recovery
• Recovering the contents of slack can be 
valuable if that slack contains additional 
evidentiary data, especially in Windows 
operating systems.
• If a file happens to require the original 
application that created it, slack at the end 




• Certain Microsoft Office applications will 
refuse to open a document if they detect any 
information past a given point. 
• Other applications in Office will read only 




• If the application relies upon the file size to 
open the file, and 
– The forensic tool disturbs the file size by 
concatenating the slacks into an active file upon 
capture or recovery,
• Trick the application into opening the file normally 
by modifying the file’ s size information.
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Data/Evidence Recovery
• There are no tools that work against all file 
systems. 
• Examiners should acquire file/data recovery 
tools capable of working against at least the 
top 5 most frequently used file systems 
– FAT, VFAT, NTFS, EXT2, UFS
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Data/Evidence Recovery
• Data recovery/collection forensic tools 
should have error handling.
• It should log any data recovery failures. 






– Determines unique factors presented in case.
• Comparison
– Attempts to link the ‘fingerprint’ of the case 
with other known cases. 
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Characterizing an Intrusion
• Individualization and comparison can help 
to link a case with other similar cases and 
uncover evidence that may be previously 
overlooked.
• Hash values for malicious files and user 
names that are identical to those recorded in 
previous cases can be helpful in linking the 




• It is important for the examiner to remain 
objectives. 
• If the examiner develops a set of required 
actions for a case type, regardless of the 
appearance of guilt, the evidence should 
stand out on its own and point to the truth. 
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Examiner’s Mindset
• If the examiner picks and chooses which 
action to perform as he goes along, instead 
of building the investigation on a solid 
framework, human nature may cause him to 
‘cut to the chase’ by
– Skipping important steps 
– Not look for certain types of evidence
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Examiner’s Mindset
• Examiners must be analytical and detailed 
in nature; performing tasks in a meticulous 
manner. 
• The training and background of an 
examiner will be a better ally than a tool.
126








• Gain control of the situation
– Take decisive actions 
• Stop any active problems
– Block the source of the problem
– Limit the damage
• Map out damage area
• Prioritize areas for investigations
• Restore systems in order of operational priority
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Turning Off The Computer 
• Information that may be lost from memory
– Processes that were running
– Network connections
– Mounted file system
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Turning Off The Computer
• Shutting down a system before collecting 
volatile data can result in a loss of 
significant evidence when
– Dealing with systems that have several 
gigabytes of random access memory 
– Systems have active network connections that 
are of critical importance to an investigation
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Turning Off The Computer
• An abrupt shutdown may 
– corrupt important data
– damage hardware, preventing the system from 
rebooting
– cause significant disruption and financial loss
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• Retained information 
– Information on the disk in the RAM slack
– Virtual memory in the form of swap and page 
files




• Disk editing programs and memory inspection 
tools can capture the entire contents of RAM 
and provide information about the processes 
that are running on a system
– Norton Diskedit 
– fport (www.foundstone.com)
– handleex (www.sysinternals.com)
– ps andpulist (Windows 2000 resource kit)
– Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT) automates the collection 
of volatile information from live computer system 
(www.porcupine.org/forensic)
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Physical vs Logical Examination
• Viewing the file logically enables the 
examiner to determine the type of data 
stored (text file, executable file, 
bitmap…).
• Searching at the physical level may has 
potential pitfalls. If a file is fragmented, 
with portions in non-adjacent clusters, 
keyword searches may give inaccurate 
results.
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Challenges of Investigating 
Criminal Activity
• The distributed nature of networks results in 
a distribution of the crime scene which can 
create practical and jurisdictional problems.
• Digital data is easily deleted or changed, 
hence it is necessary to collect and preserve 
it as quickly as possible.
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Challenges of Investigating 
Criminal Activity
• A wide range of technical expertise is 
required when networks are involved in a 
crime. Every network is different, 
combining different technologies in unique 
ways.
• A great volume of data maybe involved. 
Searching for useful evidence can be like 
looking for a needle in a haystack.
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Challenges of Investigating 
Criminal Activity
• Necessary to associate an individual with 
specific activity on a computer or network.
• Even when offenders make no effort to 
conceal their identity, they can claim that 
they were not responsible.
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Challenges of Investigating 
Criminal Activity
• Encryption can make it difficult or 
impossible for examiners to analyze 
evidence.
• Steganography, combines encryption and 
data hiding to create a file system that 





An Art or A Science?
• Because every investigation is different, it is 
difficult to create standard operating 
procedures to cover every aspect of in -depth 
forensic analysis of digital evidence. 
• Therefore, it is important to have a 
methodical approach to organizing and 
analyzing the large amounts of data typical 
of computers and networks.
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Problems Gaining Access to Data
• Difficulties of finding where the data is 
stored
– Records stored off-site raise difficulties because 
they are not in the producing party’s immediate 
custody.
– The producing party may, therefore, not even 
know that the records exist.
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Problems Gaining Access to Data
• Difficulties posed by Encryption
– Encryption applications can make records 
impossible to recover if they are used correctly 
and no data recovery procedures are in place.
– If the user forgets the password or leaves the 
company, the producing party may not be able 
to produce a readable version of a protected 
file.
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Problems Gaining Access to Data
• Provision for Data Recovery
– PGP can be configured to include Additional 
Decryption Key (ADK) that enables an 
authorized entity to decrypt and recover data. 
– Windows 2000’s Encrypted File System allows 
for data recovery agents.
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Problems Gaining Access to Data
• Difficulties posed by Obsolete or Missing 
Hardware and Software
– As organizations upgrade, change systems and 
vendors, they leave a legacy of data potentially 
incompatible with their current hardware and 
software.
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Problems Gaining Access to Data
• Difficulties posed by Obsolete or Missing 
Hardware and Software
– Old file formats become incompatible with the 
new applications, new hardware cannot read the 
old media. 
– Obsolete data may require substantial time and 
expense to retrieve and make readable.
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Problems Gaining Access to Data
• Difficulties posed by Obsolete or Missing 
Hardware and Software
– Anticipating such a burden can mitigate its 
impact by
• seeking orders or stipulations to apportion cost
• lengthen the time to response
• limit necessary effort on data discovery
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Consider the Cost of Failure
• Investigation can be invasive, disruptive, 
and expensive.
• Evidence corruption can occur 
unintentionally.
• The normal use of computers and 
management of IT systems can result in the 
inadvertent destruction of evidence.
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Preservation
• Carry out preservation procedures 
immediately.
• Prioritized preservation effort.
• Exercise care to preserve records and avoid 
possible corruption.
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Preserve Media rather than Files
• Preserve the media, as opposed to 
preserving only the files that appear to be 
interesting at the time of initial review.
• This will help to preserve not only the files 
of interest but also any files that may later 
turn out to be important as the case 
progresses.
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Preserve Media rather than Files
• Preserving the media also preserves residual 
or deleted data.
• The preserved media may contain other data 
that an examiner can use to authenticate, 
corroborate, dissect or discredit other files 
contained on the media.
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Examining the Bits
• To reconstruct the past events with as 
little distortion or bias as possible.
• There are a lot of places in the system 
that work together when a command 





• Operating systems maintain records of logins and 
logouts, and commands executed
• Individual subsystems maintain their own logging
• Mail delivery software maintains a record of 
delivery attempts 
• Privileged commands, such as su (switch userid), 
are logged for every invocation regardless of its 




– Stash data in slack space, bad blocks.
• Firmware 
– CPU, BIOS, pal, disk, network controllers.
• Kernel 
– Loadable modules, on-the-fly memory patches.
• Applications
– Rootkit trojan horse system utilities
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Opportunities for Tampering
• Library software 
– Execute trojan, open good file, backdoors.
• Processes 
– On-the-fly memory patches.
• Time Synchronization




• Raw bits 
– Media, RAM, wiring, buses 
• CPU Controllers 
– Memory, disk, network, terminal, disk blocks, memory pages, network 
packets
• Kernel 
– Translates bits into files, processes, connections, sessions, au thentication
• Library Software 
– Building blocks for applications 
• Applications 
– Depend on both program and data files, names, files, ownership, time 
stamps
• Processes






























• Device drivers 
• Dynamic libraries
• Commands
• The shell & environment variables
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Correlating Information
• Each individual log file gives its own 
limited view of what happened on a system
• How trustworthy is information from that 
log file when an intruder had an opportunity 
to tamper with the record to cover his tracks 
• Multiple sources of information must be 




• File systems typically store files as 
contiguous sequences of bytes, organized 
within a directory hierarchy 
• Files and directories have attributes that are 
stored separately
• Deleting a file from the file system 




• Traces of older magnetic patterns still exist 
on the physical media 
• Destroying or modifying data to hide 
evidence can leave significant marks 
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Logical Abstractions
• The trustworthiness of information is 
determined by its logical layering
• Only the physical level within the magnetic 
domains is real, however it is also the least 
accessible
• Abstractions of disk blocks, contiguous files 
and directory hierarchies are created by 
software which may have been tampered with
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Logical Abstractions
• The more levels of abstraction, the more 
opportunities for mistakes 
• Without a file system, disk blocks are no 
longer grouped together into meaningful 
objects - reconstruction can be like solving 
a puzzle
• With more layers of abstraction, 
information becomes more ambiguous
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Logical Abstractions
• Stored information can be volatile and 
persistent at the same time
• The volatility of stored information is 




• Registers, peripheral memory, caches




• Floppies, backup media, etc.
• CD-ROMs, printouts, etc.
28
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Preventing Harm to the Business
• Taking hard drives from computers has a 
tendency to stop productivity. 
• A quick solution would be to copy the hard 
drives so that the copy could be put in 
service and the original held for review.
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Evidentiary Images
• To obtain copies of the media for evidence, 
forensic analysis, or data recovery purposes, 
the producing party should make either an 
exact bit for bit copy of each medium.
• Theses evidentiary images (or duplicates) 
are to be used in the subsequent 
examinations or data recovery efforts 
instead of the original media.
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Evidentiary Images
• Bit for bit copying captures all the data on 
the copied media including hidden and 
residual information. Residual data permits 
the examiner to reconstruct deleted files.
• Preserving the media in bit for bit copies, as 
opposed to just copies of files, allows the 
flexibility to delve into facts and details the 
files themselves cannot disclose.
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Evidentiary Images
• When the media can be write-protected, 
imaging may sometimes be dispensed with.
• The physical write protection of such media 
must permit the examiner to review, analyze 




• Imaging process should not alter the 
original evidence in any ways.
• Ensure that none of the imaging processes 
write any data to the original medium.




• Note the serial number and other unique 
identification information of the original 
media, as well as the computer from which 
it came.
• This information permits link to its original 





• The difference between the computer 
system’s time and date and the actual time 
and data is important to either corroborate 
or discount the dates and times of files on 
that computer.
• Record the examiner’s name and the date 
the image was made.
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Preparing Evidentiary Images
• The examiner’s name and the date the 
image was made, serves as the link in the 
chain of custody for the evidentiary 
duplicate or image files.
• Maintaining a chain of custody allows the 
examiner to later testify as to the veracity or 
authenticity of particular records.
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Imaging Procedure
1. Create an Evidence Acquisition Boot Disk 
(EABD) for the imaging platform.
2. Remove the hard drive(s) from the source 
computer.
3. Fill out an evidence tag with the serial 




4. Label a forensically clean hard drive with 
an evidence label and attach the drive to 
the computer that will be used to prepare 
the evidentiary images. 
5. Boot the imaging platform with an EABD. 
Partition and format the hard drive. This is 




6. Attach hard drive to be imaged (“Source 
Drive”) to the imaging platform.
7. Load the imaging software.
8. When specifying the source and target 
drive, note that fdisknumbers physical 
drives starting at 1. The imaging software 
and other partition utilities may start the 
number sequence at 0.
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Imaging Procedure
9. Monitoring the acquisition. Someone 
should attend the imaging to ensure that 
the acquisition completes properly.
10. Boot the original computer with a 
bootable floppy. Enter the commands for 
date and time and note on the evidence tag 
the data and time represented by the 




• Three goals in filtering
– To facilitate the attorney’s review of the 
records by making the records readable
– To reduce the data that the attorney’s must 
review
– To gather information about the records that 




• The filtering procedure may require a 
workspace twice as large as the volume of 
data to be processed.
• Create work directories to contain
– \prep Files requiring further processing





– \special Recovered, encrypted & email source files
– \pslack Extracted slack
– \pcluster Extracted unassigned clusters
– \rfiles Unprocessed files after reduction
– \rslack Reduced slack
– \rcluster Reduced unassigned cluster
– \converted Processed files
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Data Filtering Steps 
1. Access evidentiary image files and restore 
any backup data.
2. Generate file lists containing hash values.
3. Recover deleted data.
4. Recover slack and unassigned clusters.
5. Identify and remove known files.
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Data Filtering Steps 
6. Remove other unnecessary file types.
7. Remove duplicates.
8. Identify and decrypt encrypted files.
9. Extract e-mail and attachments.
10. Index text data.
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Access or Restore Images or 
Backup Tapes
• Using Forensic Tools
– Encase (www.encase.com) 
– FTK (www.accessdata.com) 
– Copy the image files to the workspace rather 
than using the original evidentiary images 
throughout the filtering process.
31
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Access or Restore Images or 
Backup Tapes
– Backup software should contain error-checking 
features to verify the quality of the restored 
data. 
– The restored files will not have the evidentiary 
fragility of files restored from evidentiary 
images, since the backup and restore operations 
will not have preserved residual data.
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Access or Restore Images or 
Backup Tapes
• Using Backup Tools 
– Safeback (www.secure-data.com) 
– Restore hard drives from evidentiary images.
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Access or Restore Images or 
Backup Tapes
• In contrast with the relative ease of restoring 
hard drives, restoring backup tapes can involve 
a substantial effort.
• The most difficult work involved in restoring 
backup tapes may be configuring a system that 
can properly receive the data.
• Data backed up off network servers often will 
not restore properly unless the data are restored 
to a system configured substantially the same as 
the original system. 184
Generate File Lists 
and Hash Values
• Obtain a list of all the files and their 
respective hash values.
• Since the data and time stamps of the files 
will change during the filtering process, the 
preliminary file information and hash values 
will serve as a reference for later checking 
of the authenticity or veracity of the files.
• Capture this information before any other 
activity might alter it!
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File List Information 
1. Long and short file names
2. Extensions
3. Last written or modified dates and times
4. Created dates and times





Generate File Lists 
and Hash Values
• Generate file lists with software tools.
• Before exporting file list, populate the file 
property columns with data regarding hash 
values, file signatures, hash sets, known file 
values and other significant information
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Generate File Lists 
and Hash Values
• Processing of hard drive should be done in 
an environment that affords a level of write-
protection to the data.
• However, data restored from backup tapes 
could be processed in Windows, since there 
is no concern about losing residual data such 
as slack or unassigned clusters.
• Software Tools: 
– hash and compare (www.maresware.com) 
– rspsort (www.simtel.net ) 188
Recover Deleted Files
• Copy or export deleted files to the \special 
subdirectory
– Use copy or export commands in Encase or 
FTK.
– Preserve the directory structure in which the 




• Perform data recovery work on FAT file 
system in DOS.
– Lost & Found (www.powerquest.com)
• Recovery of data from other file systems 
will typically require the use of tools 
specific to those other operating system. 
• To recover data from an NTFS volume, 
need to work within Window NT/2000 
– RecoverNT (www.lc-tech.com)
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Recover Slack and 
Unassigned Clusters
• The purpose of extracting slack and 
unassigned clusters is to capture residual 
text data on the media for review
• 2 steps:
– Extract the slack and unassigned clusters to the 
\pslack and \pclusters subdirectories 
– Remove non-text characters from these files 
and write reduced data to corresponding 
subdirectories in \review  
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Recover Slack and 
Unassigned Clusters
• Use copy or export commands in Encase or 
FTK.
• getslack and getfree (www.secure-
data.com) extract slack and unassigned 
clusters from both FAT and NTFS.
• filter_i (www.secure-data.com), equivalent 
to the Unix stringsutility, removes non-text 
data from the extracted material
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Remove Known Files
• A large amount of data on the hard drive 
and on backup tapes consists of files, such 
as operating system and application files, 
which are not relevant to forensic 
investigations.





• Encase or FTK have sorting and filtering 
features to isolate and exclude known files.
• Identify matching hash values using 
compare (www.maresware.com)  
• Pipe resulting matches to rmd (with 
overwriting) or rm (www.maresware.com) 
to remove known files
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Remove Other Unnecessary Files
• Further reduce the data set by removing 
files based on file types.
• File extensions do not necessarily 
correspond to the file type. 
– Before removing any files, first run a test to 
identify any files whose file type does not 
match its extension. 
– Compare the file’s internal header information 
with its extension and identifies any 
mismatches.
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Remove Other Unnecessary Files
• Verify file extensions versus file types 
• Moves mismatched files to \special 
subdirectory for separate processing
• Removes remaining files of known types
• diskcat (www.maresware.com) identifies file 
extensions against mismatched file types




– Remove duplicates of all data that have not 
changed between backup sessions.
– Identify duplicates by matching names, path 
and hash values
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Identify and Decrypt 
Encrypted Files
• Identify encrypted files in the remaining data 
and attempt to decrypt them if possible.
• Identify encrypted data by scanning files for 
specific character strings in file headers or 
footers. 
– FTK (www.accessdata.com) 
– Password Recovery Toolkit (www.accessdata.com)
– ispgp (www.maresware.com) identifies PGP 
encryption
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Identify and Decrypt 
Encrypted Files
• Moves encrypted files to \special subdirectory 
for decryption 
• Attempt to obtain the password from the person 
who encrypted the file
• Otherwise, recover the password for the 
encrypted file with password recovery software




• Some e-mail applications store message and 
attachments in proprietary formats that 
cannot be reviewed with text -searching 
software. Need to rely on appropriate email 
application.
• Extracted e-mail messages should be 
converted to a text format that can be 




• After data reduction, the \review directory now 
consists of
– \rfiles All the files not excluded by data reduction
– \rslack All data from slack
– \rclusters Unassigned clusters




• Search through the files in the /review 
directory by running a series of string and 
index-based searches.
• Review the indexing log to determine if any 
files could not be indexed and why.
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Indexing
• For an index-based search
– Index the entire review directory using a search 
application
• dtSearch (www.dtsearch.com) 
– Indexing will take time since search will read 
each file and build a database of all terms and 




• Number the records for electronic management.
• This provides a more accurate way to refer to 
files.
• Sequential numbering schemes are traditionally 




• bates_no (www.maresware.com) generates a 
unique serial number for each file 
• After Bates numbering, an examiner can refer 
to the files produced during analysis by their 
unique Bates number rather than file name. 
• Once files have been Bates numbered, 
generate a new file list of all the respetive








atime time of last access
mtime time of last modification
ctime time of last status change
dtime time of deletion (Linux only)
• MAC times are volatile
• If present & unaltered, MAC times are invaluable
• Examine MAC times directly using lstat()
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MAC Times
• MAC times keep track of the final time a 
file is disturbed
• Reading a file changes the atime attribute
– When a program runs, atimeof the executable 
file changes 
– Many systems can disable atimeupdates 




• ctime keeps track of when meta 
information about the file has changed 
• dtime keeps track of when the file is 
deleted 
– In systems without dtime, ctimemay be used 




• When a file is copied, the mtime of the target 
file is the same as the original file
• The atime and ctime are the times when the 
new file is created
• This can make a file appear as though it was 
created after it was modified 
• The atime in NTFS not always updated 
when a file is accessed 
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Storing File Attributes
• Unix system directories store only the 
names of the files and their corresponding
inode numbers.  The rest of the information 
about the file are kept in the actual inode of 
a file. 
• NTFS relies on a Master File Table (MFT) 





• Login from a remote host to a target system
• inetd
– listens to the telnet port, 
– forks off the telnet daemon
• telnetd 
– executes the login program
• login
– authenticates the user 
– updates the login accounting files 
– becomes the shell 212
Reading MAC Times
MAC Permissions File Name See note on next slide
.a. -rwsr-xr-x /usr/bin/login 1
.a. -rwsr-xr-x /usr/etc/in.telnetd 1
.a. -rwsr-xr-x /usr/etc/inetd 1
.a. -rw-r--r-- /etc/group 2
.a. -r--r--r-- /etc/motd 2
.a. -rw-r--r-- /etc/ttytad 2
m.c -rw-rw-rw- /etc/utmp 3
m.c -rw-r--r-- /var/adm /lastlog 3
m.c -rw-r--r-- /var/adm /wtmp 3
.a. -rw-r--r-- /etc/passwd 2
.a. -rwsr-xr-x /bin/csh 1
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Notes on MAC Times
1. Programs executed
– login, in.telnetd, inetd, csh
• atime changed
2. Configuration and authentication files 
used 
– group, motd , ttytab, passwd
• atime changed
3. System accounting files modified 
– utmp, lastlog, wtmp
• mtime and ctime changed 214
Concealed Login
MAC Permissions Owner Group File Name
.a. lrwxrwxrwx root staff /usr/bin/cc
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/lastlog.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/pwd.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/stdio.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/ fcntlcom.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/file.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/signal.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/stat.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/ stdtypes.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/ sysmacros.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/sys/types.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/utmp.h
.a. -r--r--r-- root staff /usr/include/vm/faultcode.h
.a. -rwxr-xr-x root staff /usr/lib/cpp
.a. -rw-r--r-- bin bin /usr/lib/lang_info
.a. -r-xr-xr-x root staff /usr/bin/as
.a. -r-xr-xr-x root staff /usr/lib/ccom
.a. lrwxrwxrwx root staff /lib
.a. -rwxr-xr-x root staff /usr/bin/ld
.a. -rwxr-xr-x bin bin /usr/lib/compile
.a. -rw-r--r-- root staff /usr/lib/crt0.o
.a. -r-xr--r-- root staff /usr/lib/libc.sa.1.8
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Concealed Login
• The cc, cpp, as, and ld commands were executed
• Several header files (lastlog.h and utmp .h) were  
accessed
• A C program was compiled 
• System doesn't show any login activity
>> Someone probably broke into the system and 
compiled a stealth program to remove the 
presence from the system accounting files 
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MAC Times are Universal
• MAC times can be obtained from a running 
machine or a dead disk
• The machine reading the MAC times does 
not have to be of the same operating system 
type as the system that generated the data
37
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MAC Times are Delicate
• Collect MAC times as quickly as possible before 
gathering any other forensic data that might 
destroy them 
• Collecting MAC times must be done cautiously
– lstat() directories before opening them and examining 
their contents 
– Opening a directory for reading changes the atime
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MAC Times are Delicate
• Message digest must be done after the lstat()
– Reading a file changes the atimeof that file
• Work from a duplicate 
– Mount the media as read-only 
– Alternatively, turn off atimeupdates 
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MAC Times are Invaluable
• MAC times can provide invaluable information 
about what programs and files are used on 
operating system startup or shutdown 
• Windowing systems in firewalls and other 
security-sensitive systems add tremendously to the 
system complexity
– Too many file accesses, can cloud MAC times analysis
– Operating systems that cannot operate without a 
windowing system have an inherent security 
disadvantage 220
MAC Times of a Deleted File
• When a file is removed, the ctime is set to 
the time when the last link to the file has 
been destroyed, which is most often at the 
time it was deleted 
• The inode is also deleted from the 
directory entry, making recovery difficult, 
but not impossible
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MAC Times of a Deleted File
• UNIX
– Ownership and MAC times are preserved 
• NTFS
– Does not remove all the file information, it 
sets a flag in the file record of the MFT 
telling the file system that the file is not in 
use anymore 
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Problems with MAC Times 
• MAC times only report on the last time a 
file has been disturbed
• No way of reporting on the historical 
activity of a file or directory 
• They are less useful on busy multi-user 




• UNIX systems can use touch command to 
change atime and mtime. 
• NTFS and UNIX filesystems can also use 
utime() system call to change atime and 
mtime
• NT provides SetFileTime() system call to 
change all three times at once
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MAC Times Manipulation
• An intruder can reset the system clock and 
then change the ctime
– Changing the system clock can cause other 
warning flags 
• Alternately, the intruder can write directly 
to the inode. 
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• FAT file system
– Comprised of file allocation table and folders.
– Uses 8-bit ASCII/ANSI character set.
• NT file system
– Uses several metadata files to keep track of 
files and folders on a given volume. 




• MFT is a system file created during the 
formatting of an NTFS volume. 
• There is an MFT record for every file, 
including an entry for itself. 
• Metadata files are located in the root folder 
with names beginning with ‘$’. 
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Master File Table
• MFT records store attributes of files and 
folder, including the MAC timestamps. 
• MFT records also contain a flag that 
indicates its allocation status. 
– If zero, the record is marked for deletion, or is 
unallocated.
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Windows 2000 Metadata Files
Information about the volume, 
including NTFS version, volume 
names, and volume creation 
time.
$VOLUME3
List of file system transactions$LOGFILE2
Copy of the first 16 records of 
the MFT
$MFTMIRR1
Master File Table (MFT)$MFT 0
DescriptionFile NameRecord
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Windows 2000 Metadata Files
Boot record with bootstrap 
loader code if the volume is 
bootable 
$BOOT7
Bitmap representation of used 
and unused clusters on volume
$BITMAP6
Root folder.5




Windows 2000 Metadata Files
Enables file system extensions 
such as volume quotas 
(W2K only)
$EXTEND11
Conversion table for converting 
lowercase characters to matching 
uppercase Unicode characters
$UPCASE10
Stores security descriptors 
(W2K only)
$SECURE9







– Filenames are on stored in 32 byte structure.
• NTFS
– Filenames (index entries or index allocation) 




• When a folder contains more index entries 
than it can fit in its MFT record
– Additional data are stored on disk in index 
buffers




• For a folder












• Resident attributes are contained within the MFT 
record. 




• The $BITMAP file keeps track of cluster 
usage. 
– If a cluster is used, the bit in the $BITMAP file 
is changed to a one. 




• To allocate a file
– The $BITMAP file must be modified to reflect 
that the used clusters are allocated
– An allocated MFT record must be created for 
the file
– An index entry must be created for the file 
name in the parent folder’s MFT record or 
index buffers
– Cluster extent entries must be created in the 
file’s MFT record if the file is non-resident.
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Bitmap File
• When a file is deleted
– Its cluster references in the $BITMAP file are 
changed to zero
– The MFT record for that file is marked for 
deletion, its index entry is deleted. The entry 
below it are moved up, thereby overwriting the 
deleted entry
– The file is deleted but the data are still on the 
hard disk, its MFT record still exists with its 
deletion bit set to zero
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Bitmap File
• Recovering a deleted file
– If the MFT record can be located, the deleted 
file’s resident attributes cam be recovered, 
including its name and timestamps. 
– NTFS overwrites deleted MFT entries before 
creating new ones. Therefore, any deleted files 
recovered from an NTFS volume will have 
been deleted recently. 
– The MFT records are quickly overwritten but 
their non-resident attributes may remain on disk 
indefinitely and hence can be recovered. 244
Folder Entries for FAT
• When a user renames a file
– A new folder entry is created in the same 
folder.
• When a user moves a file
– The file’s folder entry in the original folder is 
deleted
– A new folder entry is created in the destination 
folder. 
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Folder Entries for FAT
• Renaming and moving a file within a 
volume result in the creation of folder 
entries that have 
– The same dates and times as the original entries
– The same starting clusters 
– The same file sizes
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Folder Entries for FAT
• If a file has a short file name, the information 
available is the





– Status of the attribute bits
• If a file has a long file name
– The complete file name may be available. 
42
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Folder Entries for FAT
• A moved file’s deleted and intact folder 







Folder Entries for FAT
• The examiner can plot the MAC times 
contained in all of the folder entries 
pertaining to a file to identify 
– The date that the file was first placed on the 
volume 
– The date(s) that the user modified the file 
– The most recent date that the user accessed the 
file
• In NTFS, examine the MFT records and 
index buffer
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Folder Entries for FAT
• If a folder is deleted, its data area is not 
necessarily affected. 
• If the deleted folder’s entry still exists in the 
parent of the deleted folder, that entry is 
marked as deleted, but the entry still 
contains a pointer to the data area of the 
deleted folders.
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Folder Entries for FAT
• To locate deleted folders
– Search for the occurrence of a deleted file 
starting with the E5 hex value
– Search for patterns that identify a folder rather 
than a file. 
– Examine the cluster(s) that the folder occupied 
to identify entries that relate to files that were 
located in that folder. 
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Folder Entries for FAT
• Folders on a FAT system consists of 32 byte 
entries. First 11 bytes contain 
– 8 bytes short name of the file or folder
– 3 bytes extension. 
• Folders also contain 2 other 32 bytes entries for 
– The folder’s parent
• First 11 bytes contain 2 dots (2E) followed by 9 spaces (20h)
– The folder itself 
• First 11 bytes contain 1 dot (2E) followed by 10 spaces (20h)
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Folder Entries for FAT
• Caution:
– After a subfolder is deleted, its data could 
coincidentally be overwritten by a new folder‘s 
data
– Examiners may get a false impression that they 
are looking at the old folder’s data when they 




• The Recycle Bin is a hidden system folder 
that operates in accordance with different 
rules than those that govern standard 
folders. 
• The folder is named 
– Recycled in Win95/98
– Recycler in WinNT/2K
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Recycle Bin
• When a user deletes a file, it is moved to 
the Recycle Bin. This results in 
– The deletion of the file’s folder entry in the 
folder in which the file resided
– The creation of a new folder entry in the 
Recycle Bin
– The addition of information about the file in a 
hidden system file, INFO, in the Recycle Bin.
255
Recycle Bin
• The deletion timestamp can be found in the 
INFO file.
• Each INFO file record is 
– 280 bytes in Win95/98
– 800 bytes for WinNT/2K 
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Recycle Bin
• Every file sent to the Recycle Bin is renamed 
in the following format:
D [original drive] [index no] [original extension]
• Appended to the INFO file is
– The file’s original name and path
– Its index number in the Recycle Bin
– Its date and time of deletion
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Recycle Bin
• An INFO file record containing metadata relating 
to a particular file is often effective in confirming 
or refuting computer users’ explanations 
regarding the presence or history of computer file 
recovered from their drivers. 
– File deleted by the operating system do not leave a 
record in the INFO file. 




• If a user’s explanation for the presence of a file is 
that it was inadvertently downloaded during 
Internet activity
– The file’ s location when it was deleted may tend to 
support or refute that contention.
– If the user deleted a particular file residing in a default 
download folder, or in the Temporary Internet Files, the 





• When the user empties the Recycle Bin
– Windows deletes the files in the Recycle Bin and the INFO 
file.
– The INFO file may have been deleted but a folder entry for 
the deleted INFO file still remains. 
– The first character of the entry is changed to E5 hex but the 
rest of the entry remains intact. 
– If the contents of the files are not overwritten, the records 
are available for examination. 
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Recycle Bin
• From the folder entry of the deleted INFO 
file, the examiner can decode
– The timestamps the files were deleted
– The locations of those files at the time they 
were sent to the Recycle Bin
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Recycle Bin
• When the INFO file has been deleted and 
additionally the file’s folder entry has been 
overwritten
– The INFO file may still be intact in unallocated or 
slack space. 
– The examiner can search the entire driver for 
unique characteristics of the INFO file’s contents. 
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Recycle Bin
• If the examiner identifies an INFO file 
record for a file and there are no indications 
that the file’s path existed on the seized 
media
– It is an indication that there may have been 
another piece of media attached to the computer 




• If the drive letter is unaccounted for
– It is an indication that there may have been 
another volume attached to the computer when 




• Windows\Desktop folder contains shortcut 
(.lnk) files.
• The shortcut files contain the fully qualified 
paths of the files that they refer to. 
• The shortcut files may provide indications 
about the current and previous configuration 




• The shortcut files have folder entries that 
record their MAC times. 
– The examiner can compare these dates with the 
dates related to the application’s associated files 
and folders. 
– This comparison may show that the shortcut was 
created after the installation of the program, 
giving rise to the possibility that the user 
intentionally created the shortcut and therefore 
knew of the existence of the application. 
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Shortcut Files
• The installation of an application may result in 
the creation of a shortcut in the Windows\Start 
Menu folder.
• The user may move that shortcut to the desktop, 
but this action would result in the creation of the 
moved-file indicators and evidence that 
– The user knew of the application’s existence. 
– An application program, which is no longer present 
on the computers, was installed at one time. 
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Shortcut Files
• Windows\Recent folder contains shortcut 
files that point to data files that were opened 
on the computer.
• The data area of the shortcut file contains
– The filename and fully qualified path
– The MAC times, which provide a secondary 
source to track a file’s history.
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Shortcut Files
• The MAC times provide a means of 
connecting a volume with the volume that 
the operating system is running on
– If a shortcut file refers to a target file that is 
located on a removable volume, the shortcut 
file will contain the MAC times that appear in 




• The search for shortcut files can be 
conducted in the
– Allocated area of the disk
– Unallocated area of the disk
• The examiner may conduct a search of unallocated 





• Viewing any graphics files thumbnails is 
accomplished by the creation of a hidden 
system file named Thumbs.DB. 
• Thumbs.DB contains a copy of each graphic 





• The user may delete files from the folders, 
but the copies of those files in the 
Thumbs.DB file may not be removed.
• Examination of the Thumbs.DB file may 
reveal that a file once existed on the volume 
and its modification timestamps, even 
though it is no longer existent. 
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Index.DAT
• Internet Explorer caches website that a user visits, 
in the C:\Windows \Temporary Internet Files 
folder and maps filenames to the system files. 
• The Index.DAT file uses as many 128-byte 
blocks to describe each file. The records contain 
– The URL
– The date that the page was last modified by the server 
– The date that the URL was last accessed by the user
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Registry Entries
• The Windows registry is a repository for the 
hardware and software configuration
– On Win95/98, registry is comprised of
• WINDOWS\SYSTEM.DAT 
• WINDOWS\USER.DAT
– On WinNT/2K, registry is comprised of 
• several hive files located in %systemroot%\system32\config
• NTUSER.DAT files related to each user account. 274
Registry Entries
• The registry stores information about many 
aspects of the system in cells. A cell might 
reveal
– Software installed on the subject machine
– Recently used programs and files
– Recently accessed servers usingTelenet .
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Registry Entries
• The Registry can be viewed using 
– regedit on Win95/98
– regedt32 on WinNT/2K
– regdmp utility in the Windows NT Resource Kit to 
list the contents of a registry key
• In WinNT/2K, each registry key has a 
timestamp of the most recent update to the key.
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Printing
• Printing involves a spooling process. 
• Print spooling is accomplished by creating 
temporary files that contain both the data to 
be printed and sufficient information to 




• Files with extension .SHD and .SPL are 
created for each print job. 
• The .SHD file contains information about 
the print job, including 
– The owner 
– The printer
– The name of the file printed
– The printing method (RAW or EMF). 278
Printing
• In RAW format, the .SPL file contains the 
data to be printed.
• In EMF format, the .SPL file in Win95/98 is 
different from that in WinNT/2K 
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Printing
• .SPL file in EMF format on Win95/98 
contains 
– Name of the file printed
– Printing method
– A list of files that contain the data to be printed.
• The files containing the data to be printed are in 
enhanced metafile format
• They have names in the format of ~EMFxxxx.TMP 
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Printing
• .SPL file in EMF format on WinNT/2K 
contains 
– Name of the file printed
– Printing method (EMF or RAW)
– The data to be printed. 
• The .SHD .SPL and .TMP files are deleted 
after the print job is completed. 
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Printing
• In a network environment
– The .SPL and .SHD files are found on both the 
workstation and the servers. 
– The examiner may examine the volume for 




• The .SPL and .SHD files contain the name 
of the files to be printed and its fully 
qualified path. 
– The existence of a file in enhanced metafile 
format suggests the deliberate act of printing.
• This may indicate knowledge on the part of the 




– The path may suggest that other media 
containing evidence exists. 
– If the original file that the user printed does 
not exist on the seized evidence, the file may 
be found in enhanced metafile format.
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NTFS Log File
• The $LOGFILE is created during the 
formatting of an NTFS volume 
– To keep track of transactions
– To enable NTFS to recover from system crashes. 
• By documenting the operations to be conducted to 
complete a transaction, NTFS can undo or redo 




• To delete a file
– The $BITMAP file must be changed to show 
the clusters as unallocated
– The MFT record must be marked as unallocated
– The index entry must deleted
• These steps are recorded in the $LOGFILE 
so that each step in the transaction can be 
executed again or undone if problems arise. 
– If a crash occurs, NTFS can complete partially 
completed transactions. 286
NTFS Log File
• The $LOGFILE contains
– Index entries
• To describes filename and MAC times
– Copy of MFT Record
• MFT records all file information beginning with 
‘File’ followed by a 2A hex value
– Link files
• Link files are preceded with the link file header
– Index buffers
• Index buffers are preceded with ‘ INDX’
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Windows NT Event Logs
• Microsoft WinNT can be configured to log 
events in binary files
– System events in SysEvent.evt
– Application events in AppEvent.evt 
– Security events in SecEvent.evt.
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Windows NT Event Logs
• System logs include events in the system’s 
operation such as a failed or successful 
driver startup, an application crash or errors 
associated with data lost.




Windows NT Event Logs
• Security logs contain information such as 
logon and logoff events, file manipulation, 
and other resource access events.
• Additionally,WinXP comes with the 
software-based Microsoft Internet 
Connection Firewall that has its own log 
files.
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Windows NT Event Logs
• An event log entry has 3 sections
– Header: 
• Date, Time, Username, Computer Name, Event Id, 
Source, Type, Category
– Event Description
• Information about the event or recommended 
remedy
– Additional Data
• Optional binary data.
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Windows NT Event Logs
• Windows NT has descriptive messages 
stored in the Registry and separate files. 
• The Event Viewer combines and displays 
the information in these files, providing a 
convenient way to view the data.
– Double click to bring up the Events Details 
windows.
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Windows NT Event Logs
• WinNT stores descriptive messages in the 
Registry and various messages files.
• Copying *.evt files from one system to 
another for examination may result in 
misinterpretation. 
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Windows NT Event Logs
• When viewing event logs on a remote 
system. 
– The Event Viewers will read the event record 
data from the remote log files, but will search 
the registry of the local system for the 
corresponding event message files.
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Extracting Event Log
1. Extract the event logs from the image 
files.
2. Extract all related information referred to 






3. Extract the system hives file from
– WINNT\System32\Config
4. Open regedt32, go to 
– HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
5. In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, locate key
– CurrentControlSet or ControlSet00x
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Extracting Event Log
6. Under the EventLog
– Open the Application, Security, and System 
sub-keys
– Export each key as a .reg file. 
– Examine the data portion of each key for 
EventMessageFile
– This will reveal the path and file name of the 
file the Event Viewer uses to display 
explanatory text for each event.
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Extracting Event Log
7. Extract the required executables (.exe) or 
dynamic link libraries (.DLL).
8. Edit the exported *.reg files such that
– The path in the EventMessageFile statement 
points to the location of the appropriate 
extracted files on the examination system. 
– The created key should state the sub-key as 
CurrentControlSet rather than ControlSet00x
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Extracting Event Log
9. Import the registry keys (*.reg) into the 
forensic workstation’s registry. 
10. It may be possible to open an extracted 
*.evt file with the Event Viewer using the 
Action|Open Log File menu option
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Extracting Event Log
– Most of the time, the Event Viewer will report 
that the file is corrupted and will refuse to open 
it. 
– The log is rarely actually corrupted
– When the event logging service does not shut 
down cleanly, the Windows Service Control 
Manager does not reset several bit values that 




– The event logging service cannot be stopped 
while WinNT/2K is running to prevent 
intruders from disabling event logging. 
– WinZapper can break the Event Log service 
without shutting it down, enabling an intruder 
to remove individual entries from Event Log 
files that are in use by the system.
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Loading Logs into Event Viewer
1. Go into Services in the Control Panel
– Disable the events logging service. 
– The event logging is disabled automatically 
when the system is rebooted.
2. Reboot the forensic workstation
– Check Services to ensure that the event 
logging service is not on.
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Loading Logs into Event Viewer
3. Go to the WINNT\System32\Config folder
– Rename the SecEvent.evt, AppEvent.evt and
sysEvent.evt files to something else.
4. Copy the event logs extracted from the image 
to the WINNT\System32\Config folder.
5. Go into Services
– Set the event logging service to manual start.
– Start the event logging services.
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Loading Logs into Event Viewer
6. Open the Event Viewer to display the logs 
from the imaged system. 
– This will add new events to the log files 
stamped with the current date and time.
7. To minimize contamination, immediately 
generate new copies of the event logs 
using the Event Viewer’s save as 
command.
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Displaying Logs in Event Viewer
• Although convenient, displaying logs using 
the Event Viewer is not very conducive for 
analysis
– Event Viewer is not integrated with other data 
processing tools. 
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Displaying Logs in Event Viewer
– Microsoft recommends dumpevt
(www.systemtools.com) for dumping contents 
of events logs into a format suitable for 
spreadsheets and databases. 
– Importing contents of multiple log files into a 
spreadsheet makes it easier to sort events 
chronologically and search all the logs 
simultaneously.
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Displaying Logs in Event Viewer
• When adjust for daylight saving is enabled,
dumpevt does not adjust event time 
correctly
– Events are one hour off.
• Corruption of event log record may occur
– Accidentally due to software bugs.
– Deliberately by reporting of misleading events 
that impersonate other event sources.
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Internet Information Server Logs
• IIS logs are generally located in 
– %systemroot%\sytem32\logfiles\
• Each time a file on a Web server is accessed 
over the Internet, an entry is made in an 
access log file. 
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Internet Information Server Logs













• IIS log in Win2K differs from CLF, and 
has the following format:
– IP address
– Date and time
– Processing time in ms
– Bytes sent to client
– Bytes received by server
– Size
– HTTP web server access/result code 310
Web Server Access Codes
• Success
– 200 Success
– 201 Okay Post
– 202 Okay Processing
– 203 Partial Information
– 204 Okay No response
311
Web Server Access Codes
• Redirection
– 300 Data Requested Have Moved
– 301 Found Data Has a Temp URL
– 302 Try Another Location
– 303 Not Modified
– 304 Success/Not Modified
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Web Server Access Codes
• Client Errors
– 400 Bad Request
– 401 Unauthorized Access
– 402 External Redirect Error
– 403 Forbidden
– 404 File Not Found
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Web Server Access Codes
• Server Error
– 500 Internal Error
– 501 Method Not Implemented
– 502 Server Overloaded
– 503 Gateway Timeout
314
Example of IIS Unicode Exploit
1. Intruder obtains a directory listing of C:\
– /script/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe/c+dir+c:\
2. Removes read-only permission on E.asp page
– /script/../../winnt/system32/attrib.exe/E.asp+-r
3. Deletes E.asp page
– /script/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe/c+sel+E.asp
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Example of IIS Unicode Exploit








Example of IIS Unicode Exploit
6. Removes read-only permission on E.asp
page
– /script/../../winnt/system32/attrib.exe/E.asp+-r
7. Deletes E.asp page
– /script/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe/c+del+E.asp
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Examining IIS Logs 
• It may be possible to distinguish between an 
automated tool probing a Web server and a 
human exploring a Web server by the speed 
and regularity at which sequential requests 
are made. 
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Examining IIS Logs 
• When a human is browsing or exploring a 
Web server, access log entries often show 
temporal gaps between viewed pages as the 
individual reads the contents of the pages or 
assesses the results of the requests. 
• A human may misspell a page or return to a 
particular page several time.
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Examining IIS Logs 
• Web proxies can also be used to conceal the 
IP address. However, these proxies will 
have log files showing which computers on 
the network accessed which Web pages on 
the Internet.
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Processing Evidence on MS Exchange
• Microsoft Exchange is tightly integrated 
with the operating system
– It is not feasible to restore the Exchange 
database files and examine them directly. 
– It is necessary to build a restoration server 
identical to the original server that has the same 
• Computer, site and organization names
• Versions, service packs, and hot fixes of Windows 
NT and Exchanges.
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• The registry in the original server usually 
contains most of the information that is 
needed to configure the restoration server. 
– The Microsoft Support Knowledge Base 
contains articles detailing where some of this 
information is located.
Processing Evidence on MS Exchange
322
• It may be necessary to install backup 
software because Exchange runs as a 
service on the operating system and keeps 
certain files open at all times. 
• To successfully preserve these open files, 
the backup application must use special 
processes to save the online email databases 
files.
Processing Evidence on MS Exchange
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Information Store Restoration
1. Shut down all of the Exchange services on 
the restoration server
2. Delete contents in the Exchsrvr\Mdbdata
folder
3. If the files come from an offline backup, 




4. If restoring from an online backup, restore 
the Exchange Information Store only.
5. Restart the Exchange System Attendant 




6. Open a command prompt windows
– Change directory to Exchsrvr\Bin
• cd Exchsrvr\Bin
– Run isinteg with the patch command option
• isinteg –patch
7. Start the remaining Exchange services.
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Information Store Restoration
8. Open the Exchange Administrator Program
– Select the restoration server as the server to 
administer.
– Highlight Server Object
– View Properties
– Select Advanced tab
– Under DS/IS Consistency Adjustment
• Select All Inconsistencies
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Information Store Restoration
9. The DS/IS Consistency Adjustment will 
repopulate the Exchange directory.
10. The examiner can now access the 
mailboxes of specific individuals or 
accounts.
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Processing Evidence on MS Outlook
• In many situations, the Outlook email 
clients will not have sufficient capabilities 
to perform a full forensic analysis. 
• The examiner have to translate email 
messages and attachment from the .pst file 
into a format more amenable to searching 
and analysis.
329
Processing Evidence on MS Outlook
• Email migration tools
– UniAccess (www.comaxis.com) will extract 
emails messages out to an HTML format, with 
hypertext links from messages to their 
attachments.
– Exlife (www.ornix .com) will convert the email 
messages to text files. Attachments are 
extracted out of the .pst into their native format.
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Windows Active Directory 
• Active Directory (AD) is core components of 
Win2K









Windows Active Directory 
• AD is stored on Domain Controllers in
– %systemroot%\NTDS\ntds.dit
– The ntds.dit file can be viewed using the Active 
Directory snap-in in Microsoft Management 
Console.
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• Unix recognizes 2 basic user types:
– Superusers or Root (USERID=0)
– Ordinary users (USERID!=0)
• When a system administrator creates a new 
user account, the system acknowledges the 
new user by adding user entries in the 
/etc/passwd file. 
• The new user is assigned a unique USERID.
339
User Permissions
• When the user logs into the Unix 
environment, a shell process is executed on 
behalf of the user. 




• Other processes run on behalf of the user 
will have the same permission which is 
known as the real user-id (ruid). 
• A user may execute a file owned by root, 
where Set User-ID (SUID) functionality 





– The /etc/shadow file contains encrypted passwords 
and does not allow ordinary users to modify it for 
security reasons. 




– The passwd program used to change passwords has  
SUID permission set so that it runs with root (user-id 
0) privileges.
– This allows ordinary users to update the otherwise 
locked /etc/shadow file. 
– Listing the passwd executable file will show an ‘s’
over the file owner’s executable permission, 




• Reviewing and comparing SUID files to a known 
baseline for those files, may identify a backdoor 
that gives an ordinary user root privileges. 
• The find command will produce a comprehensive 
list of files with the SUID/SGID permission set. 
– Set Group-ID (SGID) permission allows an executing 




• Special attention should be given to world-
writeable files, especially system files.
– Anyone can place a malicious code on the system. 
• To list all world writeable files 
# find / -type f \(  -perm -2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls -l {} \;
# find / -type d \(  -perm -2 -o -perm -20 \) -exec ls –ld {} \;
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File Hashes
• When analyzing a system without baseline 
files, examiners must create or obtain their 
own.
• Creating a baseline may involve installing the 
operating system or coordinating with 
vendors for a baseline. 
• Sun@Micosystems ’ Solaris Fingerprint 
Database contains close to 1 million md5sum 
hash entries of trusted binaries. 346
File Hashes
• After installing the subject operating system










• The /etc/syslog.conf file sets the facility and 
priority level of individual logs. 
– Facility is the service that an event will 
originate
– Priority is the extent to which logging will 
occur. 
– The facility and priority make up one field, 







System daemons (may cause redundant logging)Daemon
The cron daemonCron
Private authorization messagesAuthpriv














• Some Unix services are specifically initiated 
or terminated based upon the configuration 
of scripts located in the /etc/rc directories. 
• The directories are named according to run 
level and each script starts with 
– S for start, K for kill
– For example
• /etc/rc3.d/S80sendmail is the sendmail Startup script 
initiated at run level 3. 
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System Services
• Examiners can get an idea of what services are 
launched by understanding the Unix scripting and 
services. 
• Other services are initiated when needed by a 
daemon that listens for network requests. 
– This daemon is called the Internet Daemon and is 
controlled by /etc/inetd.conf. 
– This file will provide the name of the service, the type 
of delivery, protocol, wait status, uid, server and any 
arguments. 352
User Accounts 
• The /etc/passwd file identifies 
– User account names
– User and group ids
– User general information
– User home directory
– User shell
– If it contains password hashes, the system is 
vulnerable to password cracking. 




• User-id 0 should be reserved for root only. 
• Any other shared user-id 0 should be 
questioned. 
• Verify that daemon accounts, including 
‘nobody’
– Do not reference a user shell
– Should state /bin/false
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Scheduled Jobs
• Intruders sometimes create scheduled jobs to 
ensure that certain malicious processes stay 
running. 
– On Linux, scheduled jobs are in found /etc/cron.d
• These jobs are run at intervals determined by /etc/crontab . 
– Other Unix systems store cron jobs in 
/var/spool/cron/crontabs. 





Keeps track of each users most recent login 
time and records their initiating IP Address 
and terminal
Lastlog
Keeps track of users currently logged into the 
system. Provides output for the commands w, 
finger and who.
utmp /utmpx
Keeps track of login and logouts. Grows in 
length and is extended to wtmpx. The last





Keeps a record of recent commands used by 
the user. Usually kept in the users $HOME
directory.
History files
Tracks originating IP address of WWW 
connection.
Httpd





Records major events and is usually rolled 
over into historical logs with naming 
conventions: messages, messages.1, 
messages.2, messages.3
Messages .[0-X] 
A daemon that refers to the syslog .conf
configuration file for detailed logging. The 
names of further logs are identified. Logs 
with unique names and locations may be 




Records the use of dial out facilities. Records 
username, time, date and phone number.
Aculog
This is usually facilitated by syslogd in the 
same format. It provides status of mail 
handling.
maillog
Maintains extensive logs to track incoming 
connections and typically shows the 




Captures network IP packets. The administrator 
may run a packet sniffer to maintain statistics, 
troubleshoot problems, or overall manage of 




Used to bill users on their CPU usage. 
Maintains a list of user’s commands and their 




• Unix tracks current and previous activity 
using lastlog, utmp and wtmp . 
• Each time a user logs into a Unix system, 
the login program searches lastlog file for 
the user’s UID. If found, the time and 
location where the user last accessed are 




• New login time and hostname are updated 
in the lastlog file. 
• The utmp file is opened and a record for the 
user is inserted. 
• The utmp file contains a list of current 
logins. 
• The utmp file is used by rwho, w and who.
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Login Process
• When the user logs out, the entry in the 
utmp file is deleted. 
• Data in the utmp file are appended to the
wtmp file. 
• Another record is added when the user logs 




• The wtmp file maintains a history of login 
activity on the system. 
• The wtmp file is used by the program last
and ac.
• The default wtmp file will increase without 
bound. It is normally truncated by the daily 
scripts run by cron, which rename and 
rotate the wtmp files.
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Shell History Files
• The shell history record commands issued 
in the shell environment, of which the 
examiner can track commands the intruders 
issued to the system. 
• The history log is stored per-user basis in a 
user’s home directory. 
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Shell History Files
• When multiple-shells are involved 
concurrently, cached commands are written 
into a new file after the history file has been 
deleted. 
• Default locations for history files
– .history for C shell (CSH)
– .sh_history or .ksh_history for Korn Shell (KSH)
– .history for Bourne Again Shell (BASH)
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Restoring Tape Images
• Unix system allows many useful ways of 
looking at the data from the tape. 
• Linux provides many useful utilities, 




• Determine the name of the tape drive
– Cycle through a loop
– Substitute each number from a list 
• Drive names in SunOS/Solaris 
/dev/rmt/{drive#:0,1,2}[density indicator:l,m,h,u,c][berkley ][no rewind]
• Drive names in Linux 
/dev/ [no rewind]st{drive#:0,1,2}
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Determining the Tape Drive
• For Solaris:
For drive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
>do
>mt –f /dev/rmt/$(drive)n status
>done
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Determining the Tape Drive
• For Linux:
For drive 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
>do
>mt –f /dev/nst$(drive) status
>done
370
Determining the Tape Drive
• Look at what SCSI devices are available
cat /proc/scsi/scsi
• Check the status to ensure the write-
protection has been set. 
mt –f /dev/nst0 status
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Ensuring Write Protection
• If write-protected, the status shall have the 
WR_PROT flag set. 
– 8 mm tapes
• Protected if red tab is covering the hole
• Unprotected if hole is visible
– 4mm DAT tapes
• Protected if white tab is opened
• Unprotected if white tab is closed
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Determining the Block Size
• Set the block size to zero in order to 
automatically seek the block size used
mt –f  /dev/nst1 setblk 0
• Common block sizes
– 521 bytes for dd
– 10240 bytes for tar or cpio . 
– Some proprietary backup commands use block 
sizes that adjust or vary throughout the tape. 
• In this instance, use tcopy to copy the data
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• Read one block with the tape drive on 
automatic and check how big it is. 
#dd  if=/dev/nst1  of=test_file  count=1  bs=512k
– Rewind the tape to the beginning
– #mt –f /dev/nst1 rewind
Determining the Block Size
Source Destination Read only 1 Block Block Size
374
Checking the File Type
• Verify the type of data stored on the tape
# dd if=/dev/nst2 count=1 |file –
• The file command will give an indication for most 
formats of tar, cpio and backup
• The examiner should use the appropriate 
command to restore the data from the tape.
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Checking the File Type
• Most tape will have header information on 
the file type.
• If the file command does not give a clear 
determination of the type of data, examine 
the file manually using 
– xxd (hex dump) 
– od (octal dump)
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Manual Tape Copy
• Duplicate a copy and store the original 
evidence away. 
# mt –f /dev/nst0 setblk 1024
# mt –f /dev/nst1 setblk 1024
# dd if=/dev/nst0 of=/dev/nst1 bs=1024
– Repeat the dd commands until all files on the 
tape have been copied.
Set Block Size on Source, with No Rewind
Set Block Size on Destination, with No Rewind
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Identifying Attached Hard Drive
• Disk drives are generally of two main types
– IDE
– SCSI
• On Linux IDE 
– Primary controller
• Master drive is /dev/hda
• Slave drive is /dev/hdb
– Secondary controller
• Master drive is /dev/hdc
• Slave drive is /dev/hdd
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Identifying Attached Hard Drive
• Linux partitions
– Partitions will add a number: hdb1, hdb2, hdb3 
and hdb4 for the primary partitions.
– Extended partitions start with hdb5, hdb6 and 
so on.
• Sun partitions
– Disks are numbered from 0 to 7.
– Slice 2 is referred to as the ‘backup slice.
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Identifying Attached Hard Drive
• SCSI disk devices 
– Typical names are /dev/sda and /dev/sdb.
– The first SCSI disk device detected will be 
letter a, the second b and so on. 
– A failure or removal of a driver or SCSI 
controller card may cause the name of a drive 
to suddenly change. 
380
• SCSI disk devices
– File systems automatically mounted at boot time may 
no longer function if a failure is encountered. 
– All drivers required for boot should be verified and 
mounted manually to protect the evidence. 
• Automatic mount at boot only recommended for Linux IDE. 
– SCSI drives have a physical write-protect jumper that 
can be set to provide write protection.
Identifying Attached Hard Drive
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Identifying Attached Hard Drive
• The fdisk command for Linux is very useful 
in listing drive and partition information on 
block devices. 
• Examiners may verify what devices they 
expected to see through the partition 
information.
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Clearing a Hard Drive
• Clear the new disk of all data 
– sync ensures all buffer caches are written to disk
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb; sync 
• Verify that the disk has been cleared by 
dumping the device out to display all non-
zero bytes.
# dd if=/dev/sdb | xxd | \
grep –v “0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000”
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Duplicating a Hard Drive
• Disk duplicate can also be performed using
#dd  if=/dev/sda of=/dev/sdb; sync
• Verification can be performed using md5sum
# dd if=/dev/sda | md5sum
# dd if=/dev/sdb count={# of records} | md5sum
– If the destination drive is larger than the block count 
limit, it will have to be added to ensure that the 
md5sum does not consider the trailing zeroed bytes.
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Mounting a Hard Drive
• Use the mount command to
– Show devices already mounted on the system.
– Verify what mount points already been used.




Mounting a Hard Drive
• Show that the file system is available 
logically and is read-only. 
• Use the loop option to ignore cylinder 
/head/sector parameters and access the 
block device block by block.
#mount –r –t ufs –o loop /dev/sdb1/TARGET
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Unix System Logs
• The last command is used to query wtmp
log files to determine who logged into a 
system and when they logged out. 




• Not all programs makes an entry in wtmp in 
all cases. 
– The sshd does not make an entry in wtmp when 
using scp port forwarding.
• The wtmp log can be corrupted by an 
incomplete write




• syslog sends information to a central logging 
host using the UDP protocol.
– UDP is an unreliable connectionless protocol.
– syslog timestamps the log entry with the date and 
time of the syslog server, not the sending host. 
• This can introduce a time discrepancy. 
– The syslog server has no way of confirming the 
origin of a given log entry. 




• For added security, use tcp_wrappers to 
restrict access to a server and generate more 
detailed entries in the system logs. 
• Not all programs can be wrapped using
tcp_wrappers, hence host-based firewalls 
are often used to restrict access.
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Unix System Logs
• Host-based firewalls can create very 
detailed logs because they function at the
datagram level, catching each datagram
before it is processed by tcp_wrappers. 
– Firewalls can log all connections to a host, both 




• Sun has a Basic Security Module (BSM) 
that creates audit records similar to NT 
Event Logs in a binary format. 








– Web servers such as Apache and Netscape 
running on Unix have log files similar to the 




– Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is used 
to deliver email over the Internet. 
– Post Office Protocol (POP) enables individuals 
to read email by downloading it from remote 
server. 
– The Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) 
enables individuals to view email while 
residues on the server.
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Unix System Logs
– SMTP servers do not usually require a 
password. Thus, it is
• Easy to forge messages




– POP and IMAPO servers require username and 
passwords before providing access to the 
personal email. 
– Thus, if a message has been deleted from the 
server, there may still be evidence of its 
existence in the server’s log files.
• SMTP servers keep logs that pass through. 





Super Inode Data Inode Data Super Inode Data

















• Regular file 
• Directory 
• Symbolic link (alias for other file)
• Device (e.g., terminal, disk, memory)




• Everything is placed in one logical tree. 
– No C: or D: drives
– Even devices are accessible through the file system.
• Directories are files 
– Except that users can’t write to them 
– Some remote file systems may disallow reading
• Files may contain holes
– No data is written in holes
– Holes read back as all-zero blocks
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File System Properties
• Multiple references are possible for a file
– A file can appear in multiple places, even in places 
owned by different users
• Zero references are also possible
– A file can still exist after it is removed
• No built-in undelete provision like DOS




– Numeric user and group ID 
• Permissions
– Read, write, execute for owner, group, other
• Types
– File, directory, symlink, device
• Reference count
• File size in bytes
• Time stamps 
– MAC times 402
Physical Locality
• Modern UNIX file systems do not scatter 
the contents of a file randomly over the 
disk to avoid fragmentation
• The file system locality allows deleted file 
contents, access time patterns and other 
attributes to survive long after a file is 
deleted 
• When a file is deleted, the system makes 
only minimal changes to the file system 
68
403
Permanency of Delete Content
• A really secure delete takes time 
• It is possible to recover data from the disk 
even after overwriting multiple times 
• It is possible to recover data from the RAM 
after powering off
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To Wipe a UNIX System
• Wipe files before removing them
• Wipe free space 
• When shutting down the system





Grafting to Hide Effects of Wiping
• All-zero free blocks are unusual 
– Raise suspicion of wiping
• Solution
– Overwrite free space with plausible data
• Cloning/grafting
– Use copies of recently accessed files from the system 
• Eg. mail, program source code, web pages/images
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Effects of File Deletion: Directory 
• The directory entry with the file name is marked 
as unused
• The file name becomes disconnected from any 
file information
• Names of the deleted file can still be found by 
examining a directory with the strings command
• Linux does not allow directories to be accessed in 
this manner. 
– Use the icat utility to work around this restriction
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Effects of File Deletion: Inode
• The inode file attribute block is marked as 
unused in the inode block allocation bitmap
• Some file attribute information is destroyed, 
but a lot of information is preserved
• Linux preserves the connections between 
the file inode block and the first 12 file data 
blocks 
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Inode Information for Deleted File
• Ownership: 
– Numeric user and 
group ID
• Permissions: 
– Read, write, 






• Time stamps: 
– Last file Modification 
– Last file Access 
– Last status Change 
• Owner, permissions, refcount
• Reference count 
– Zeroed when removed
• File size in bytes
– Zeroed, except LINUX
• List of data block numbers
– Zeroed, except LINUX
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Effects of File Deletion: Data Blocks
• File data blocks are marked as unused in their 
block allocation bitmap
• Contents in the file data blocks are left untouched
• File data blocks are no longer connected with the 
file 
• Linux has an option to erase file data blocks upon 
file deletion, also the first 12 data blocks remain 
connected to the inode block 410
Effects of File Deletion: Summary
•Directory




–Last read access time Preserved
–Last write access time Preserved
–Last attribute change time Time of Deletion
–Delete time (in Linux) Time of Deletion
–Directory to ref count Destroyed (Preserved in Linux)
–File type Destroyed (Preserved in Linux)
–Access permissions Destroyed (Preserved in Linux)
–File size Destroyed (Preserved in Linux)
–Data block addresses Destroyed (Preserved in Linux)
•Data blocks
–Data contents Disconnected (Preserved in Linux)
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Erasing the Tracks
• An intruder may remove exploit source and 
executable code after they have served their 
purpose
• As the result of such cleanup activity, the 
only visible evidence is the last 
modification time of the directory
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Finding the Tracks
• When a program is compiled, executed or deleted
– The compiler processes the source code
• It creates several temporary files before the executable 
program pops out. 
• When the intruder compiles, runs or deletes an 
exploit program
– We can find traces of the deleted files
• Program source file
• Executable file
• Compiler temporary files
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Finding the Tracks
• Use the ils utility to retrieve the file attributes
– The deleted files have no names, disk names and 
file inode numbers are used
• Compiler temporary files live in the same file 
system zone as the /tmp directory 
– The deleted temporary files is overwritten only 
when a process needs to create a new temporary 
file. 414
Access Time Patterns
File Size  MAC  Permissions  Directory  File <Dir-Inode #>
85 m.. -rw-r--r-- wietse <hda6 -311549> 
10897 mac -rw-r--r-- wietse <hda1 -2022>   
301 mac -rw-r--r-- wietse <hda1 -2023>    
872 mac -rw-r--r-- wietse <hda1 -2024>    
85 .a. -rw-r--r-- wietse <hda6 -311549>  
4173 m.. -rwxr-xr-x wietse <hda6 -311550>
4173 .a. -rwxr-xr-x wietse <hda6 -311550>
1024 m.. drwxr-xr-x wietse /home/wietse  
85 ..c -rw-r--r-- wietse <hda6 -311549>   
4173 ..c -rwxr-xr-x wietse <hda6 -311550>
Create source file
#85 <hda6 -311549>
Compiler temp file  
M = Write/Create
A = Read/Run













Forensics on the Network
• Log files contains large amounts of trace 
information.
• IP address may not pinpoint the culprit, but 
it does narrow down the search to a 
particular machine. 
• Server logs record which IP address had 
used a specific services at a specific time.
417
Forensics on the Network
• IP address are stored in the Web server 
access log.
• Dialup modem banks and BOOTP/DHCP 
servers create log files of IP address 
assignments.
• Firewalls and routers keep log of the 
TCP/IP traffic passing through (usually 
incoming).
418
Challenges of Network Analysis
• Evidence is often distributed on many 
computers. 
– The distributed nature of the networks may 
make it impossible for investigators to gain 
physical access to the device that contains 
valuable evidence.  
– It may be necessary to collect evidence from a 
remote system or access an active network 
device to collect volatile data. 
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Challenges of Network Analysis
• Evidence is often present on a network for 
only a short time.
– Such information is stored in volatile memory 
of network devices or in network cables.
– Windows of opportunity for collecting this 
volatile evidence is very small.  
420
Challenges of Network Analysis
• When collecting network log files, it may 
not be feasible to shut down the systems
– Evidence in volatile memory can be lost if the 
network cable is disconnected or the computer 
is turned off. 




Challenges of Network Analysis
– One approach to gathering evidence from a system 
entails using the who and netstatcommands to 
send the results into a file on an external device. 
– This technique minimizes the impact on the system 
when valuable evidence may be stored in slack and 
unallocated space.
• Encryption is becoming more common, which 
allows criminals to scramble incriminating 
evidence.
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Difficulties of Collecting 
Network Evidence
• Log files contain overwhelming information 
at the transport and network layer
• State tables contains activities of many users 
but are only available for a short time
• Cutting and pasting on segments of a log file 
is not satisfactory from the evidentiary 




• Consider taking print screen snapshots
• Use message digests to preserve the 
integrity of the original copies of all log 
files, and perform investigations on 
duplicate copies
• Cross comparison of the log files can 
provide a rich source of evidence
424
Collecting Evidence on Network
1. Maintain a log using Unix script command 
or Telnet/SSH session logged to a file. 
Videotaping.
2. Resolve all IP addresses to obtain their 
associated canonical names so that both 
the IP addresses and names are available at 
a later dates even if the name is changed in 
the domain name system.
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Collecting Evidence on Network
3. Use SNMP to obtain information from 
routers and firewalls.
4. Take printscreen with date and time from 
a trusted time source.
5. Use traceroute to document the location 
of the host being accessed.
426
Collecting Evidence on Network
6. Encrypt and digitally sign all evidence 
files to preserve the integrity.
7. Seek and collect corroborating 
information from multiple independent 
sources.
8. Access log entries in the IDS.




• Look for traffic anomalies
• Look for traffic originating from or 
terminating on the compromised machines




• It is not feasible for an examiner to 
comprehend all traffic by viewing its hex 
representations. 
• Examination tools are required to 
reconstruct the packets and display them in 
a way that facilitates analysis.
429
Network Traffic Reconstruction
– mailsnarf and webspy can reassemble and 
display application layer data in real time, 
providing an effective way to monitor an 
individual’s online activities. 
– NetWitness (www.forensicexplorers.com) has 
the capability to capture traffic (or read a
tcpdump file), reconstruct session, display 
content in real time and analyze the traffic.
430
Network Traffic Reconstruction
– review (security@net.ohio -state.edu) can 
process the original binary data in a tcpdump
log. By piecing together TCP packets and 
extracting the original payload, it is possible to 
obtain files that the intruder downloaded from 
or uploaded to a system.
431
Routers
• Routers can be configured to keep traffic-
related logs. 
– However, routers are often configured with 




• A growing number of routers have NetFlow to 
improve routing performance. 
• When the NetFlow feature is enabled, routers 
record detailed information about each flow
– Current time according to the router
– Start and end times of the flow
– Source and destination IP addresses and ports, IP 




• If the system is compromised,NetFlow logs 
will show 
– The source of the attack
– Protocols used
– Ports accessed
– Amount of data transferred
434
NetFlow
• Once the source of the attack is known,
NetFlow logs can be searched for other 
machines on the network that were targeted 
by the attacker.
• NetFlow packets are exported when a flow 
ends, resulting in a log files with entries 
sorted by flow end times. 
– Sort NetFlow logs using the start time of each 
flow before attempting to interpret them. 
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NetFlow
• NetFlow record does not indicate which 
host initiated the connection, it only 
indicates that one host sent data to another 
host.
– Therefore, it is necessary to infer which host 
initiated the connection.
– Sorting the relevant flows using their start times 
to determine which flow was initiated first.
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NetFlow
• NetFlow records exported from a router are 
encapsulated in a UDP datagrams
– Some of the records may not reach the intended 
logging server. Thus, the logs may not be complete. 
– Newer NetFlow records contain a sequence number 
that can be used to determine if any records are 
missing or if forged records have been inserted. 
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NetFlow
• NetFlow records are sometimes exported 
before a flow is terminated.  
– Thus, a single flow may cause several flow 
record to be created. 
– In this case, several flow records may have to 
be combined to determine the amount of data 
transferred or duration of the flow.
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Dialup Server
• When an individual dials into the Internet, 
there are two forms of evidence at the ISP
– The contents of the terminal server’s memory





• The TACACS authentication system 
keeps records of the time, user name, 
terminal server and port, and IP address 
for each login and logout event.





– SLIPOFF (Type=10) 440
Dialup Server
• Restrict the modem pool to authorized users 
by requiring users to authenticate with a 
user name and password when they connect. 
• The TACACS logs can then identify the 
account that was used to authenticate access 
to the modem pool.
441
Dialup Server
• The logs from RAM can be collected using 
the show logging command. 
• Each log entry contains the
– Date and time
– Facility code





• The show history command can be used to 




• A pen registry is a device that is physically 
attached to a target phone line. 
• It records all of the numbers that are dialed 
through that line with the time and duration 
of the calls. 
• It provides a complete record of incoming 
and outgoing phone calls for the suspect.
444
Phone Tracing
• Requesting a phone company to trace an 
intruder presents a problem when dealing with 
a modem pool
– Many phone circuits are associated with a single 
dial-up number
– Need to correlate the phone traces against the 
modem pool authentication logs and match phone 
calls against login sessions. 
– Event lag and clock offset complicates correlating 




• Phone switch records
– Server = Terminal server name
– Line = Port on the terminal server
– Slip = DNS name for the IP address
associated with that port. 
• This information can help trace an IP address to 
a specific terminal server/port and to a unique 
circuit id, span, channel and trunk for the phone 
company to trace the circuit in real time.
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Network Traffic
• To monitor network traffic, sniffers decode
datagrams and display them in an easy-to-read 
format. 
• Etherpeek (www.etherpeek.com) provides 
several views of captured traffic
– It shows the raw data, the decoded data, and 
interpreted view showing what the data represent. 
– Etherpeek can also be configured to generate an 




• When a hub is used, communication between 
machines on the same network is visible to all 
machines connected to the hub, making 
eavesdropping very simple. 
• When a switch is used, communication between 
machines is not visible to all computers on the 
subnet. However, 
– ARP proxying can be misused to intercept traffic 
– dsniff (naughty-monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff) 448
Network Sniffer
• Snoop is network sniffer installed by default 
with SunOS/Solaris.
• Entries in the snoop are not time-stamped.
– The -t option is required to timestamp entries 





• d Delta Time since receiving the previous datagram
• a Absolute Clock time
• r Relative Time relative to the first datagram displayed 
– The absolute time is usually desirable because it can 
be easily compared with timestamped information 
from other sources.
– The -p option can be used to display time relative to 
any selected datagram. 
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Capturing TCP Packets
• tcpdump (www.tcpdump.org) can be 
installed on most versions of Unix and has 
been ported to Windows.





• tcpdump only captures the first 68 bytes of a
datagram by default 
– To collect more information, set a larger snaplen
value using the –s option. 
– Using a larger snaplen increase the chance of 
overloading and losing datagrams
• Filters can be used to reduce the amount of 
information that tcpdump collects. 
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Capturing TCP Packets
• tcpdump represents TCP flags as follows:
– S SYN Synchronize sequence numbers, 
establish connection
– F FIN Terminate connection
– R RST Reset connection
– P PSH Push data, do not buffer before send
– . No flag set
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Examining TCP Logs
1. tcpdump can contain the complete 
contents of all network traffic for each of 
the sessions, including the data portion of 
the packets. 
2. Use the filtering expressions in the
tcpdump to pull out packets of interest 
from the total log based on the 
examination of the packet headers. 
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Examining TCP Logs
3. Use review (security@net.ohio-state.edu)
as a graphical user interface to browse the
tcpdump log
4. Look at the summary of the contents of a 
single log, view the contents of sessions 
within a log and replay the contents of 
selected sessions to see an ‘intruder’s eye 
view’ of the log contents.
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Merging Logs
• There are some hosts where network traffic 
goes out through a router and returns through 
the second (due to asymmetric routing). 
• This can also be an issue where there are 
multiple SMTP servers and for Web proxy 
servers.
• Sometimes, it is necessary to merge several 
logs together to reconstruct a complete record 





– Mouse button clicks
• Result structures








• xterm sessions in tcpdump logs are recorded 
in non-human readable binary structures
• A special graphical user interface, e.g. 
review, is necessary to pull out the 
keystrokes in the xterm sessions=
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Accessing Unix Log Files











Accessing Unix Log Files
• acct or pacct
– Accounting logs contain commands typed by 
every user
• Aculog
– Contains a record of when modems were used 
to dial out
• lastlog
– Contains a record of each user’s most recent 
login or failed login 460
Accessing Unix Log Files
• loginlog
– Records failed logins
• sulog
– Records every attempt to log in as the 
administrator of the computer (root). 
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Accessing Unix Log Files
• messages or syslog
– Main system log file containing wide range of 
messages from various applications. Routers 
and firewalls can be configured to add their 
messages to this file.
• utmp and utmpx
– Contains records of all users currently logged 
into a computer. 
– File saved in /etc
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Accessing Unix Log Files
• wtmp and wtmpx
– Contains a record of errors that are encountered 
when accessing external media
– File saved in /etc
• xferlog
– Contains records of all files transferred from a 
computer using the FTP
78
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Jan 1 23:45 mycomputer sendmail[11668]: “debug” command from 
hacker.dhp.com (199.245.105.25)
Jan 1 23:45 mycomputer sendmail[11668]: “wiz” command from 
hacker.dhp.com (199.245.105.25)
Jan 1 23:46 mycomputer sendmail[17936]: TAA17936: ruleset=check_rcpt, 
arg=someone@hotmail.com, relay=08-162.015.popsite.net [207.240.169.162], 
reject=550
<21freeto@flashmail.com>…Relaying denied
Jan 1 23:47 mycomputer sendmail[17936]: TAA17936: 
from=smoke@www.lg.co.kr,
size=0, class=0, pri=0, nrcpts=0, proto=SMTP, relay=08-162.015.popsite.net 
[207.240.169.162], reject=550 someone@hotmail.com….Relaying denied
syslog
Attacker IP address
Dial in connection Source of junk mail
464
syslog
Jan 1 23:48 mycomputer rshd[7373]: connection from 199.245.105.25 on illegal port 2066
Jan 1 23:48 mycomputer ftpd[7375]: connection from hacker.dhp.com
Jan 1 23:49 mycomputer login[7593]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as +
Jan 1 23:49 mycomputer login[7595]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as bin
Jan 1 23:50 mycomputer login[7596]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as daemon
Jan 1 23:50 mycomputer login[7597]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as lp
Jan 1 23:51 mycomputer login[7599]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as nuucp
Jan 1 23:51 mycomputer login[7600]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as root
Jan 1 23:52 mycomputer login[7604]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as user
Jan 1 23:52 mycomputer login[7605]: failed ?@ hacker.dhp.com as uucp
Jan 1 23:53 mycomputer ftpd[7654]: connection from hacker.dhp.com 
Jan 1 23:53 mycomputer telnetd[7653]: connection from hacker.dhp.com 







Cautions When Accessing Unix Logs
• On some UNIX systems, wtmp and utmp
files truncate the source host name for 
remote login sessions to some limited size.
– This obscures the source host name if it is long. 
• One approach to addressing this problem is 
to modify the last command to display full 
hostnames.
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• Accounting records only contain the name 
of the binary that was executed and not the 
full path name to the file. 
• Need to search all attached file systems for 
executable files with the same name. 
Cautions When Accessing Unix Logs
467
• In shell scripts, the name of the interpreter 
for the script is recorded, but the name of 
the script is not recorded. 
• The name of the executable can be inferred 
based on the shell history files and by 
examining the user’s PATH environment 
variable settings. 
Cautions When Accessing Unix Logs
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• Shell history files are typically owned by 
the account whose activity they record, and 
so are subject to editing and erasure. 
• Shell history is also written when each shell 
exits, so overlapping shells can obfuscate 
the record.
Cautions When Accessing Unix Logs
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• The syslog timestamp that appears on the entries 
in the log files is the time that the entry was 
received by the local machine according to its 
own clock, not the clock of the machine that the 
log entries come from.
• This can cause confusion if the examiner tries to 
correlate those log entries to other events from 
the original host, since there may be a clock 
offset between that host and the syslog host. 
Cautions When Accessing Unix Logs
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Accessing WinNT Log Files
• Log files in 
– %systemroot%\system32\config\
– C:\winnt\system32\log
• appevent.evt - log of application usage
• secevent.evt - log of security related activities
• sysevent.evt - log of system events
471
WinNT State Tables
Log of current and recent connections only!
1/23/00 10:10:02 AM Security System Event 515 SYSTEM ORGO 
1/23/00 10:09:02 AM Security Privilege use 577 SYSTEM ORGO
1/23/00 10:07:02 AM Security Logon/Logoff 528 ANONYMOUS ORGO
1/23/00 10:07:02 AM Security Logon/Logoff 528 ANONYMOUS ORGO
1/23/00 10:05:04 AM Security Privilege use 578 eco3 ORGO
1/23/00 10:05:02 AM Security Logon/Logoff 538 eco3 ORGO
1/23/00 10:04:33 AM Security Privilege use 576 eco3 ORGO
1/23/00 10:03:02 AM Security System Event 529 SYSTEM ORGO
Date Time Source   Category  Event  User Computer
1/23/00 10:10:10 AM NETLOGIN None 5719 NA ORGO 
1/23/00 10:09:11 AM EventLog None 6006 NA ORGO
1/23/00 10:08:12 AM Dhcp None 1005 NA ORGO
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Forensics in the Datalink Layer
• The datalink and physical layers are the 
richest sources of digital evidence
• Data captured using a sniffer can be very 
useful in 
– Reconstructing a crime
– The accuracy of the entries in the logs is based 
on the confirmation that they have not been 
manipulated 474
Forensics in the Datalink Layer
• Datalink layer addresses (MAC addresses) 
are more identifying than the Network layer 
addresses (IP addresses)
– A MAC address is directly associated with the 
Network Interface Card in a computer





• The Address Resolution Protocol is used by 
routers to map an IP address to the MAC 
address of a particular computer
• The ARP cache on a computer or router can 
be retrieved using arp –a
476
ARP Cache
• The ARP cache does not keep permanent 
record and must be examined shortly after 
the connection has occurred
• Some routers can be configured to detect 
incorrect IP addresses to identify computers 
that have been purposefully reconfigured to 
hide the user’s identity
477
Intrusion Detection System
• Snort (www.snort.org ) inspects traffic and 
only stores data that are suspicious.
• The IDS keeps a log of attacks at the 
network level, allowing the examiner to 
determine the attacker’s IP address.
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Intrusion Detection System
• Unlike tcpdump , Snort can 
– Inspect the datagram payload
– Decode the application layer of a datagram
– Compare the datagram contents with a list of rules. 
– Configure rules to detect specific types of datagrams 
– Reassemble fragmented packets before checking 
them against known attack signature




• Logs vary in the degree to which they can 
be relied upon to be accurate. 
– utmp and wtmp logs on some UNIX systems 
are world writable
– Any user can modify their contents. 
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Reliability of Logs
• The reliability of the logs is dependent on 
the integrity of the systems that generate the 
logs. 
– If those subsystems have been compromised or 
replaced, the logs that they generate may not be 




• The accuracy of the logs is also subject to the 
security of the network protocols used for 
transporting the messages. 
– syslog and NetFlow logs are both sent using UDP. 
– The logs can be incomplete.
– It is relatively easy to create false entries by 
directing carefully crafted UDP packets with 
spoofed source addresses to the log servers.
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Reliability of Logs
• Guard against the dangers of incomplete or 
incorrect logs by correlating events from as 
many sources as possible and account for 
discrepancies between the logs.
483
Time-Related Issues
• Most log files include some sort of time 
stamp which can be used to correlate entries 
from several logs against one another. 
• One common problem is that the clocks on 
those hosts may not be synchronized. 
• It is also important to know the time zone 
that each log was recorded in. Unfortunately, 
the timestamps in many logs do not include 
the time zone. 484
Time-Related Issues
• Event lag is the difference in times between 
related events in different types of logs.
– There can be significant event lag between the 
start of a phone connection and the start of an 
authenticated session on the modem pool. 
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Time-Related Issues
• Since the amount of lag is often variable, 
events should not be correlated specifically 
by starting time or even duration, since the 
session in the network traffic log would last 
longer than the login session. 
• However, most of the log entries associated 
with a login session on a host should fall 
within the start and end times of that session. 
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Time-Related Issues
• Sometimes logs are created in order of the 
ending time of a session, instead of the start 
time and this can lend further confusion to 
the correlation process. 
– Log entries for NetFlow logs are created when 
the flow of traffic ends. 
– UNIX process accounting logs are created when 




• Since the ending events often match up more 
closely in time, it is advisable to use the end 
time of a session for making correlations
• It is also trivial to leave a process running in 
the background so that it will persist after 
logout (using nohup), in which case its 
process accounting records will not be 
bounded by the login session.
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DNS Problems
• Intruders can steal domains, poison the caches on 
DNS servers, or inject false information into 
address/name lookups. 
• Many subsystems resolve the IP addresses that 
they know into names using DNS and then only 
log the resolved names which may not be correct. 
• Thus, it is necessary to log messages with both the 
IP addresses and the resolved names.
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Forensics on the Internet







Email clients can be configured with false 
information when communicating with the MTA. 
The trusted Mail Transfer Agent is then exploited 










Forging an email on SMTP
(Simple Mail Transport Protocol) 
Message at Recipient
> HELO Fake.message.com
> MAIL FROM: fake@spoofedaddress.com
> RCPT TO: you@emailaddress.com
> DATA
Subject: Spoofed Email
Date: date and time stamp 1
This is a forged message.
> QUIT




This is a forged message.
492
Email Tracing
Received header of Email show Mail Transfer Agents along the route taken by the message
time stamp 2time stamp 1
Sender MTA 1 MTA 2 Receiver
Received: from trustedmta.com by yourmailserver.emailaddress.com 
(5.61/1.34) Id AA1404; date and time stamp 2
Received: from fake.message.com (corpus. delicti.com [207.244.93.93])  
by trustedmta.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id VAA01050 for
<you@emailaddress.com; date and time stamp 1










Information from Received Header
Domain Name













Forging an article on NNTP
(Network News Transport Protocol)


















Date: date and time
Message-ID: 8pF762$Flg@masters0.internet.net
NNTP- Posting- Host : cheat.usenet.com
This is a forged message.
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NNTP- Posting- Host: cheat.usenet.com











• Communications are transient and hence not archived
• Communications can also bypass IRC network once 
Direct Chat Mode (DCC) or file server (fserver) is 
established.





– Uses a person’s IRC nickname to get the person’s 
email address, chat channel, IRC server chatting on, 
IP address.
• /whowasoldnickname 
– To obtain logged information from the IRC server’s 
temporary cache if the culprit leaves the IRC or 
changes his nickname
• /who *domain-name* or *pen-name*
– Searches subnet for any information associated with 
the culprit 498
Identifying the Intruder
1. Log all packets related to a particular logon 
session.
2. Invoke tcpdump on the targeted host on login 
and terminate on logout and log all actions to 
a history file.
3. Track the channel the intruder typically 
hungs out on to the account used for 
authentication, and map to the compromised 




4. Monitor suspicious activities such as 
– Several different people connecting to IRC 
through the compromised account
– Multiple simultaneous logins 
– Use of accounts for people who were no 
longer affiliated
– Intrusion and denial of service attacks
500
Digital Evidence on the Internet
• Digital evidence is often stored on remote servers
• The evidence can be stored in many different 
places to complicate search
• Creating a cohesive reconstruction can involve a 
large amount of evidence from a wide variety of 
sources: 
– Phone traces, pen registers, NetFlow, tcpdump logs, 
authentication logs, victim host logs and host based 
evidence
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Digital Evidence on the Internet
• Seizing evidence directly from the remote 
servers is sometimes impossible 
• Ensure that evidence collected from the 
Internet is authentic and not modified 
during transmission
502
Digital Evidence on the Internet
• Web browser, email clients, newsgroup 
activity and log files on the local computer 
also keeps records of the pages visited, 
copies of emails and live chats 
• Do not change file names for documentary 
purposes or edit contents of files to make 
them more readable
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Identifying an Unknown Program
• Run the program, see what happens.
– What if the program turns out to be destructive?
• Run the program on a sacrificial machine.
– What if the program depends on specific 
machine features?
• Static analysis of program file
– Slow, but hopefully safe.




• Program file analysis tools
– strings shows clear-text strings embedded in any file
– grep searches for specific strings 
– file identifies file content by looking at part of the 
data
• General file analysis tools
– nm displays compiler and runtime linker symbol table
– ldd identifies dynamic libraries used 
– disassemblers, debuggers 508
% ls -l a
-rwxr-xr-x 1 wietse staff 67724 Jul 24 18:21 a
% file a
a: ELF 32-bit MSB executable SPARC Version 1, dynamically linked, not stripped
Identifying an Unknown Program
An executable program
Not stripped, so a lot of compiler information is still available
509
Clues from Symbol tables
Compiler symbol table reveals internal procedure names
Run-time linker symbol table reveals calls of external shared library routines












• A combination of:
– MAC time
– unrm
– grep program files for source code
• Standard Unix tools
• Reconstructing mail files
• Text-based log files
• Correlator (binary, repeating logs, etc.)




% strings - a
- umount remote file system export
- show all exported file systems umountall
- umount all remote file systems umount
[-upTU] [-P port] <path> - mount file system
mount
<local-file> [<remote-file>] - put file
<uid>[.<gid >] <file> - change owner
chown
<mode> <file> - change mode
chmod
<dir> - remove remote directory
rmdir
<dir> - make remote directory
mkdir
<file1> <file2> - move file
<file1> <file2> - link file
<file> - delete remote file
512
Backdoor Service
• Stand-alone telnet server
• Bypass TCP wrapper and system login procedure
% telnet victim 5120
Trying 131.155.210.17...
Connected to victim.














• It is virtually impossible in most cases for 
the intruder to eradicate network traces
– Don’t know where data was saved
– Must determine where data flow went
– Compromise all routers, hosts, etc.
– Destroy all information there, plus recursively 
follow this list
514
Network Sniffing & Spying
• IDS often ineffective by themselves 
• Useful for damage control, not for data 
recovery
• Best as standalone monitoring system
• Requires lots of storage for complete traffic
• Must protect the system(s) doing the 
sniffing and storing data




• System and user programs
• System and kernel memory
• Raw memory & disk
• Anything with IP #/hostnames
516
System Configuration
• Enter into the realm of auditing
• Invisible changes
• Freezing system should gather most of this






• Access control 
– hosts.allow, httpd.conf, sshd_config
• Trust 
– servers, rhosts, network information
• Configurations 
– routes, inetd.conf, startup files
• Protocols
• User
– .rhosts, .forward) 518
Programs














Active Internet connections (including servers)
Routing tables
% netstat -a -f inet
Protocol R-Q S-Q Local Address Foreign Address State
tcp 0 0 flying.smtp 192.215.43.108.4778 EST
tcp 0 0 flying.http dialup6929.nssl ..2787 EST
tcp 0 0 flying.smtp 192.215.43.108.4769 WAIT
tcp 0 0 flying.http telapex..2198 SYN_RCVD
% netstat -rn
Destination Gateway Flags Refcnt Use Interface
127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 UH 1 1365 lo0
default 209.179.181.129 UG 17 2089112 le0
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Portscanners









• Keeps track of every query of host
• Send a passive signal to bind
• Dumps database into named_dump.db
• Compare system logs, known hosts
– use TTL vs time left in memory
522
TCP Wrapper Alert
• Suspicious activity at some unlikely hour
• Screen saver accounts don’t finger around at 
midnight.
• Suspect screen saver account compromised




Feb 13 23:05:34 wsbs01 in.fingerd[7948]: connect from root@wsbs03
Feb 13 23:05:35 wsbs06 in.fingerd[15895]: connect from nobody@wsbs01
Feb 13 23:05:36 wsbs06 in.fingerd[15897]: refused connect from nobody@localhost
wsbs06 wsbs01 wsbs03
# finger @ localhost@wsbs06@wsbs01
524
Suspicious Process
Process name: misleading to hide real purpose.
Process start time: matches time of incident.
Process privileges: super-user
# ps aux
USER    PID  %CPU %MEM SZ RSS TT STAT START TIME COMMAND 
root 0  0.0 0.0 0 0 ? D Jan 14 0:01 swapper
root 1  0.0 0.0 52 0 ? IW Jan 14 0:00 /sbin /init -
root 2  0.0 0.0 0 0 ? D Jan 14 0:00 pagedaemon
root 75 0.0 0.0 16 0 ? I Jan 14 0:00 (biod)
root 55 0.0 0.0 68 0 ? IW Jan 14 0:00 portmap




USER PID %CPU %MEM SZ RSS TT STAT START TIME COMMAND 
Wietse 152 0.0 1.5 56 212 p0  S       09:12 0:00 -csh
HOME=/home/wietse USER=wietse LOGNAME=wietse PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:
/usr/ucb : /usr/bin/X11:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/bin
MAIL=/var /spool/mail/wietse SHELL=/bin/csh TERM= xterm (csh)
Basic listing
Command and environment listing
# ps ax
PID TT STAT TIME COMMAND 
152 p0 S 0:00 -csh (csh) 
883 p0 R 0:00 ps ax
526
ps incantations (System V)
# ps -ef
UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME COMD
wietse 9157 9154 24 12:57:58 pts/0 0:00 -csh
wietse 9184 9157 21 13:00:43 pts/0 0:00 ps -ef
# ps -ealf
F  S   UID PID PPID C PRI NI ADDR SZ WCHAN STIME TTY TIME COMD
8  S wietse 9157 9154 25 41 20 fc52bcc0 218 fc52be90 12:57:58 pts/0 0:00 -csh
8  O  wietse 9204 9157 21 55 20 fc52b000 173 13:13:03 pts/0 0:00 ps -ealf
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List Open Files and Connections
# lsof-p 12823 
COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE/OFF INODE NAME
<defunct> 12823 root cwd VDIR 7, 22 1024 868362 /var
<defunct> 12823 root T00 VREG 7, 22 32768 868676 /var
<defunct> 12823 root T01 VREG 7, 6 24576 139429 /usr
<defunct> 12823 root T02 VREG 7, 6 516096 139397 /usr
<defunct> 12823 root T03 VREG 7, 0 4096 14951 /
<defunct> 12823 root T04 VREG 7, 6 40960 139492 /usr
<defunct> 12823 root 3u inet 0xff64b50c 0x0 TCP *:5120
ftp://vic .cc.purdue.edu/pub/tools/l s o f/  
The intruder had left behind a process running with super-
user privileges that listened for incoming connections on 
TCP port 5120. This process looked like a privileged 
backdoor However, the executable file itself had been 
deleted. 528







Reconstruction of User Activity
• Reconstruct what was typed
• Determine what happened
• Determine the damage done
• Determine what files are used
• Correlation is the key
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What to Trust
• When a machine has been compromised, 
all information that comes from the 
machine must be treated with extreme 
suspicion
• Intruders routinely replace system utilities 
such as ls, ps and netstat with versions that 




• Modifications to application program and 
data files can be detected relatively easily 
by comparing the files on the system 
against a known -to-be-good baseline. 
• Toolkits for UNIX achieve stealth by 
modifying a running OS kernel on-the-fly 
• Kernel-level modifications can be much 
harder to detect 
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Unmistakable Rootkit Signature
• Finds trojan versions of command file
– find / -type f -print | xargsmd5 >file
• du (hide sniffer, logs, and configuration files)
• ifconfig (hide sniffer activity)
• login (backdoor)
• ls (hide sniffer, logs, and configuration files)
• netstat (hide intruder network connections)
• ps (hide sniffer process)
• Plus what turns out to be configuration files, 










Contents of a Forensic Toolbag
– Statically linked data collection 
tools
• dd, cp, cat, ls




How and What to Grab
• Take the system offline
• Keep track of everything you type or do
• Grab first, analyze later
• Note hardware, software, system configuration
• Automation is necessary (time & consistency)
• Follow order of volatility
• Make copies (including tools) to safeguard them
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Collecting Evidence
• Gather in order of
– Memory
– Unallocated filesystem
– netstat, route, arp
– ps, capture all process data
– stat & MD5 on all files, strings on directories
– Config, log, interesting files such as cron, at
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List Open Files and Connections
• lsof command 
• (vic.cc.purdue.edu/pub/tools/lsof) 
• what files a process executes
• what files a process accesses
• what network connections a process uses
• the current directory
• the internal inode number 











• NFS/Net data handled at server
– dd all filesystems(if possible)
– stat & MD5 all files
– strings on directories
– Capture logfiles, sys configs, important files











Freezing an Attacker’s Process
• Do not connect to the port
– Bad things might happen
• Do not terminate the process
– All information would be lost
• Suspend the process 
– kill terminates the process
– kill -STOP suspends the process
– kill –CONT resume the suspended process
• Checking the result 




– Studies a program without actually executing it
– Disassemblers, decompilers, source-code 
analysis tools,  strings and grep commands
– Can reveal how a program would behave under 
unusual conditions 





– Study a program as it executes
– Debuggers, function call tracers, machine 
emulators, logic analyzers and network sniffers
– Analysis is fast and accurate. However, what 
you see is all you get
– Difficult to make a nontrivial program traverse 
all the possible paths through its code.
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Program Analysis 
• Black Box Analysis
– Dynamic analysis without access to program 
internals
– Only observables are the external inputs, 
outputs, and their timing characteristics. 





– Study of program behavior by looking at the 
after-effects of program execution
– Often the only tool available after system 
intrusion
– Some information disappears quickly as normal 




Program code and constants (from program file)
Program variables (saved in core dump)
Direction of growth of stack segment
Shared library code and constants (from lib. files)
Shared library variables (saved in core dump)
Direction of growth of data segment





• # dd < /dev/kmem> output
• # dd < /dev/mem > output2
• # dd < /dev/rswap > output3
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Capturing Process Memory
• pcat dumps the entire memory of a process 
to file,  including code, data, heap, libraries 
and stack
• Result can be examined with unstructured 
tools such as strings, binary editor
# pcat 12832 > pcat.12832
To dump all memory of process 12832
550
Examining the Memory
• Use ps or lsof to locate program 
– pcat 123 | strings > 123.mem
• grep ‘[host/IP pattern]’ 123.mem
• Use strings and less to examine further
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File Accessible by Inode Number
• # ils device
– List removed files (inode unallocated and/or refcount 0)
• # ils -o device
– List removed open files (inode allocated but refcount 0)
• # ils -l device
– Existing and removed files (inode allocated/unallocated)
• # ils device inode
– List specific inode
• # icat device inode >file
– Access file content by inode number 552
Capturing Program File
• icat retrieves file associated with device 
name and inode number.
• Recover deleted but still open or running 
files.
• Result can be examined with standard 
debuggers and with unstructured tools such 
as strings, binary editors
To save contents of file <pid> 868676 on <device> /dev/sd2g




• gcore is a standard utility program that takes 
a snapshot of the process data and stack but 
not of the program code
• gcore creates core dump checkpoints of 
variables and stack





# ls -l core.12832
-rw-r--r-- 1 root 8421808 Feb 24 09:29 core.12832
Core dump checkpoint for process 12832
• The output fromgcore is in the form of a 
core dump file 
• Result can be examined with standard 




# strings core.12832 | more
Error: cant open file
kill



















Activities of process 12832
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Capturing Process Information
• /proc filesystem provides process information on 
executable file, current directory and process 
memory. 
• Entries in /proc/<pid> give access to process info
• Capturing the program file is as simple as 
copying /proc/<pid>/file
• Capturing process memory requires more work 





Program file /proc/pid/object/a.out /proc/pid/file /proc/pid/exe
Process memory /proc/pid/as /proc/pid/mem /proc/pid/mem 
Memory map /proc/pid/ap /proc/pid/map /proc/pid/maps
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Capturing Network Information









• Speed is important
• Router flow logs 
• Portmasters , dialup equipment
• Sniffer, tcpdump
• Server information 
– DNS, NFS, NIS, mail, syslog, WWW, news





Watching a Process in Action
• Tracing a process at the machine instruction level 
generates enormous amounts of information.
– Tracing process manipulates the traced process via 
operating-system debugger hooks. 
– Passing control back and forth between the traced 
process and the tracing process after each machine 
instruction slows down execution
– Every file access, every network access, every 
interaction with the world requires a system call to 
request assistance from the operating system.
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Watching a Process in Action
• Use standard debugging hooks to intercept and log
– System calls (tapping the user-kernel interface)
– Library calls (tapping the application-library interface)
– Individual application routines (requires program file)
– Individual machine instructions
• Run-time tracing can generate large amount of data
• Run-time tracing can impact performance 
noticeably 562
Watching System Calls
• Watching system calls is better than 
watching machine instructions
– System calls happen at much lower frequency
– Causes less slowdown of execution
– Produces less information
• Information about system calls 
– Have better signal to noise ratio
– Suitable for filtering on the function call name 
or on function call arguments 
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Watching System Calls
• User-kernel interface does not show what 
happens inside the application or inside 
library routines
• All information must enter or leave the 
program via a system call, input, output, 
network, file or terminal
• Many system-specific tools
– trace (SunOS 4)
– truss (Solaris 2)
– ktrace (*BSD) 564
System Call Tracing
watch process 12345
and its child processes
show everything read from Ch 6
show everything written to Ch 4
look at read/write calls only
















– Log every library routine call (output like strace)




– Portable to SUNs
• tap
– ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/tap/
– Hook into streams -based tty systems.
– Portable to SUNs
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Hiding a Process from Observation
• Cannot use lots of CPU, memory or I/O resources 
• Modified ps, lsof, top applications or library 
routines
– Can be sufficient when process listing applications 
must be installed as privileged commands.
• Modified kernel: crude implementations of 
loadable kernel modules 
– Hides a process even from the most privileged users.
– http://thc.pimmel.com/
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Hiding a Process from Observation
• Standard B2+ security feature (covert channels)
• Spying on an intruder without being seen
• Hiding a password snifferprocess







A Forensic Case Example
Investigating a suspected intrusion
• Priorities:
– Gathering evidence of the break-in
– Prevent or contain the damages
– Restore the integrity of the system
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When Faced with a Situation
• Secure and isolate
• Record the scene
• Conduct a systematic search for evidence
• Collect and package evidence
• Maintain chain of custody
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Leave the System On / Off ?
• Leave the system running 
– Catching the intruder red-handed
– Preserving evidence on live connections and RAM
– Danger of losing or overwriting evidence during 
investigation
• Disconnect and reboot the system
– Contain the damage




• Ask all non-essential users to log off
– To facilitate investigation
– To reduce noise interference
– To prevent malicious code from spreading
• Offer use of system administrator account
– To enable investigator freedom of access for 




Script started, file is evidence
# date
Sat Mar 6 20:03:34 1999
Open a log file to keep a complete 
record of all investigation activities
Type exit to close log on completion
573
Check Who is On
# /bin/who
root console Mar 6 16:00
rewt pts/26 Mar 6 15:45 (174-16-52.world.com)
Your administrator login
Suspected intruder since 
all other users have log off Source of intruder ’s remote access
574
Check Recent TCP/IP Connections
# /bin/netstat –a
cases.forensic-science.com.telnet 174 -16-52.world.com.1711 8235
0 64260 0 ESTABLISHED
Indications of Telnet connections from world.com to forensic -science.com 
Confirms remote connection based 




rewt pts/26 174-16-52.world.com Sat Mar 6 15:45 still logged in




# /bin/ps –auxwww | grep rewt
UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD
rewt 2198 2191 0 Mar 6 ? 378:50 rsh www.corpus-delicit.com 
exec/temp/.invisible/destroy
rewt 2186 1993 0 Mar 6 ? 295:31 sniffer
root 4094 3155 0 16:02:14 0:00 grep rewt
rewt 1993 1946 0 15:46:57 pts/24 0:01 -csh
List all intruder’s processes
Possibly a destruction program running on remote 
machine www.corus-delicit.comusing remote shell
Processes with start time > 24 hrs
97
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Contain the Damage 
# /bin/kill –9 2198
# /bin/kill –9 2186
# /bin/kill –9 1993
PID of processes 
executed by rwet




Mar 5 23:43:13 cases.forensic-science.com mountd[513]: 
Unauthorized access by NFS cilent 174-16-65.world.com
Mar 5 23:43:13 cases.forensic-science.com syslogd : 
Cannot glue message parts together
Mar 5 23:43:13 cases.forensic-science.com mountd[513]: 
Blocked attempt of  174-16-65.world.com to mount
Intruder gained access through




^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H 
^E^H ^E^ ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E 
^E^H H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H 
^E^H(Mar 5 23:43:13 cases.forensic-science.com ^E^H 
^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H ^E^H
Overflow data from a file




Mar 5 23:46:54 cases.forensic-science.com PAM_pwdb[3122]: (login) 
session opened by user doomed by (uid=0)
Mar 5 23:46:54 cases.forensic-science.com login[3122]: LOGIN ON 
ttyp0 BY crak0 FROM 174-16-65.world.com 
Mar 5 23:50:03 cases.forensic-science.com PAM_pwdb[3130]: (su) 
session opened for user rewt by doomed (uid=0)
File containing buffer overflow data
Switching to a newly created account with root access
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Determine Intruder Activities
# /bin/ps –auxwww | grep rewt
UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME CMD
rewt 2198 2191 0 Mar 6 ? 378:50 rsh www.corpus-delicit.com 
exec/temp/.invisible/destroy
rewt 2186 1993 0 Mar 6 ? 295:31 sniffer
root 4094 3155 0 16:02:14 0:00 grep rewt
rewt 1993 1946 0 15:46:57 pts/24 0:01 -csh
Recall on the intruder’s processes




# /bin/ls  -altc
drwx-------- 2 root root 512 Mar 6 Jan 1 15:33 ./
drwx-------- 8 root root 512 Jan 1 15:33 ../
/tmp/.hidden not found 
ls command may have been replaced with a 




How to Hide a Directory
mkdir .invisible
mv rootkitkit .tar.gz .invisible
cd .invisible





Install the rootkit as follows
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RedHat Package Manager (RPM)
• The RPM provides a convenient way to 
determine if common system files like ls have 
been modified
• The command rpm –Va verifies all of the 
important files on the system
• This method is not failsafe
– A sophisticated intruder can also modify the RPM 






Surely enough, the version 







-rw-r--r-- 1 rewt 3925716 Mar 6 21:21 info3
-rw-r--r-- 1 rewt 108133 Mar 6 16:48 info2
-rw-r--r-- 1 rewt 1818708 Mar 6 16:03 info1
-rw-r--r-- 1 rewt 4414846 Mar 6 15:54 destroy
drwxr-xr-x 2 rewt 512 Mar 6 00:22 sniffer
drwxr-xr-x 3 rewt 512 Mar 6 00:20




• Terminate the script logging the investigation 
by typing exit
• Print all evidence and sign on each page
• Copy evidence to disk using tar (instead of cp) 
to preserve timestamps and file attributes




• Duplicate evidence for safekeeping and 
further investigation 
• Reboot the system 
• Make a bitstream copy of the hard drive
• Examine router log files
– Log files will reveal trial and error entries of 
intruder attempting to gain access
• Reformat disk, reinstall OS





– Exploited common vulnerability to intrude into 
system
– Obtained access from a dial-up account at 
world.com
– Modified the system using a rootkit
– Created a hidden directory by modifying ls
– Hide tools in hidden directory 
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• The ubiquitous nature and increasing 
complexity of wireless networks raises a 
host of criminal and legal issues. 
• Of concern is how law enforcement can 
locate and process wireless network digital 




• Time is of the essence when collecting data. It 
is important to build relationships and 
procedures with wireless operator personnel so 
that when a situation arises, time will not be 
lost.
• The list on www.infobin .org has the names of 
ISPs and contacts at their legal departments for 
services of court orders and search warrants.
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Wireless Network Analysis
• Generally, the most complex parts of the 
process are
– Law enforcement having to find the right 
people to talk to at the wireless network 
operator.
– The system analyst receiving authorization to 
track a phone call.
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Wireless Network Analysis
• The ability to quickly track a subscriber 
location during the course of a phone call is 
possible but requires personnel familiar with 
the network operator’s equipment. 
• Procedures should be in place at the operator 
to aid in rapidly expediting the investigation.
• Procedures should also be in place for law 
enforcement so that they know who to call for 
emergency assistance. 600
Circuit Switched Wireless Network
• The 3 most popular digital circuit switched 
wireless technology
– GSM 
• Global System for Mobile Communications, TDMA
– IS-136/TDMA
• Time Division Multiple Access
– IS-95/CDMA




• A GSM mobile device is marked with a 
unique International Mobile Equipment 
Identity (IMEI) numbers. 
• IS-136 and IS-95 mobile devices are 
marked with a unique ESN (Electronic 
Serial Number). 
• The IMEI or the ESN can be found printed 
on the back of the mobile device. 602
Mobile Equipment Identity
• The 14 digits IMEI contains the
– Type Approval Code (TAC) 
• 6 digits
• Issued by the certification body to the manufacture
– Final Assembly Code (FAC)
• 2 digits
• Issued by the manufacture for this particular 
equipment type
– Serial Number (SN) 
• 6 digits
• The manufacturer’ s unique production number
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Mobile Equipment Identity
• The IMEI can be interrogated with the key 
combination *#06#. 
• A 1-digit Check Digit (CD) is calculated 
from the 14 IMEI digits and is not sent 
within the GSM network. 
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Mobile Equipment Identity
• The IMEI can usually be found in the 
EEPROM memory. 
• There are many tools available for 
modifying the IMEI. This may provide 
problems when tracing and furnishing proof 
on the use of the mobile device.
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SIM Card
• In GSM, the Subscriber Information 
Module (SIM) contains data such as
– The subscriber’s phone number
– The subscriber identity number




• The phone number is called the Mobile 
Subscriber ISDN. 
• The International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI) is globally unique to a 
particular subscriber. The 15 digits IMSI 
can indicate the subscriber’s country and 




• A Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(TMSI) can also be stored on the SIM card 
to avoid revealing the IMSI number. 
• IS-136 and IS-95 mobile device do not use 
a SIM card. The phone number or Mobile 
Identification Number (MIN), the IMSI, 
PIN number and authentication keys reside 
on the mobile device itself.
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SIM Card
• Data in a SIM is protected with a PIN.
– The number of attempts at entering a PIN is 
limited to 3. 
– If none of the attempts is successful, access to 
the protected data is blocked. 
609
SIM Card
• This blockade can be lifted with a PUK (Pin 
Unblocking Key). 
– A PUK is entered together with a newly chosen 
PIN. 
– The number of attempts at entering a PUK is 
limited to 10. 
– In many countries, PUKs can be obtained from 
the subscriber’s network provider.
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Extraction of SIM Data
• Cards4Labs (www.forensischinstituut.nl) is 
modular program for reading smart cards 
via PC/SC compatible smart card readers. 
• For reading SIM data, the PUK can be 
requested from the network provider with 
relevant authorization. 
• This PUK, when entered with a PIN of 
choice, allows access and decoding of files, 
including data that have been erased. 
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GSM Memory
• It is also possible to retrieve supplementary data 
through the direct reading of the EEPROM or 
FLASH memory contained in the GSM device.  
• To do this, the memory is removed and read 
with a universal programming device. 
• The decoding process amounts to looking at the 
memory dump in a hexadecimal viewer such as 
the Hex-Workshop (www.hexworkshop.com). 
612
Back Door 
• Many systems have a back-door 
deliberately built in to circumvent security. 
• The reserve password may be found in the 
technical documentation. 
• For some GSM, service sets used by repair 
departments can be used to retrieve or 




• The MSC is the nerve center of the circuit 
switched network. 
• The MSC performs call setups and maps out 
the path of a call between the originating 
and destination points. 
• The MSC switches calls between Location 
Areas and between other MSCs . 
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Mobile Switching Center
• The MSC interconnects calls from its own 
network area to other fixed line network, a 
data network, or another wireless network. 
• Billing information in the CDR (Call Detail 
Record or Charging Detail Record) is also 
derived from the MSC.
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Home Location Registry
• The HLR contains subscriber information 
such as who pays the bill, their billing 
address, their phone number, the services 
that they are allowed to use. 
• The HLP will always know the location of 
the mobile device as it may need to route 
call to the mobile device. 
• Ciphering keys for a particular subscriber 
are also held in the HLR. 616
Visitor Location Registry
• The VLR contains the subscriber 
information of all users active in a particular
MSC’s network. 
• When a subscriber roams into a new MSC 
area, the VLR will request information from 




• At the same time, the HLR will create a 
record showing the name of the VLR  to 
which a subscriber is presently associated.
• When the subscriber moves out of an
MSC’s area, the record in the MSC’s VLR 
is created and the HLR is notified.
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Equipment Identity Registry
• In GSM, the EIR contains a list of IMEI 
numbers that the operator has registered. The 
EIR can be used to blacklist stolen mobile 
devices to prevent further abuse.
• IMEIs are categorized as 
– White: authorized mobile devices
– Black: unauthorized/reported stolen mobile devices
– Gray: malfunctioning mobile devices. 
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Operational and Maintenance Center
• The OMC provides a view of the 
operational status of the network, network 
activity and alarms. 
• The OMC can be used to
– collect traffic information from the network
– examine a particular mobile call in progress 
(mobile trace)
620
Turning on a Mobile Device
• Switching on a mobile device causes the 
device to register with the network and 
inform the network of its Location Area. 
• The mobile device may also be requested to 
perform a location update every so many 
minutes to identify its location within the 
network. 
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Turning on a Mobile Device
• The MSC for the area informs its VLR as to 
the Location Area the mobile device has 
reported its presence and inform the 
subscriber’s HLR accordingly. 
• Information from the subscriber’s HLR will 
also be updated with the VLR name with 
which the subscriber is now registered.
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A Mobile Device in Idle State
• In a listening state, the mobile device may 
be asked to perform a Location Area 
update.
• This allows the network to identify the 
Location Area in which the subscriber 
resides.
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Roaming with a Mobile Device
• With the information exchange on the 
Location Area, the subscriber’s home 
network will know the wireless network 
operator and MSC/VLR where the 
subscriber is roaming, either in
– The home network
– Another network
– A network in another country
624
Connecting A Call
• When placing or receiving a call with a 
mobile device, the network knows which 
cell sector to which the subscriber is 
connected. 
• This particular location information is 
transient (possibly 72 hours or less) as 
compared to the information such as the 
calling party and called party, which can be 
found in most billing records.
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Areas of Digital Evidence
• Areas useful for forensics on wireless 
network:
– Equipment connected to the mobile device 
– The mobile device itself 
– The wireless network 
– The subsequent network that the caller accesses
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Equipment on the Mobile Device
• Criminal activity involving wireless 
networks can involve a laptop connected to 
a mobile device. 
• Data that may prove useful to an 
investigation may reside on the laptop or 
network.
627
Equipment on the Mobile Device
• A laptop enabled by a mobile device may 
have been connected to a Ethernet or 
wireless (802.11) network. 
• If a mobile device has then been used to 
dial-up to another network, then the laptop 




• Many mobile devices have some sort of 
PIM (Personal Information Manager) built 
into the device that may yield useful 
information. 
• The mobile device memory (and the SIM 
card) may contain critical information. 
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The Mobile Device
• The phone lists within the mobile device 
may contain: received call phone numbers, 
dialed phone numbers and missed phone 
numbers stamped with a data and time.
• Do not assume that the date and time are 
accurate on a mobile device. The subscriber 




• Most mobile devices have the capability to 
store names and phone numbers for a 
subscriber to dial. 
• This information may also yield valuable 
information, such as names and numbers of 





• The mobile device memory (and the SIM card) 





– MSISDN (phone number) for subscriber identification
– Correlation to billing record
– Location where the mobile device was last used.
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The Mobile Device
• The mobile device may also hold voicemail 
number, voicemail PIN, numbers stored on 
speed dial and calling card information.
• SMS messages of interest may still be 
resident on the mobile device or SIM card. 
The inbox stores incoming SMS messages, 
while the outbox or sent lists contain 
previously sent SMS messages.
633
The Mobile Device
• Mobile devices may also use PIN numbers 
that may hamper access to data resident in 
the mobile device. 
• When seizing mobile device, losing power, 
running out of battery power, or removing 




• The MSC can be rich with digital evidence. 
• Billing records can contain the caller’s 
number, receiving party number, time when 
the call was placed, and duration of call. 
• Billing records may also note how and 
when payment was executed.
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The Wireless Network
• The HLR contains subscriber 
information that can be matched to a 
phone number. 
– It is important to know that not all GSM 
network operators use EIRs.
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The Wireless Network
• SMS messages may be kept for a varying 
period of time at the SM -SC (Short 
Message Service Center)
– Messages for a particular subscriber may be 
waiting here, ready to be forwarded. 
– These waiting unclaimed messages could be 




• The OMC and the signaling links can 
provide data in real time regarding the 
activities of a subscriber. 
• Due to the extensive capabilities of the 
OMC, user activities of network operator 
personnel should be logged. These logs 
may also be useful.
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The Wireless Network
• The elements in the core network interface 
with each other via the SS7 (Signaling 
System #7) protocol. 
• Logging SS7 data can yield information 
regarding mobile location or evidence 




• The caller may use a mobile device to 
accessed a subsequent network.
• If one network hands off to the other 
network, a record will be kept. This can be 
useful for determining a suspect’s activity 
near a border between countries roaming.
• However, the MSC may be in a different 
country and information from the foreign 
operator may not be readily available. 640
Concerns with Encryption
• Most wireless technology standards 
emphasize security of the radio link but do 
not provide for real security on the core 
network where communications and 
signaling takes place. 
• Information is not encrypted after the BTS 
(Base Transceiver Station). Easier to 
wiretap the non-radio links at the MSC 
rather than the radio link itself.
641
Concerns with Encryption
• Wiretapping at the MSC is the easiest 
method to obtain unencrypted information.
• Cipher keys and authentication values used 
by mobile devices to encrypt 
communications are passed in clear text 
between MSCs . 
642
Records kept in the MSC
• The MSC is the heart of the network. 
– It stores everything internally in memory and 
releases these data as input to other functions 
in the switch.








• Billing records are usually kept in a 
database for use by customer service. 
• Billing data are typically archived for a long 
term, such as 7 years for both legal reasons 




• The anchor switch which routes a call from 
a mobile device is tasked for 
– Generating its own CDR (Charging Details 
Records) 
– Collecting CDR from other switches through 
which the call passes
645
Fraud management
• The fraud management system analyzes the 
CDR for unusual and abnormal patterns. 
• The fraud management system will note when 
a subscriber breaks this pattern and if this 
unusual activity continues for a period of time. 
• The network operator may then call the 
subscriber to ensure that the mobile device is 
under the subscriber’s control.
646
Wiretapping
• A judge may issue a court order demanding 
that a particular phone number of a 
suspect’s mobile device be wiretapped. 
• The security department at the network 
operator can then authorizes a wiretap to be 
performed by its technical personnel. 
647
Wiretapping
• When the subscriber’s mobile device makes 
a call or receives a call, 
– The operator’s switch will break out a second 
line for the call 
– The second line is then passed over a secure 




• Network operation details can quickly take 
up massive amounts of storage space. 
• Records are soon aggregated into smaller 
summary files to save storage space, and to 
focus operator personnel on higher priority 




• A phone call can pinpoint (down to the cell 
site) where the call was made from. 
• However, after the operational network data 
are summarized, only the switch name 
associated with the call will be available.
650
Location Based Services
• Various types of position determining 
equipment (PDE) technologies exist to 
calculate the location of a subscriber down. 
• Using these technologies, a wireless 
operator can provide to its subscribers 
location based services. 
– For instance, a message or advertisement could 
be sent to the subscriber’s mobile device about 
local attractions or services.
651
Location-Based Services
• Using position determining equipment, a 
mobile can also be ‘pinged’, thus 
– Forcing the mobile to re-register with the 
network
– Provide signals for the position determining 
equipment to home in and fix a location
652
Location-Based Services
• Position determining technologies can also 
enable an operator to provide emergency 
services. 
• When an emergency call is placed, the 




Specifications Speed Frequency Techniques
802.11 < 2 Mbps 2.4 GHz Freq Hopping Spread Spectrum
Direct Seq Spread Spectrum
Infrared
802.11a < 54 Mbps 5 GHz Orthogonal Freq Div Multiplex
802.11b < 11 Mbps 2.4 GHz Direct Seq Spread Spectrum
654
Wireless LAN Analysis
• Areas useful for forensics on wireless LAN:
– Equipment connected to the mobile device 
– The mobile device itself 
– The wireless network 
– The subsequent network that the caller accesses
110
655
Equipment on the Mobile Device
• A laptop connection enabled by a WLAN 
card may be connected to an 802.11 
network. Software in the PC may contain 
useful data of network activity. 
• The network to which a WLAN user is 
connected to may also contain session logs 
of the user’s activity within the network.
656
The Mobile Device
• Like the Network Interface Card on the 
Ethernet, the WLAN card has a fixed Media 
Access Control (MAC) address that is 
unique to the WLAN card and can also be 
used to identify the card ’s vendor.
• The MAC address of the WLAN card can 
provide a form of identification of the 




• Access Point on the wireless network logs 
associations based on the MAC address. 
Most Access Points allow administrator to 
configure an access list based on MAC 
address.
• The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 




• An intruder can jump in and join a network 
for which he does not have permission to 
join by using a probing mechanism.
• Such probing mechanism permits a 
broadcast request to gather Access Point 
information and then carry out an auto-join 
function into the network.
659
The Wireless Network
• Access Points should have the ability to 
support encryption using Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP). 
• Even when the WEP is enabled, the 




• The subsequent network may contain 
session logs of the user’s activity within the 
network.
• Digital evidence in this area can be 
extremely difficult to access, particularly if 
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This set of laboratory exercises is specially designed to illustrate the computer forensic concepts 
being taught in class. By performing the exercises, it will help you to understand and internalize 
the key concepts. In these exercises, you will learn to use operating system tools and rootkits to 
extract useful digital evidence as well as lay your hands on professional computer forensic 
software and freeware. 
 
The intention of this laboratory manual is not to spoon-feed you with step-by-step instructions on 
how to conduct a forensic examination. Rather, you will be expected to actively search for the 
relevant information, user instructions and downloads, in carrying out your exercises. This is to 
build up your resourcefulness and creativity towards tackling future forensic examinations. 
Pertinent technical guidance will accompany each of these exercises in order to help you get 
started. 
 
Do not attempt to copy from the forensic examination of other project groups, as each group will 
be issued with subject evidence with subtle differences among them. 
 
Maximize the use of the technical resources available in the laboratory and make this an 
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The Foundstone Forensic Toolkit contains several Win32 command line tools to help examine 
files on a NTFS disk partition for unauthorized activity. Some of these open source tools include  
 
AFind lists files by their last access time without tampering the data the way that right-
clicking on file properties in Windows Explorer will. AFind allows you to search for access 
times between certain time frames, coordinating this with other logon information, you can 
determine user activity even if file logging has not been enabled. 
 
HFind scans the disk for hidden files. It will find files that have either the hidden attribute 
set, or NT's unique and painful way of hiding things by using the directory/system attribute 
combination. This is the method that Internet Explorer uses to hide data. HFind lists the last 
access times. 
 
SFind scans the disk for hidden data streams and lists the last access times. 
 




1. You should be able to obtain the necessary information and downloads from the 
knowledge page at www.foundstone.com to install the forensic software on your 
forensic PC. If you need specific technical assistance on the Foundstone Forensic 
Toolkit, you may contact labs@foundstone.com. The web page provides valuable 
information on the command line switches for the various embedded tools. 
 
2. You will need to first unzip the downloaded file before installation.  
 
3. You will also be issued a duplicate of the subject floppy disk you are going to 
examine. 
 
4. Open a DOS Command Prompt to run the forensic tools. You may also explore with 
the other tools in the Foundstone Forensic Toolkit that are not described above. You 
can type the name of the tools to list the command line switches that are applicable to 
them.  
 
5. Run Afind with the correct command line switch to determine files which were 
accessed within the last 2 days. 
 
6. Run Hfind with the correct command line switch to determine the last access time of 
the hidden files. 
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7. Run Sfind with the correct command line switch to determine the last access time of 
the hidden data streams. 
 
8. You may also use FileStat to perform a quick dump of all the content and security 
attributes of the files you have examined above (one at a time) to your evidence file. 
 
9. Compare the above findings with that using the dir command in DOS. What are the 
command line switches required in dir to generate the equivalent information? 
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EnCase is the industry leading computer forensic software tool used by most all computer 
forensic examiners. Award winning and court tested, EnCase software allows law enforcement 
and IT professionals to conduct a powerful, yet completely non-invasive computer forensic 
investigation. EnCase features a graphical user interface that enables examiners to easily manage 
large volumes of computer evidence and view all relevant files, including "deleted" files, file 
slack and unallocated data. The integrated functionality of EnCase allows the examiner to 
perform all functions of the computer forensic investigation process, from the initial 
"previewing" of a target drive, the acquisition of the evidentiary images, the search and recovery 
of the data and the final reporting of findings, all within the same application. The final reports 
and extracts generated by the built-in report feature documents the investigation results and 
integrity of the original data with a clear and concise chain of custody to ensure the 




1. Installation of the forensic software 
2. Acquisition of evidence from the subject PC 
3. Creation of evidence files for forensic analysis 
4. Analysis of acquired evidence 
5. Recovery of deleted files and folders 
6. File signatures analysis 
7. Hash value analysis 
8. Temporal reconstruction of events 
9. Creation of forensic report 




1. You should be able to obtain the necessary information and downloads from 
www.encase.com to install the forensic software on your forensic PC. If you need 
specific technical assistance on EnCase, you may contact support@encase.com or 
help@encase.com, or go to the technical support web page. The web page provides 
valuable information on setting up, acquisition, analysis, archive, restoration, 
reporting and other technical support. 
 
2. You will be issued with a physical dongle in order for EnCase to run on your 
machine—a copyright protection feature. Attach the dongle onto your machine’s 
USB or parallel-port. You will also be issued with a user name and password to 
enable you to perform download from the EnCase website. 
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3. Download EnCase from the website to your Windows-based forensic PC (the 
computer used to conduct the forensic examination). Run setup.exe and install 
EnCase. Reboot your PC. 
 
4. Run EnCase. Goto the Tools menu to create an EnCase boot disk. The boot disk is 
used to boot up the subject PC (the computer you are going to examine). It can also 
be used to boot up your forensic PC to a safe version in DOS.  
 
5. Connect the subject PC directly to your forensic PC using either the lap-link parallel 
cable or network cross-over cable. In order to connect to the forensic PC on the 
network cable, ensure that the subject PC has a NIC supported by EnCase in the boot 
disk. You may also need to disconnect your forensic PC from the LAN if there is only 
one NIC on the machine. The list of supportable NIC can be found on 
www.encase.com/html/encase_network_boot_disk_page.htm. Otherwise, get the 
DOS packet driver for the specific NIC on the subject PC, copy and load (may require 
creating a config line in a batch file) the packet driver on the boot disk.  
 
6. Boot up the subject PC using the EnCase boot disk. Load the packet driver and launch 
EnCase for DOS. 
 
7. Boot your forensic PC into Windows, launch EnCase for Windows. You should be 
able to preview and acquire evidence on the subject PC from your forensic PC. 
 
8. Preview the subject PC. This feature is designed to allow you to pre-scan a suspected 
drive for potential evidence efficiently. As an exercise, you will not need to acquire 
the entire drive in the subject PC to your forensic PC for analysis—this will take too 
much memory, even if compressed, and too much of your time. You will just have to 
do a screen capture on a preview of the subject PC to show that you know how to 
preview and acquire evidence remotely. 
 
9. Explore the various functionalities of EnCase. 
 
10. Assuming the evidence is already captured on a floppy disk this is issued to you. 
Insert the floppy disk onto your forensic PC and acquire the evidence on the local 
disk. Create an evidence file of the subject floppy disk. 
 
11. You may also want to add external viewers (e.g. add MSWORD.EXE to for .doc files 
or OUTLOOK.EXE to for email messages) to EnCase to help view the data stream in 
the files more easily. 
 
12. Print out your certification of completion. Hint: It is a file attachment within another 
file that has been deleted in a hidden folder. Note the original file type may have been 
changed.  
 
13. Proceed to analyze and document your findings on the evidence file into a report. 
Perform the relevant steps to fulfill the laboratory requirement stated above. 
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14. Summarize your forensic investigation and make a presentation of your case in a 
legally convincing manner in class. 
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Laboratory Exercise 3: AccessData Forensic Toolkit 
 
The AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) is a handy utility for computer crimes 
investigators. FTK offers users a complete suite of technologies needed when performing 
forensic examinations of computer systems. Its full text indexing offers quick advanced 
searching capabilities. Its deleted file recovery and file slack analysis are commendable. FTK is 
also interoperable with AccessData's password recovery and encryption file identification 
programs. In addition, the FTK incorporates Stellent's Outside In Viewer Technology to access 
over 255 different file formats. The Known File Filter (KFF) feature can be used to automatically 
pull out benign files that are known not to contain any potential evidence and flags known 
problem files for the investigator to immediately examine. FTK can also support evidence files 




1. Installation of the forensic software 
2. Acquisition of evidence from the subject floppy disk  
3. Creation of evidence files for forensic analysis 
4. Analysis of acquired evidence 
5. Recovery of deleted files and folders 
6. File signatures analysis 
7. Export of recovered deleted files and attachments 
8. Creation of forensic report 




1. You should be able to obtain the necessary information and downloads from 
www.accessdata.com to install the forensic software on your forensic PC (the 
evaluation version is adequate for this laboratory exercise). If you need specific 
technical assistance on the AccessData Forensic Toolkit, you may obtain online 
support from its web page.  
 
2. You will need to first unzip the downloaded file before installation.  
 
3. You will also be issued a duplicate of the subject floppy disk you are going to 
examine, assuming the evidence is already captured on a floppy disk.  
 
4. Insert the floppy disk onto your forensic PC and acquire the evidence on the local 
disk. Create a new case. Adopt the default case log options, processes, case 
refinements and index. Add evidence and select the local drive of the floppy. 
 
5. Explore the various functionalities of FTK. 
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6. Recover and export your certification of completion. Print the certificate using the 
original Microsoft Office application. Hint: You may use the impressive advanced 
searching capabilities of FTK with the keyword ‘certificate’. 
 
7. Proceed to analyze and document your findings on the evidence file into a report. 
Perform the relevant steps to fulfill the laboratory requirement stated above. 
 
8. Summarize your forensic investigation and make a presentation of your case in a 
legally convincing manner in class. 
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Microsoft WinNT/2K can be configured to log events in binary files, namely the 
a. System events in SysEvent.evt. The system log includes events in the system’s 
operation such as a failed or successful driver startup, an application crash or errors 
associated with data lost. 
b. Application events in AppEvent.evt. The application log is for events recorded by 
applications. 
c. Security events in SecEvent.evt. The security log contains information such as logon 
and logoff events, file manipulation, and other resource access events. 
 
Window NT/2K event log stores the descriptive messages in the registry and the separate 
executables (.exec) or dynamic link library (.dll) files. The Event Viewer combines and displays 
the information in these files, providing a convenient way to view the data. Consequently, 
copying event log (.evt) files from one system to another for examination may result in 
misinterpretation when viewing event logs on a remote system. The Event Viewers will read the 
event record data from the remote log files, but will search the registry of the local system for the 
corresponding event message files. Unless the forensic PC have similar configuration to the 
imaged system, it may be necessary to extract all the registry keys and event message files from 
the image. By viewing the extracted logs using the Event Viewer, it is possible to create a short 
list of missing event message files and configure them in the forensic PC accordingly. Otherwise, 
the Event Viewer will not display explanatory material for any event for which there is no 




You are the System Administrator of a computer laboratory. It was reported to you that there was 
an intrusion originating from a Windows NT/2K machine in the laboratory. You are to examine 
the event logs on that machine with minimal disturbance to the logs that are continuously 
running on the machine. As such, you decide to extract the event logs and examine them using 




1. Extract the event logs and registry keys from the subject PC 
a. Copy the event log (.evt) files from C:\WINNT\system32\config  
b. Run regedit 
c. Select 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Eventlog 
d. Select menu Registry>Export Registry Files 
 
2. Disable the current event logging on the forensic PC 
a. Right click My Computer on the desktop and select Manage  
b. Open Services and Applications\Services\Event Log 
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c. Select and apply Disabled under Startup Type 
d. This is necessary because when the event logging service does not shut down 
cleanly, the Windows Service Control Manager does not reset several bit 
values that indicate the files is open and thus cannot be accessed. The Event 
Viewer will report that the file is corrupted and will refuse to open it. 
However, the log is rarely corrupted in reality. 
e. Reboot the PC to apply the selected setting 
f. Right click My Computer on the desktop and select Manage 
g. Open Services and Applications\Services\Event Log  
h. Check that the event log is not started 
i. Rename the event log (.evt) files in C:\WINNT\system32\config 
 
3. Load the extracted event logs and registry keys onto the forensic PC 
a. Copy the extracted event log (.evt) files into C:\WINNT\system32\config 
b. Right click My Computer on the desktop and select Manage  
c. Open Services and Applications\Services\Event Log 
d. Select and apply Manual under Startup Type 
e. Start the event log services 
f. Run regedit 
g. Select 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Eventlog 
h. Select menu Registry>Import Registry Files 
 
4. Load the event message files onto the forensic PC 
a. Examine the data portion of each sub-key for EventMessageFile to reveal the 
path and file name of the file the Event Viewer uses to display explanatory 
text for each event. Since this is a tedious process, this exercise will be limited 
to the Security sub-keys only.  
b. Extract these required executables (.exe) or dynamic link library (.dll) files 
from the subject PC and load them onto the forensic PC. 
c. Double click on the EventMessageFile to edit the path and file name of the 
registry (.reg) files such that it points to the location of the appropriate 
extracted files on the forensic PC. 
 
5. Analyze the extracted event logs on the forensic PC 
a. Right click My Computer on the desktop and select Manage  
b. Select Services and Applications\System Tools\Event Viewer 
c. This will display the logs from the subject PC, but will add new events to the 
log files stamped with the current date and time. You may minimize such 
contamination by immediately generate new copies of the event logs using the 
Event Viewer’s Save As command. 
d. If you saved the event log with another file name, you may open the event log 








It was evident from the previous exercise, the clumsiness of performing manual Windows event 
log analysis on a remote forensic PC. Moreover displaying the logs using the Event Viewer is 
not very conducive for analysis since the Event Viewer is not integrated with other data 
processing tools. Even Microsoft recommends using the SomarSoft’s DumpEvt utility to dump 
contents of the event log into other formats suitable for spreadsheets and databases. Besides, 
performing separate log analysis on individual machines in a networked environment does not 
readily link a related event across multiple machines. Rather, importing the contents of multiple 
machines’ log files into a spreadsheet makes it easier to sort events chronologically and search 
the logs simultaneously. 
 
SomarSoft's DumpEvt is a Windows NT program designed to dump the event log in a format 
suitable for importing into a database. It is similar to the DUMPEL utility in the NT resource kit, 
but without some of the limitations. DumpEvt has also been updated to allow dumping of 




You are to investigate an intrusion originating from a Windows NT/2K machine in the network. 
In particular, it was reported that an intruder has remotely installed a Trojan client from machine 
A onto machine B on the same network. You are to install and use DumpEvt to examine the 




1. You should be able to obtain the necessary information and downloads from 
www.systemtools.com/somarsoft to install the event log dump utility on your forensic 
PC. The embedded Help menu provides valuable information on installation, 
command line options, known bugs and limitations, and other technical support. 
 
2. You will need to first unzip the downloaded file before installation.  
 
3. Use the Notepad to create a batch (.bat) file to extract the event logs from machine A 
and machine B onto the forensic PC. 
 
For example, the following command lines will extract the whole (all) application log 
(app) from both the subject PC (machine A, machine B), and append them to (or 
create new) an output file (c:\evidence\application_log.csv) on the forensic PC, in a 
comma-delimited spreadsheet (.csv) that can be viewed on Excel. The status and error 
messages of the extraction are appended to a text file (c:\evidence\error.txt). 
 
dumpevt.exe /computer=machine_A /logfile=app /outfile=c:\evidence\application_log.csv /all >> c:\evidence\error.txt 
dumpevt.exe /computer=machine_B /logfile=app /outfile=c:\evidence\application_log.csv /all >> c:\evidence\error.txt 
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4. Run the batch file. 
 










Unix serves as a wonderful training ground for computer security specialists. It teaches about 
access permissions for objects; learning about those rwx's in directory listings gives one an 
appreciation for granular security. It builds on MS-DOS knowledge: hidden files are dot files in 
Unix. They become visible by the ls-al command (similar to dir /a:h). Unix expands on MS-
DOS piping and redirection capabilities. Searching or manipulating files and directories using 
find and sort, an investigator, for example, can search a directory for inactive files (by date) and 
pipe the results into a report file. The find command also produce a comprehensive list of files 
with the SUID/SGID permission set. Using Unix scripting capabilities (similar to DOS batch 
files), an investigator may create combinations of commands into specialized programs to 
conduct security audits and to do file checking as a part of an inquiry. The grep command 
searches files or directories that contain a particular character string. This capability provides for 
granular searching. Unix also has the capability to list processes actively running on the machine 
by executing the command ps -ef. Processes may be deleted using the kill command. The top, 
head, and tail commands allow examination of portions of logs or process lists.  
 
The Unix system also has a comprehensive set of system configuration files that can prove to be 
an invaluable source of information to an investigator. The /etc/syslog.conf file sets the facility 
and priority level of individual logs. Some Unix services are specifically initiated or terminated 
based upon the configuration of scripts located in the /etc/rc directories. The investigator can get 
an idea of what services are launched by understanding the Unix scripting and services. Other 
services are initiated when needed by a daemon that listens for requests. For example, the 
Internet Daemon is controlled by /etc/inetd.conf and this file provides the name of the service, 
the type of delivery, protocol, wait status, UID, server and any arguments. The /etc/passwd file 
identifies the properties of the user accounts while password hashes are commonly protected in 
the /etc/shadow files. Since UID 0 should be reserved for root only, any other shared UID 0 
would ring a bell, so is a ‘nobody’ daemon account that references a user shell. Scheduled jobs 
planted by intruders can be found in /etc/cron.d. The syslog.conf  configuration file can be used 
to identify logs with unique names and locations.  
 
Last but no least, the Unix system has a set of standard logs, which include 
a. wtmp/wtmpx  keeps track of login and logouts. Grows in length and is extended to 
wtmpx . This file can be referred to by the last command. 
b. utmp/utmpx keeps track of users currently logged into the system. This file can be 
referred using the commands w, finger and who. 
c. lastlog keeps track of each users most recent login time and records their initiating IP 
Address and terminal. 
d. sulog records the usage of the su switch user command. 
e. httpd tracks originating IP address of WWW connections. 
f. History files keeps a record of recent commands used by the user in the $HOME 
directory.  
g. FTP Logs.xfr maintains extensive logs to track incoming connections and the 
originating IP address of the connection.  
 15 
h. maillog provides status of mail handling.  
i. aculog records the username, time, date and phone number of dial out facilities.  
j. acct/pacct maintains a list of user’s commands and their process time they used.  




You are the System Administrator of a Unix network server. It was reported to you that there are 
still system activities originating from the user account CISR in the past 1 week, although the 
particular employee with the above account UID has already left the organization for good. 
Using the rudimentary Unix commands, system configuration files and standard system logs, 




1. You will need to log in the Unix system as a System Administrator with root access 
privileges in order to access the system configuration files and system logs. 
 
2. It will be helpful to pipe and redirect the system configuration files and standard 
system logs to temporary files before using commands such as grep, find and sort to 
search or manipulate the files and directories for records with keyword CISR.  
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Analyzer is a fully configurable network analysis program for Win32 environment. It captures 
packets from network and displays them through a graphical interface. The user can choose the 
network adapter used for the capturing and monitoring process, specify an appropriate filter, 
select, copy and paste packets. This product is developed by the Politecnico di Torino and its 
contributors. It is released under a BSD-style license and partially sponsored by Microsoft 
Research. Analyzer can display the capture files created by WinDump and tcpdump if the capture 




You will be issued a set of ACP files with the network traffic captured by WinDump, tcpdump or 
WinPcap (www.netgroup.polito.it). You are to download and use Analyzer to examine the 
network traffic. Investigate the websites visited by the user and analyze any suspicious network 




1. You should be able to obtain the necessary information and downloads from 
www.netgroup.polito.it to install the forensic software on your forensic PC. The Help 
menu provides a more detailed documentation of the Analyzer. 
 
2. You will need to first unzip the downloaded file before installation.  
 
3. You will be issued a set of ACP files with the network traffic captured on a floppy 
disk. Open the files in Analyzer to perform your analysis. 
 
4. Explore the various functionalities of Analyzer. It allows you to describe the protocol 
format, customize the display of the packets, evaluates statistics, plots graphs, set 
query on the analysis engine and set filter at the MAC, Network, Transport or 
Application Layer.  
 
5. Although not required in this exercise, Analyzer is also capable of capturing packets 
from the network for real time monitoring and creating capture files. It uses the 
WinPcap library to capture packets and set monitoring filters on the network traffic 
monitor. 
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